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Modelling the European Sugar Sector 
– Incentives to Supply Sugar Beets and Analysis of Reform Options – 
 
Marcel Adenäuer 
 
The Common Market Organisation for sugar of the European Union has withstood major 
reform of any kind over the last three decades while other agricultural markets have been 
subject to far reaching reforms. Today, this ‘invulnerability’ is over. Reform pressure occurs 
from many sides. The sugar using industry objects to having to pay prices that lie three times 
above world market levels for European sugar, and recent global developments have made a 
reform of the European sugar market inevitable. (1) The Everything but Arms concession 
granting the Least Developed Countries a quota and duty-free access for all goods but arms 
into the EU including sugar as of 2009 makes a high-level of sugar imports from these 
countries likely. (2) Brazil, Australia and Thailand filed complaints against the European 
Union, arguing that C-sugar exports and re-exports of imported sugar have to be considered 
subsidised exports so that the current quantity limit of 1.3 million tons of subsidised exports is 
overshot by about 3 million tons. Since the EU lost the following WTO panel, sugar exports 
are to be reduced considerably in future. Consequently, European sugar production must also 
be significantly reduced. 
This study analyses the impacts that a reform of the European sugar sector may have on 
European farmers. Since such an analysis is only possible if the observed supply behaviour in 
the past can be explained, this aspect is analysed first. Particular emphasis is given to the 
question, why European farmers supply sugar quantities considerably beyond their quota 
endowments for which only world market prices are paid. A number of behavioural 
hypotheses are introduced and evaluated using data from national statistics, farm data and 
own estimates of marginal production costs and of single farm quotas. The results from this 
analysis are then used to modify the agricultural sector model CAPRI with which possible 
reform options are evaluated. These adjustments help to analyse the supply response of 
European farmers to changes in the political environment of the sugar sector compared to 
other model approaches. 
 
Keywords: reform CMO Sugar, CAP, C-sugar, agricultural modelling, CAPRI,  
Everything but Arms, WTO panel, sugar beet supply response 
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Kurzfassung 
Modellierung des europäischen Zuckersektors: 
- Anreize für die Produktion von Zuckerrüben und Analyse von Reformoptionen – 
Die Gemeinsame Marktordnung für Zucker (ZMO) ist seit 1968 Bestandteil der 
Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) und enthält fast alle bekannten Marktregulierungs-
instrumente: Produktionsquoten, Garantiepreise, Intervention, Exportsubventionen (teilweise 
finanziert über Produktionsabgaben), Importzölle, die praktisch prohibitiv wirken, sowie 
Präferenzabkommen mit einigen Staaten über den zollfreien oder zollermäßigten Import von 
Zucker. Obwohl andere Sektoren der Landwirtschaft in den letzten Jahren weit reichend 
reformiert worden sind, ist die ZMO bis heute unberührt geblieben. Diese „Unantastbarkeit“ 
scheint nun ein Ende gefunden zu haben, denn eine Reihe globaler Entwicklungen bedrohen 
diese Marktordnung in ihrer Funktionalität:  
 Das „Everything but Arms“-Abkommen (EBA) erlaubt seit 2001 49 Entwicklungsländern 
den zoll- und quotenfreien Export aller Produkte außer Waffen in die EU. Von dieser 
Regelung sind bisher nur Zucker und frische Bananen ausgenommen worden. Diese 
werden aber nach einer Übergangsregelung im Jahre 2009 vollständig miteinbezogen, so 
dass zusätzliche Zuckerimporte aus den begünstigten Ländern sehr wahrscheinlich sind 
und Teile der heimischen Zuckererzeugung verdrängen werden. 
 Im April 2005 hat das WTO-Berufungsgremium („Panel“) anlässlich einer Beschwerde, 
die von Australien, Brasilien und Thailand gemeinsam gegen bestimmte Aspekte der EU-
Zuckerregelung erhoben wurde, entschieden, dass die EU deutlich mehr subventionierten 
Zucker exportiert, als es gemäß WTO-Abkommen erlaubt ist.  
 Ein wesentliches Instrument der letzten GAP-Reform von 2003 ist die Umstellung von 
aktivitätsbezogenen Ausgleichzahlungen auf ein System von entkoppelten Prämien. Diese 
Regelung hat generell zur Folge, dass Anbauaktivitäten, für die bisher keine 
Ausgleichzahlungen gewährt worden sind, gegenüber den zuvor auch schon 
prämienberechtigten Anbauaktivitäten, an Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gewinnen. Da der 
Zuckerrübenanbau zur ersten Gruppe gehört, ist es wahrscheinlich, dass dieser zukünftig 
ausgedehnt wird, was erhöhte Exporte von C-Zucker zur Folge hätte. 
Aus diesen Gründen kann eine Reform der ZMO nicht verhindert werden und die Analyse der 
Auswirkungen möglicher Reformszenarien auf die europäische Landwirtschaft, wie sie die 
vorliegende Arbeit leistet, gewinnt zurzeit stark an Bedeutung. Da eine solche Analyse nur in 
Kenntnis der Produktionsanreize für den Zuckerrübenanbau möglich ist, werden diese 
zunächst analysiert. Die C-Rübenproduktion erhält in diesem Zusammenhang eine zentrale 
Bedeutung, denn in Europa werden jährlich über drei Millionen Tonnen C-Zucker produziert, 
obwohl einige Analysen zeigen, dass die Erlöse aus der C-Rübenproduktion die von ihr 
verursachten Kosten nicht decken können. Daher können die beobachteten 
Zuckerrübenproduktionsmengen nicht mit der Gewinnmaximierungshypothese erklärt 
werden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden alternative Verhaltenshypothesen aufgestellt und 
anhand von INLB-Daten überprüft. Die daraus gewonnenen Erkenntnisse werden im 
Anschluss dafür verwendet, das Agrarsektormodell CAPRI so zu modifizieren, dass eine 
Politikwirkungsanalyse von Reformoptionen der ZMO möglich wird. Die detaillierte 
Abbildung des Zuckerrübensektors im CAPRI-Modell und die Analyse möglicher 
Bestimmungsgründe für den Zuckerrübenanbau bilden einen beträchtlichen 
Forschungsbeitrag zu den zurzeit vorhandenen Ansätzen zur Analyse des Zuckerrübenanbaus. 
Schlüsselworte: ZMO-Reform, GAP, C-Zucker, Agrarsektor-Modellierung, CAPRI,  
Everything but Arms, WTO-panel, Zuckerrüben-Angebotsreaktion 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The Common Market Organisation for sugar (CMO Sugar) is part of the European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It protects European sugar production almost perfectly 
against any sugar exporter in the world. Only a few bilateral agreements with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as well as with India and Brazil allowed for sugar 
imports into the European Union in the past. European sugar supply is regulated by a quota 
system with high guaranteed prices. Only sugar produced within these quotas can be sold on 
domestic markets, while sugar produced beyond them, so-called C-sugar, has to be sold on 
world markets at prevailing prices. Export subsidies allow for exports of quota sugar and re-
exports of preferential imports. All these regulations turn the European sugar sector into one 
of the most heavily protected sectors of the CAP and in the world.  
Most other sectors included in the CAP were subject to far reaching reforms in the last 
decades. The reform in 1992, known as the McSharry reform, was a milestone in this respect 
because it introduced direct farm payments, coupled to activity levels of production, and 
phased out the former predominant system of high guaranteed producer prices that had led to 
tremendous surpluses on European markets for agricultural products. This in turn induced 
high expenditures of the European fund for agricultural guarantee and orientation (FEOGA). 
In 1999 the so-called Agenda 2000 reform continued this reform process, by further 
decreasing support of the agricultural sector. The most recent reform took place in 2003 and 
was a result of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Agenda 2000. Former subsidies that were 
coupled to activity levels were now transformed into decoupled payments.  
Up to now, the CMO Sugar, however, has not been at all affected by these reforms for the 
following reasons: The main driving forces behind the CAP reforms were (1) to reduce 
expenditures of the European budget on agriculture and (2) to reflect the guidelines of the 
various WTO rounds. As the CMO Sugar did not cause high FEOGA expenditures1 or 
conflict with WTO agreements, these two issues have so far not had an impact on the 
CMO Sugar. 
                                                 
1 Only subsidised re-export of preferential sugar imports are currently financed by the FEOGA budget. 
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In fact, the costs for the CMO Sugar are borne by sugar producers who finance subsidised 
exports, sugar consumers who have to pay a price for sugar three times higher than on world 
market and finally, sugar exporting countries who suffer from lower market access. In the 
past, the lobby of sugar consumers was not as powerful as that of sugar producers, so that 
pressure from the consumer side had hardly any effect.  
Pressure from the WTO did not rise in the past until Brazil, Australia and Thailand filed 
complaints against the European Union, arguing that C-sugar2 exports as well as re-exports of 
imported sugar under preferential agreements have to be counted as subsidised exports and 
that the quantity limit of 1.3 million tons of subsidised exports is overshot by about 3 million 
tons. The WTO ruled this panel against the EU in May 2005 which threatens the basic 
principles of CMO Sugar. The lost WTO panel, however, is a very recent development while 
the European Commission has been considering a reform of the CMO Sugar for several years. 
The need to reform the CMO Sugar originated in the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) agreement 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 416/2001 of 28 February 2001), which grants duty-free access 
to imports of all products, except arms and munitions, from least developed countries (LDCs) 
without any quantitative restrictions.3 Sugar imports from the beneficiary countries into the 
European Union are therefore likely and threaten the functionality of the CMO Sugar. 
Any proposal to reform agricultural policy triggers a demand for an economic impact 
analysis. HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) compiled a ‘Study to assess the impact of future 
options for the future reform of the sugar common market organisation’ which was 
commissioned by the Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG Agri) of the EU Commission. 
It provides quantitative analyses on the impacts of several options for the future reform of the 
CMO Sugar. The results of these analyses were meant to strengthen the analytical basis for 
the preparation of the EU Commission proposal for the further reform of CMO Sugar. The 
author of this dissertation is co-author of that study which served as a first motivation to 
analyse the CMO Sugar. The study relies on impact analyses carried out with economic 
models that are able to analyse agricultural markets. Generally the parameters that control 
these models are derived from observed behaviour in the past. In the sugar or sugar beet 
sector, this derivation is not straightforward since there was hardly any change in the 
incentives that may influence the production quantities. Neither sugar quotas nor the prices 
for quota sugar show any variance in the past that would allow for econometric analysis. The 
                                                 
2 The surplus of sugar over production quotas is called C-sugar. 
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specification of these models with respect to a plausible supply response was therefore a 
major issue of the quoted study as well for this dissertation. 
Recent literature addresses the CMO Sugar and impacts of its reform. The author of this 
dissertation has contributed to the discussion of these issues in the above-mentioned study and 
other papers (ADENÄUEr et al. 2004; ADENÄUER, HECKELEI 2005; ADENÄUER 2005). Some 
parts of this dissertation are summarised in these papers. Other more recent studies on the 
topic of C-sugar (WITZKE, KUHN 2004; MENSBRUGGE et al. 2003; FRANDSEN et al. 2003; 
CERNAT et al. 2003) are available as well. The results show large differences in the results – 
mainly with respect to the supply response of European sugar production to changes in sugar 
quotas or prices. These discrepancies can partly be explained by differences in model 
approaches or analysed scenarios, but they also result from different assumptions on the 
supply behaviour of European farmers. 
In view of this background information, the following research questions are analysed in 
this study: 
 What are the determinants influencing European farmers in their decision to 
cultivate sugar beets? 
 Why is there so much C-sugar in Europe although production costs are said to be 
higher than world market prices for sugar? 
 What are the marginal production costs in the sugar beet supplying regions of the 
EU? 
 How can the findings of the previous research questions be implemented in an 
agricultural sector model? 
 What are the likely effects of proposed reform options on the CMO Sugar? 
1.2 Methodological Approach and Technical Implementation 
Regarding the research questions, this study is divided into two major parts: the analysis 
of incentives to supply sugar beets in Europe, and the empirical analysis of selected reform 
options of the CMO Sugar. In order to analyse the first issue, we need to define several 
behavioural hypotheses that go beyond the classic profit maximisation assumption. These 
hypotheses are, whenever possible, assessed with respect to observed data (at farm and 
national level) and their contribution potential to the explanation of observed supply 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 This agreement has been in place since 2001, but a transition period ending in 2009 was negotiated for sugar. 
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behaviour. In the second part, we use the results of the previous analysis to modify the 
agricultural sector model CAPRI4 (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis) 
such that a comprehensive modelling of the European sugar market is achieved. With this 
version of CAPRI, we analyse selected reform options of the CMO Sugar. The technical 
solution of CAPRI is based in the programming language GAMS5 (General Algebraic 
Modeling System). Most other calculations or estimations used in this study are carried out 
with GAMS as well. For the presentation of results, we make use of a graphic utility called 
GNUPLOT and Microsoft Excel as well.  
1.3 Structure of the Study 
First, an introduction to the European sugar market and the CMO Sugar is given in the 
next section in order to provide the reader with basic principles and figures that are essential 
to understand the rest of the study. We further analyse sugar beet production in the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) in order to better understand the distribution of key 
indicators among farms within the EU. 
In section 3, we provide a framework that allows the estimation of single farm quotas. 
This data is missing in the FADN sample. Next, we apply a method to define marginal costs 
of sugar beet production at farm level which was developed by VIERLING (1996) and also 
applied by HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) in a slightly modified way and show finally, that the 
observed sugar supply in Europe is unlikely to be the result of profit maximising farmers. 
The examination of the FADN sample is followed by an analysis of incentives to supply 
sugar beets in Europe in section 1. In particular, we examine why there were huge amounts of 
C-sugar in a number of European countries in the past, although farm management specialists 
agree that sugar in those countries can hardly be produced at world market prices. The 
findings of this section are then used to modify the agricultural sector model CAPRI such that 
an analysis of reform options of the CMO Sugar results in a plausible supply response. In the 
same section, a small sensitivity analysis of the CAPRI model with respect to model 
parameters is given. Section 5 provides an analysis of selected reform options of European 
                                                 
4 Further information can be found on the web page: www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/capri_e.htm. 
5 Details on: www.gams.com. 
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sugar markets and a comparison of its results to other studies. The final section provides a 
summary of the whole analysis, shows the limitations of the study, and identifies fields for 
further research.  
2. Specialities of the Sugar Sector  
2.1 EU Commission’s Introduction to Sugar 
‘Sugar is not a staple food, yet it has seized the imagination of politicians and people 
around the world. It caused a sensation when European explorers first brought it home from 
their overseas adventures during the early modern era. It then counted heavily in many 
governments’ foreign policies during the age of empire – until Europeans went to great 
lengths to start producing it at home at the end of the nineteenth century, initially in northern 
France. Sugar beet growing was introduced in order to break dependence on sugar cane from 
the colonies, the sole source of sugar at the time, which made it a rare and precious 
commodity. The crop gradually spread throughout Europe. From the 1920s on, with the 
development of maritime transport, sugar beet production faced competition from cane sugar 
and has survived largely as the result of tariff protection. 
Sugar (the proper term is sucrose, which breaks down into two components - glucose and 
fructose), is the most plentiful and economic sweetener. Sucrose can be found in many natural 
foods (e.g. fruits and vegetables) but can only be extracted economically from sugar beet and 
sugar cane. Sucrose is an important source of energy.  
Sugar is often thought of as a single product – a granulated foodstuff to sweeten tea and 
coffee. Of course, most people realise that sugar is present in many other foods, in many 
different forms. But many overlook just how diverse the uses of sugar can be. Furthermore, 
there are other sweeteners in everyday use in our lives, and not just in foods. […]’ 
The European Commission provides this introduction to sugar on their web site6 and 
makes the following points: (1) The European sugar production competes with cane sugar 
from oversees. The production process of cane sugar is clearly cheaper than that of sugar 
beets and this is not only due to lower wages and social standards in cane sugar producing 
countries. Therefore, European sugar production survived largely as a result of tariff 
protection. (2) Sugar is chemically identical regardless of whether it is processed from beet or 
                                                 
6 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/capreform/sugar/infopack_en.pdf: The European Sugar Sector – Its 
importance and its future. 
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cane. Cane- and beet sugar are therefore fully substitutable. (3) The direct consumption of 
sugar plays only a minor role in the pattern of uses. The biggest part of sugar consumption 
takes place in terms of other foods.  
Those three points are some major characteristics of sugar supply and consumption in 
Europe. Especially the fact that European sugar production mainly survived through 
protection against cheaper sugar imports from other countries should be kept in mind when 
we give an overview on some global players on the world sugar market in the next section. 
After that, we summarise the main instruments of the CMO Sugar in the section 2.3. Next, 
some sugar statistics are presented to show the characteristics of European sugar supply. We 
make use of national, regional and even farm statistics in order to shed light on the 
importance of sugar beet production in Europe. 
2.2 Global Payers on International Sugar Markets 
The European Union has developed from a net sugar importer to the second largest sugar 
exporter on the world market. Figure 2.1 shows the sugar exports of the ten biggest exporters 
and the imports of the ten largest importers. More than 80 % of the world sugar exports are 
carried out by only ten of the most important sugar exporting countries (Brazil, EU, Australia, 
Thailand, Cuba, South Africa, etc.), whereas demand derives from many small importing 
countries. Brazil is by far the largest sugar exporter. As low cost producers, they benefit from 
favourable natural conditions that allow for a long processing campaign of up to nine months. 
Temperature, rainfall and land relief allows cane mechanisation and irrigation, if necessary. 
Favourable economic conditions such as low factor costs (especially wages), low social and 
environmental standards, subsidies for ethanol production facilities and ethanol use are 
responsible for the international competitiveness of the Brazilian sugar industry.  
Australia, the third biggest sugar exporter, achieves its competitiveness through the 
extremely high productivity of farmers and processing industry. In contrast, the sugar industry 
in Thailand is characterised by a rather low labour and land productivity with very low factor 
prices and social and environmental standards. In this group of sugar exporters, South Africa 
is faced with the worst natural conditions (low temperature, distribution of rainfall, land 
relief) which often do not allow cane mechanisation and irrigation. But the low wage level as 
well as an extremely long processing campaign helps to reduce the natural disadvantages and 
to maintain competitiveness to a certain extent. 
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Figure 2.1: World sugar trade (raw sugar equivalent), average values 1997-2000 
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Source FAOSTAT 
The Russian Federation is one of the greatest sugar importers of the world. Here, the high 
domestic demand of sugar cannot be satisfied with domestic production due to production and 
processing technologies. In the United States, there are only small areas with natural and 
economically favourable conditions for sugar production. Whereas beet sugar production in 
California has to fight with droughts and highly competitive alternative crops, sugar cane 
production in Louisiana suffers from land drainage demand and low temperatures. Despite 
very low factor prices and environmental and social standards, the Indian sugar industry is 
characterised by structural and productivity deficits. Additionally, the sugar industry suffers 
from extended political regulations restricting structural improvements and increasing 
production costs through rather high minimum prices for cane as well as maximum prices for 
a certain sugar volume (compare HENRICHSMEYER et al. 2003).  
While the examination of total imports and total exports provides an overview of the 
importance of a few global players on the world market, it does not reveal much about the 
importance of imports and exports for individual countries. A small country that satisfies its 
domestic sugar demand completely with imports is probably more affected by changes in the 
world market price of sugar than a big country that imports a large amount of sugar in 
absolute terms but where imports only make up a small part of the total domestic demand. 
The group of Least Developed Countries plays only a minor role on world sugar markets 
in terms of imports and exports. Sugar production amounted to about four million tons, 
exports to about million tons and imports to circa two and a half million tons of raw sugar 
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equivalent in 1997/1999 (FAOSTAT). The situation is similar for the ACP group of states. 
Their production amounts to about four million tons, the exports sum up to about two million 
tons and they import circa 500 thousand tons. Nonetheless, these two country groups play a 
major role in the European CMO Sugar today and will do so in future. As mentioned before, 
the ACP countries benefit today from preferential access to the European sugar market and 
the LDCs will obtain quota and duty-free access to the European markets for almost all 
products including sugar in course of the EBA agreement. This increases the pressure on the 
CMO Sugar as the equilibrium described in Figure 2.3 will be disturbed. A thorough analysis 
of the EBA agreement is a major part of the analysis of reform options in chapter 5, so we 
will come back to this point later on.  
The only country that is found on both sides of Figure 2.1 is the EU which is a result of 
the distorting effects of the CMO Sugar. Under free trade conditions, it would not be possible 
to be a major sugar exporter and a major sugar importer at the same time. To understand those 
distorting effects, we provide an overview on the CMO Sugar in the next section. 
2.3 The EU Common Market Organisation (CMO) for Sugar 
The CMO Sugar is a part of the Common Agricultural Policy that was established by the 
treaty of Rome in 1957. The Sugar sector was added in 1967 and since then, the policy 
instruments have remained almost unchanged. The elements of the CMO Sugar are well 
documented in other places (LINDE et al. 2000, BLUME et al. 2002) and the legal text can be 
found in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (CEC) (2004a). Therefore, we will 
only examine the main instruments in order to provide the reader an overview of the 
CMO Sugar. 
Each year by the first of August, an intervention price for white sugar is fixed by the EU 
Council of Ministers of Agriculture., This is a minimum price at which the EU is obliged to 
buy quota sugar, if the EU sugar market price falls below this level. In fact, intervention was 
only rarely necessary , since EU market prices stayed well above 105% of the intervention 
price in the past7 (LINDE et al. 2000, p 9). Since 1993, the intervention price has stayed 
constant at 631.9 €/t white sugar. Since intervention only seems to be a theoretical instrument 
                                                 
7 BLUME et al. (2002) explain the fact of the high market prices in the different Member States as well as price 
differences between them with imperfect competition and tacit collusion. The most important aspect of tacit 
collusion is that firms can succeed in charging a price that far exceeds marginal cost, as long as the other 
firms do the same. 
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of the CMO Sugar, the main use of the intervention price is to derive a minimum, base price 
for sugar beets. This is done in the following way: 
 
 [ Intervention price    631.9  €/t white sugar 
 -  Processing costs    243.6  €/t white sugar 
 + Value of by-products      22.5  €/t white sugar 
 - Transport costs of beets     44.1 €/t white sugar] 
 * 13% sugar per ton of beets 
 = basic sugar beet price     47.67  €/t sugar beets 
 
This basic sugar beet price is used to derive a minimum beet price which sugar processors 
must pay to the farmer for sugar beets produced within the production quotas. The calculation 
of minimum beet prices is explained below but first, the quota-levy mechanism needs to be 
explained. 
The quota-system in the sugar sector distinguishes between A- and B-quotas. The farmer 
is also allowed to produce above these quotas but does not receive any price support in this 
case (so-called C-sugar). It is often said that the CMO Sugar is budget-neutral and self-
financing. This is due to the levy mechanism. In other words, the sugar processing firms must 
finance the exports of quota sugar as shown in Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: The quota-levy mechanism 
Intervention price for sugar
World market price for sugar
Levy
C-sugar
Sugar quantitiesA-quota ~ domestic demand B-quota
Export
costs
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The A-quotas allocated to each EU Member State were originally intended to meet the 
domestic demand in each country. Since human consumption has risen since the days the 
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CMO Sugar was established, about a third of B-sugar is sold on the EU market today. 
Therefore, the part of the domestic sugar production that has to be exported with subsidies is 
about 2/3 of the B-quota. The necessary funds are provided by collecting a basic levy of 2 % 
of the intervention price for both A- and B-quotas and a variable levy on B-quota sugar with a 
maximum of 37.5% of the intervention price from the processing firms. The sum of both 
levies must equal the export costs of quota exports. Those are calculated as the difference 
between the real domestic demand and the total quota production multiplied by the 
differences between the intervention price and the world market price for sugar. If the levies 
are not sufficient to cover the export costs, additional levies are collected on both types of 
quota sugar. In Figure 2.2 we assume for the sake of simplicity that the A-quota corresponds 
to the domestic demand and it shows how total levies are calculated.  
The total levies calculated at EU level are distributed among Member States according to 
their quota sugar production. Those are then collected by national paying agencies from the 
sugar processors. But sugar processors only bear 42% of those levies. The rest is passed on 
the sugar beet farmers by reducing the prices for A- and B-beets. The following example shall 
illustrate this mechanism. 
 
 Total quota sugar production      14.1  Mt 
 Domestic consumption     12.7 Mt 
 Difference       1.4 Mt 
 EU sugar price      720 €/t 
 Sugar world market price     215 €/t 
 Difference       505 €/t 
 Total export costs = 505€/t*1.4 Mt  =  total levies  707  M€ 
 Total A-levy  = 2% * intervention price * total A-sugar 
  = 2% * 631.9 €/t * 11.7 Mt =    147 M€ 
 Total B-levy8  = 707 M€ - 147 M€ =    560 M€ 
 
Both levies are now expressed in €/t of produced quota beets and multiplied by 58% to 
obtain the part of the levies that is taken by the farmer 
 
 A levy = 147 M € / 90 Mt sugar beets * 58%  = 0.95  €/t of sugar beets 
 B levy = 560 M € / 18.5 Mt sugar beets * 58% = 17.6  €/t of sugar beets 
 Minimum price A-beets = basic beet price – A-levy  = 46.62 €/t of beets 
 Minimum price B-beets = basic beet price – B-levy  = 30.07 €/t of beets 
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For several reasons, the effective prices paid to a farmer can differ considerably from the 
minimum beet prices. First of all, the effective price generally depends on the real sugar 
content of the delivered beets and not on an average as was used in the calculation of the basic 
beet price. Since the calculation of this price has not changed since the early days of the 
CMO Sugar, it is likely that the effective beet prices are higher today because sugar yields per 
ton of sugar beets have increased due to technical progress, on the one hand, and to losses 
during processing having been reduced, on the other hand. Additionally, effective beet prices 
are calculated on the market price for sugar which is well above the intervention price, 
leading to higher prices as well.  
Some EU Member States do not distinguish between A- and B-quotas and pay a mixed 
price for both to the farmers. A survey carried out in HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) have 
shown that only Germany, France, Austria, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
apply the classical two-quota system, while the others use a pooled price system. Since 
1995/96 in some countries the CMO has fixed premiums on top of the intervention price in 
order to compensate for comparative disadvantages of sugar production in those countries. 
These regions are Ireland, Finland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain 
(LINDE et al. 2000) – a further reason for higher beet prices. Price mark ups can also be 
received for a higher qualities, early delivery, etc. Transportation of sugar beet to the factory 
is further to be financed by the processing firms. Hence, farmers often take over this job and 
get compensated. Sugar processing firms and farmers sign contracts known as inter-trade 
agreements, in which beet delivery rights, purchase prices, delivery periods, transportation 
compensation and quality are laid out. Sugar quotas and beet delivery rights are not tradable, 
neither between farmers, nor between processing firms or EU Member States, which leaves 
space for efficiency gains as they are well known from micro theory.  
Sugar beet producers have the further possibility of making C-sugar become a part of the 
next year’s sugar quota. This so-called carry forward mechanism can help to smooth out the 
effects of good and bad harvests, but it has become less attractive since the storage costs have 
not been financed by the EU budget since 2000/2001. Carry forward possibilities are limited 
to 20% of the A- quota and were not fully used in the past years. 
The EU sugar market is protected from the world market by a system of prohibitive import 
duties and export refunds. Imports can enter the EU only by preferential agreements because 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 If the total B-levies exceed 37% of the intervention price multiplied by the B-sugar production, an additional 
levy is charged on both A- and B-sugar.  
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tariffs are so high that it is financially unattractive to export to the EU in spite of the fact that 
tariffs were reduced according to the agreements negotiated in the Uruguay round. The 
unattractiveness is even enhanced by a special safeguard clause that allows for additional 
duties if either the import quantities exceed or the price of the imported products falls below 
certain trigger thresholds. As a consequence, hardly any non-preferential sugar was imported 
in the past.  
The EC was a net importer of sugar when the CMO was established. But it soon became a 
net exporter although this may seem surprising given that quotas didn’t change. But the 
possibility to produce C-sugar and the fact that some B-quotas were not fully used in the first 
years of the CMO allowed for an extension of European sugar production. Today, the EU is 
the second largest exporter of sugar after Brazil and supplies about five million tons of raw 
sugar equivalent on the world market yearly. Those exports consist of three types of sugar: (1) 
Quota sugar exports that are subsidised by the levy mechanism. The total quantity depends on 
quotas and domestic demand. (2) Re-exports of preferential imports which are also eligible 
for subsidised exports but financed by the FEOGA budget and (3) C-sugar exports sold at 
world market prices without export refunds. C-sugar is not allowed to be exported with 
subsidies, because subsidised exports are limited by WTO commitments (about 1.4 Mt). Re-
exports (additional 1.6 Mt) and C-sugar were not counted within that limit in the past. 
Figure 2.3 summarises the possible sugar supply and demand sources on the European sugar 
market.9  
Figure 2.3: Origins and destinations of EU sugar 
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9 We find the three different sugar types produced on the domestic market and preferential sugar imports on the 
supply side, while the demand consists of domestic demand, subsidised and non subsidised exports. 
Subsidised exports are limited by WTO commitments and partly financed by producer levies and the 
FEOGA budget. 
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2.4 Key Indicators of the European Sugar Market 
This section will focus on key indicators of sugar supply demand and trade in the EU. In 
particular, attention will be given to the last decade (1990-1999). 
Sugar quotas allocated to each EU Member State did not change during this time period. 
Consequently, it is likely that European sugar supply did not change much either apart from 
yield fluctuations. The only obvious kink in supply and sugar beet area is found in 1995 when 
Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the Community, as can be observed in Figure 2.4. Even 
the McSharry reform in 1992 did not seem to have influenced the sugar sector on the 
production side. 
Figure 2.4: European sugar production, sugar beet area and sugar yield 1990-1999 
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     Source: CAPRI data base 
The average European sugar yield is clearly increasing due to technical progress. 
Reversely, the quota restriction leads to slightly decreasing sugar beet areas. All in all, it 
becomes apparent that the quota system prevents huge fluctuations in sugar supply and sugar 
beet allocation since farmers can almost perfectly plan their revenues from producing sugar 
beets – at least within the quota – because prices and delivery quantities are fixed in the inter-
trade agreements mentioned in the previous section. However, farmers do not know what 
their revenues from producing C-sugar will be, as they depend on the “free” world market 
price for sugar. The farmers’ incentives for producing C-sugar are one of the major questions 
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analysed in section 4. The average sugar production over the last decade and the quota 
endowment of each individual EU Member State are given in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5: Sugar quotas and average production (1990-1999) per EU Member State 
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     Source: CAPRI data base 
Three countries produce less sugar than their quotas allow. In Italy, sugar supply amounts 
to only 99.6% and in Greece to 88% of total quotas. In Portugal, the average production is 
only a very small fraction of total quotas. Portuguese statistics – especially for sugar – are 
very unreliable. We therefore eliminated Portugal from further analysis. By this, we do not 
lose significant information with respect to the European sugar sector since Portugal’s sugar 
production amounts to less than 1% of total European sugar supply. The most important sugar 
producing countries (according to their share in total EU sugar supply) are France10 and 
Germany who together account for about 50% of European sugar production. The importance 
of C-sugar in the European Union is apparent from the difference between sugar production 
and sugar quotas. France, the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Denmark produce on average more than 115% of their sugar quotas.  
The importance of sugar beet production at regional level is apparent from Figure 2.6. The 
graphic on the left hand side shows the importance of a NUTS 2 region11 for the European 
                                                 
10 French Overseas territories are not included. 
11 NUTS is the common classification of territorial units for statistical purposes of the European Union. More 
information is given on the website http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/g24218.htm. 
Specialities of the Sugar Sector 
Key Indicators of the European Sugar Market 
 
 
15 
sugar supply. The darker a region is shaded, the larger the area allocated to sugar beets. We 
see that the Picardie in France is the biggest sugar beet supplier (162 000 ha). Graphic I is on 
the one hand a good indicator of the importance of a region for the European sugar supply, on 
the other hand, it makes no predication about the importance of sugar beets within a region 
since the total beet area depends on its geographical size. Therefore, graphic II presents the 
share of sugar beet acreage in percentage of total crop area, ranging from below 1% to 28%. 
The region Koeln in Germany has the largest share of sugar beet acreage. The average share 
in the EU is only about 5%.  
Figure 2.6: Regional share of sugar beet acreage (I) and share of sugar beet acreage in 
total crop area (II) – three-year average 1997 - 1999 (in %)12 
     I      II 
 
Source: CAPRI database 
It has already been noted that the EU market price for sugar is well above the intervention 
price. In fact, it is not easy to obtain prices for raw sugar in the EU. It seems that no one has 
an interest in publishing the prices at which industrial users can buy raw sugar from the 
processing firms. Due to this lack of information about EU sugar market prices, the EU 
Commission decided to include a section in the 2004 reform proposal (CEC, 2004b) of the 
sugar sector that introduces a price reporting system. To our knowledge, the only reliable 
                                                 
12 Some results in this study are presented in terms of maps similar as Figure 2.6. For a better orientation we 
present in the appendix starting on page 170 the names of the regions and their NUTS codes. 
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source is CAOBISCO13, in LINDE et al. (2000) and BLUME et al. (2002). We tried to contact 
CAOBISCO in vain so that we can use the figures presented in BLUME et al. (2002) for the 
years 1998 – 2001 only. All prices presented there for the different EU Member States at 
different periods in a year lie clearly above the intervention price. The lowest price (698 €/t) is 
found in Greece (1998) and the highest (847 €/t) in the United Kingdom (2000). The 
differences between world market prices, intervention prices and EU prices for sugar are 
illustrated in Figure 2.7.  
Figure 2.7: Sugar prices 
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Source: CAPRI database, CAOBISCO, LINDE et al. (2000). World market prices are FOB 
 of the Paris Stock market 
France was chosen as an example here since it is the most important sugar supplier in the 
EU and has, in turn, a great influence on the aggregated EU sugar price. Sugar trade in past 
years has been heavily influenced by the CMO Sugar as well. On the import side, it is 
determined by several preferential import agreements with the ACP countries, some Balkan 
states and India. Therefore, it is not surprising that sugar imports have stayed almost constant 
at a magnitude of about two million tons.  
Sugar exports consist of re-exports of preferential imports, subsidised B-sugar exports and 
exports of C-sugar. The first two components do not vary much because they are fixed by the 
CMO, while the latter fluctuates with the yield variation in the EU and due to the decisions of 
sugar beet producers to cultivate C- beets. Consequently, the export curve follows the shape 
of the production curve in Figure 2.4. Given this small overview, the sugar sector is one of the 
most distorted in the EU. It uses almost every imaginable market intervention mechanism. 
                                                 
13 CAOBISCO is the Association of Chocolate, Biscuit and Confectionery industries of the European Union. 
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Consequently, efficiency losses are more than likely as identified by MAHLER (1994), for 
example. 
Figure 2.8:  Sugar imports and exports of the EU-15 (raw sugar equivalent) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Million t Imports
Exports
 
   Source: FAOSTAT 
One major goal of this study is to analyse the supply behaviour of European sugar beet 
farmers. Given that there has been hardly variance in aggregate sugar production, prices or 
quotas over the last decades, we cannot learn from observed supply response. Time series data 
on aggregated level is therefore useless for our purpose. Therefore we use the panel dataset 
from FADN to derive more information on European sugar beet production in the next 
section. 
2.5 Sugar Beet Production in FADN 
The FADN provides data on activity levels, production quantities, and revenues for a huge 
number of agricultural production activities. It further includes information on premiums, 
costs and farm structures. Unfortunately, it does not provide satisfactory information on farm 
sugar quotas or sugar beet delivery rights. Such data is only found for a number of farms in 
the Netherlands and Belgium. Additionally, variable costs are not allocated to single 
production activities. Both are essential variables for the analysis of sugar beet production. 
Sections 3.1 and 3.3 will provide estimation frameworks for both variables. But before we 
deal with missing data in the sample, we would like to give an overview of key indicators of 
sugar beet production in the FADN- database in the years 1990-199914 in order to shed light 
on the importance of sugar beet production for European farmers. 
                                                 
14 FADN data was only available for these 10 years. 
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Our FADN dataset distinguishes 1001 main regions in the EU-15.15 In about half of them 
(546) sugar beets are cultivated. In the observed period of ten years (1990-1999), in each year 
an average of about 56000 farms is included in the sample. Of these, only about 7000 (12%) 
produce sugar beets. This indicates that the sugar sector is only a small one compared to 
agriculture as a whole. Each farm has a certain weighting factor in order to ensure that the 
FADN sample represents sectoral statistics. Although sugar beet production seems to play a 
minor role for total agriculture, at farm level, it is extremely important for the farm income, if 
sugar beets are cultivated. In order to examine this further, it is useful to look at the share of 
sugar beets in the crop rotation and that of their revenues in total and in crop output given in 
Table 2.1. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the share of revenues in total revenues 
because costs are omitted. Unfortunately, farm costs are not allocated to production activities 
in FADN so that a comparison of income from different activities is not possible. Some 
plausibility thoughts on the correlation of profits and revenues will be given later on. For 
now, we can conclude that a share of 25% in total farm output and 33% in total crop output on 
EU average is quite high. In Table 2.1 µ is the average value over farms and years and σ its 
standard deviation. The Italian sample is by far the largest, followed by France and Spain. 
Surprisingly, in Belgium and the Netherlands we find the highest share of sugar beet farms in 
total farms, followed by Germany, which implies that in these countries many agricultural 
budgets are dependant on sugar beet production to a certain extent. In the third column, we 
find means and standard deviations of the share of sugar beets in crop allocation. The means 
vary between 25% in Italy and 11% in Austria while the standard deviation takes its 
maximum and minimum in the same two countries. Although means and standard deviations 
provide an overview on the importance of sugar beet production in crop rotation, the shape of 
the distribution of that indicator among farms within a Member States is unknown. Although 
the United Kingdom and Denmark show similar values for µ and σ, the distributions may look 
completely different. There are some general characteristics of the distribution of the share of 
sugar beets in crop rotation over farms and time. They are truncated at 0 and 1 because either 
a farmer produces no sugar beets at all or – as the maximum – uses the total area for sugar 
beets, which can only be considered a theoretical solution, since the cultivation of beets as a 
                                                 
15 As the sample size of sugar beet farms in Portugal is very low and national statistics are inconsistent as well, 
Portugal was not included in our sample. As Luxembourg does not supply any sugar beets, it has also been 
excluded.  
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monoculture is said to be impossible with respect to rotational restrictions.16 Nonetheless, this 
case also appears in the sample. This could either be a result of data errors or it is possible that 
a farmer who only grows sugar beets might exchange his fields each year with neighbours not 
producing sugar beets. Generally, plant cultivation specialists recommend growing sugar 
beets on one field every third year, at most, because of phytosanitary problems due to 
nematodes and other diseases.  
Table 2.1: Indicators on sugar beet production in FADN 
Total 
number of 
farms*
µ σ µ σ µ σ
EU 56152 12% 7017 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.19
BL 1455 31% 451 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.38 0.17
DK 2107 14% 300 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.32 0.24
DE 5389 24% 1287 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.33 0.18
EL 5305 9% 456 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.17 0.30 0.18
ES 7036 12% 814 0.22 0.18 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.22
FR 7627 11% 851 0.12 0.07 0.20 0.13 0.27 0.14
IR 1209 7% 81 0.12 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.49 0.22
IT 17463 9% 1579 0.25 0.14 0.30 0.20 0.32 0.19
NL 1440 26% 375 0.21 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.30 0.22
AT 2076 18% 365 0.11 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.33 0.13
SE 792 15% 119 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.16 0.42 0.27
FI 968 10% 101 0.24 0.19 0.34 0.28 0.52 0.27
UK 3286 7% 238 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.31 0.15
*   Average number per year in observed period
** Only sugar beet producing farm
Share of sugar 
beets in crop 
rotation**
Share of sugar beet 
revenues in total 
farm output**
Share of sugar beet 
revenues in total crop 
output**
Number of 
sugar beet 
farms*
 
       Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
To visualise the distributions of the rotational shares of sugar beets, we carried out Kernel 
density estimates (LEWIS et al, 1988, see section 8.2) for each of the selected Member States. 
The results are summarised in Figure 2.9. A three-dimensional Figure has been chosen in 
order to concentrate as much information as possible into one Figure and to allow a better 
comparison among Member States. To help the reader understand Figure 2.9, we have 
                                                 
16 Note that we use only farms that produce sugar beets. Therefore, the distribution is not truncated at zero but at 
zero + eps. 
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highlighted in each density function a rotational share of 20%, 40% and 60% with a different 
coloured bar and we have sorted the functions by their highest value so that narrow and high 
functions are plotted on the right side and less high, wide functions are found on the left. 
Additionally, we show in Table 2.2 how many farms cultivate less than 20% (40%) of their 
usable area with sugar beets.17  
Figure 2.9: Kernel density estimates of sugar beet rotation shares in the EU  
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 Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
It is apparent that in Italy and Finland and the Netherlands as well, there are many farms 
with a rotation share of sugar beets greater than 20%. In most EU Member States, only a 
small number of farms produce sugar beets at a greater intensity than 40% but in Finland, 
Greece, Spain and Italy, we find about 10% of farms doing so. While we should treat the 
results for Finland cautiously as there is only a very small number of farms in the sample, it is 
worth noting that the three other regions are the southernmost in our sample. There are 
probably other cropping procedures in central and northern Europe or the economic 
environment is more heterogeneous compared to southern regions.  
                                                 
17 Whenever we present results for FADN observations, we only deal with the 95% quantiles of the selected 
variable in order to minimize the influence of outliers on aggregated results. 
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Table 2.2: Cumulative percentage of farms cultivating less than 20% (40%) of their 
usable crop area with sugar beets. 
share in rotation 
< 20%
share in rotation 
< 40%
AT 96% 100%
IR 88% 99%
FR 87% 100%
DE 75% 99%
UK 73% 99%
BL 69% 98%
DK 68% 98%
SE 65% 100%
EL 60% 92%
ES 60% 87%
FI 53% 85%
NL 53% 97%
IT 43% 86%
 
   Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
We assumed that the probability density functions (pdfs) of sugar beet rotational shares in 
the United Kingdom and Denmark might look different, although their means and variances 
are very similar. Figure 2.9 confirms this assumption because the shape of both functions is 
very different. 
The share of sugar beets in crop rotation gives us an idea of the importance of sugar beets 
in individual farm crop rotations, but it is of less significance regarding the importance of 
sugar beets for the farm income, although there is likely to be a high correlation. Table 2.1 
provides information on the share of revenues from sugar beets in total farm revenues and 
total revenues from crop products. Figure 2.10 and Table 2.3 complete the picture of sugar 
beet revenues compared to total farm revenues. Again we find that the southern European 
regions and Finland have more farms where sugar beet revenues take a higher percentage of 
total revenues.  
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Figure 2.10: Kernel density estimates: Share of sugar beet revenues in total farm 
revenues in the EU 
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 Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
In contrast, there are fewer farms in France, Germany and the UK where the sugar beet 
revenue is higher than 40% of total revenues. The bars in Figure 2.10 are again set at sugar 
beet revenues of 20%, 40% and 60% of total revenues. Obviously many farms at least in the 
left half of Figure 2.10 have higher sugar beet revenues than 20% of their total revenues. If 
we assume that farms where sugar beet production provides a high level of revenue rely 
stronger on the production of sugar beets, this confirms the hypothesis that reductions in sugar 
beet support will have a major impact on the income structure of sugar beet farms in those 
countries. One might further argue that those farms where sugar beet revenues amount to less 
than 20% of total revenues can survive even if they were forced to stop sugar beet production, 
because they can easily switch to other crops, so that the revenue losses would be even lower.  
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Table 2.3: Cumulative percentage of farms where sugar beet revenues are less than 20% 
(40%, 60%) of total farm revenues. 
share in total 
revenues < 20%
share in total 
revenues < 40%
share in total 
revenues < 60%
BL 70% 95% 100%
DK 68% 87% 98%
NL 66% 98% 100%
DE 65% 90% 100%
FR 58% 92% 100%
AT 55% 92% 100%
IR 52% 92% 98%
UK 44% 89% 99%
SE 44% 78% 99%
EL 39% 79% 94%
IT 38% 72% 91%
FI 32% 71% 84%
ES 19% 56% 80%
 
  Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
The last column in Table 2.1, Figure 2.11, and Table 2.4 provides an overview of the 
importance of sugar beets for the cropping sector. While the previous section compared sugar 
beet revenues to total farm revenues, we now compare them now to total crop revenues. Of 
course, means and variances are higher than before, but the EU Member States are affected 
differently.  
In countries where intensive animal production activities play a major role, like in the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland, sugar beet revenues account for a high share of total crop 
revenues, although the share in total revenues when compared to other countries is relatively 
small. In contrast, in Spain and Italy, where animal revenues play a minor role – at least for 
sugar beet producing farms in our sample– sugar beet revenues make up almost the same 
share in crop revenues as in total ones. But all in all it becomes apparent that sugar beet 
production plays a major role with respect to revenues in cropping activities. In Figure 2.11 
the density functions are again marked with bars at revenue shares of 20%, 40% and 60%. 
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Figure 2.11: Kernel density estimates: Share of sugar beet revenues in total crop 
revenues in the EU 
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  Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
Table 2.4: Cumulative percentage of farms where sugar beet revenues are less than 20% 
(40%, 60%) of total crop revenues 
share in total crop 
revenues < 20%
share in total crop 
revenues < 40%
share in total crop 
revenues < 60%
NL 40% 88% 97%
FR 35% 84% 100%
EL 34% 78% 96%
DK 34% 67% 96%
IT 30% 71% 93%
DE 27% 68% 95%
UK 24% 74% 99%
ES 15% 54% 81%
AT 15% 72% 100%
BL 12% 56% 96%
SE 9% 47% 92%
FI 5% 36% 66%
IR 3% 36% 81%
 
  Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
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In each country a minimum of about 12% up to about 60% of all sugar beet producing 
farms have sugar beet revenues that amount to more than 40% of total crop revenues. Only in 
the Netherlands, France, Greece and the United Kingdom do we find that less than 26% of 
farms have revenue shares of above 40%. Considering this, it is not surprising that European 
sugar beet farmers fear a reform of the CMO Sugar because a key part of their revenues and 
consequently their profits would be lost. On the other hand, there are other sugar beet farmers 
who are expected to easily survive adjustments in the CMO Sugar, because sugar beet 
production on their farms does not play a major role. 
The question now is to what extent these results of the revenue comparison can be applied 
to a comparison of profits. Generally, the picture would be the same, if the correlation 
between costs and revenues were the same for each production activity. But generally the 
CMO Sugar allows for higher margins between costs and revenues for the production of sugar 
beets compared to competing crops. Comparisons of the costs of sugar beet production (e.g. 
SCHMIDT, 2003, HENRICHSMEYER et al., 2003a) show that sugar beets produced within the 
B-quota have a gross margin that is comparable to that of soft wheat. Generally it can be 
assumed that A-Sugar beets take the highest share in total beet production of a farm, which in 
turn means that average gross margins of sugar beet production are notably higher than those 
of soft wheat, which is the dominating crop at least in Germany and France. If this situation is 
applicable to other countries and alternative crops – and the CMO Sugar implies this – it can 
be concluded that a comparison of profits among production activities will increase the 
importance of sugar beets compared to the revenue comparison evaluated above.  
2.6 Summary 
We have shown in this section that sugar beet production is of minor importance for 
European agriculture as a whole but many European sugar beet farmers receive a major part 
of their income from producing beets. Consequently, they would suffer from a reduction in 
support to the sugar sector. The magnitude of this support is apparent from the overview on 
the CMO Sugar. European sugar prices are three times above world market levels, guaranteed 
through tariff protection against cheaper imports. We identify Germany and France as the 
major sugar producers in Europe and show the importance of C-Sugar production in many EU 
countries. To identify the importance of sugar beet production on farm level and its 
distribution among farms we use the FADN dataset. We find that sugar beet production 
contributes considerably to single farm income, while the sugar sector is relatively small 
compared to agriculture as a whole.  
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In the next section we further exploit the FADN dataset in order to shed light on the costs 
of sugar beet production, single farm quotas and their fill rates. 
 
3. Farm Quotas and Marginal Costs of Sugar Beet 
Production in FADN 
Single farm quotas and marginal costs of sugar beet production are necessary for our 
analysis in section 4. Incentives to supply sugar beets cannot be analysed on farm level 
without knowing those two variables. Also, the estimates derived in section 3.2 and 3.3 will 
serve as inputs for the specification of the agricultural sector model CAPRI in section 5. The 
importance of both variables can further be strengthened if we remember the implications of 
profit maximisation for the two quota system of the CMO Sugar, what is done in the next 
section. 
3.1 Sugar Beet Production and Profit Maximisation 
First, we need to examine how a profit maximum is characterised in dual theory. In 
general, we know that such an optimum is achieved where the profit function takes its global 
maximum, which means that a farmer cannot increase his profits by changing the land 
allocation at given prices. For a multi-output farm where all crop production activities 
compete in the input factor land, the dual value of this factor is equal among production 
activities. That means an additional unit of soft wheat returns the same profit as an additional 
unit of sugar beets. In a profit maximum it is further guaranteed that within each production 
activity the rule marginal revenues = marginal costs holds, where the marginal costs contain 
all shadow values of binding restrictions. 
Let us now concentrate on the special aspects of the sugar beet production where farmers 
face production quotas and guaranteed prices for quota beets. The farmer, as a price taker, 
expects a certain price for his products, based on market regulations and his experiences in 
past years. Therefore, prices in the planning phase can only be expected prices. For sugar 
beets (at least for quota beets), prices are not that uncertain compared to other products such 
as potatoes, because the inter-trade agreements (see section 2.3) regulate the prices for quota 
beets in detail before sugar beets are seeded. Only prices for C-beets are dependant on world 
market developments and thus uncertain. Prices for sugar beets, laid down in those 
agreements, are generally based on an average sugar content of 16% and a standard quality. 
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Deviations from those standard values affect the effective prices per ton of beets. The same 
accounts for beet delivery rights. In fact, prices and quotas are fixed on the basis of sugar 
rather than of beets. Therefore we define in the following costs, revenues, and prices on sugar 
basis. 
In Figure 3.1, on the vertical axis (expected) prices for the three types of sugar, denoted by 
PA, PB, and PC are given. The production value of the A-quota is then indicated by the yellow 
box and that of the B-quota by the green box. Everything beyond these boxes belongs to 
C-sugar production (blue box). Five different marginal cost functions (MC1-MC5) that 
characterise five different producer types are also found in the figure. Following the general 
rule marginal costs = product price, producer type 1 is a high cost producer. His marginal 
costs of sugar beet production are so high that he will not completely fill his A-quota. For 
producer type 2 the A-quota is a binding restriction because his marginal costs are somewhere 
between PA and PB. Types 3 and 4 can be described similar to types 1 and 2 with the 
difference that the B-quota is referred to. The last type (5) is a low marginal cost producer 
because his marginal cost curve crosses PC at a production quantity above total quotas. 
Figure 3.1: Sugar beet producer types 
A  Q u o ta B  Q u o ta
P A
P B
P C
B ee t p ro d u ction  (X )
M C 1
M C 2
M C 4
M C 3
M C 5
X 1 X 2 X 4X 3 X 5  
  Source: Author’s illustration 
The differences in the five producer types can also be expressed in terms of quota rents. 
Quota rents exist if marginal costs are lower than the price a farmer receives. Therefore type 1 
has no quota rent at all because his marginal costs equal the relevant beet price (Pa). The 
contrary is true for the other producer types. Their total quota rent can be measured by the 
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part of the yellow and green boxes that lie above the respective dotted line. The lower the 
marginal costs, the bigger the quota rents are. Clearly, the different producer types react 
differently to changes in quotas and prices. While type 5 only responds to changes in C-beet 
prices, the other types mainly react to changes in quota endowments and quota prices. The 
importance of farm heterogeneity with respect to the aggregated supply response is stressed in 
WITZKE and HECKELEI (2002). 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the information of the individual farm quota endowment is 
essential information for the analysis of sugar beet production at farm level. As mentioned 
above, the FADN records include this information only for Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Consequently, we decided to estimate the missing quotas. How this is done is described in the 
next section. 
3.2 Estimation of Single Farm Sugar Quotas and Beet Prices 
VIERLING (1986) also analyses the FADN sample with respect to sugar beets. He solves 
the problem of missing data on farm quotas by using a pragmatic approach. He applies the 
national relation of A-, B- and C-sugar to every single farm. But this method is unsatisfactory 
due to a number of reasons: the national share of quota sugar is not constant for the observed 
years due to a varying sugar production. Applying the national shares would therefore trigger 
different levels of farm quotas in each year18. However, farm quotas are said to be constant in 
reality, except for a few cases of quota transfers. Applying instead the national average across 
years would yield relations of quotas to production that are inconsistent with national 
aggregates in single years. We would also probably observe a significant number of farms 
that do not fill their whole quota rights in some years due to yield variations, or other factors. 
Hence, it is advisable to allow for an under-delivery of quota rights by single farms in certain 
years. Our approach relies on farm level accounting identities, which serve as data constraints 
of a quota estimation exercise. Several assumptions are made and some prior information is 
used in the approach. The methodology is explained below.  
                                                 
18 Note that it is possible that the farm quotas take the same value only if the relative changes in beet production 
are the same at farm and at national level.  
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3.2.1 Variables, Assumptions and Data 
National Level 
A BQ ,Q  = A- and B-sugar quota [tons of white sugar] 
Yt  = national sugar production [tons of white sugar] 
tS    = national average sugar content per beet [%] in year t ∈ {1990,…,1999} 
tAP    = average sugar beet price in year t [€/t] 
A B C
t t tP , P ,P  = national prices for the different beet types  and years [€/t] 
Farm Level 
itY   = sugar beet production of farm i = 1,...,N and year t [tons] 
itR   = revenue from sugar beet production of farm i and year t [€] 
itW   = Representative factor for farm i in year t 
it it itAP R Y=  = average sugar beet price of farm i and year t [€ per ton of sugar beet] 
 
Unknown Quantities (Farm Level) 
A
iQ   = A-quota of farm i [tons of white sugar] 
B
iQ   = B-quota of farm i [tons of white sugar] 
C
itY   = C-sugar production of farm i in year t [tons of white sugar] 
B
itY
−   = B-quota under delivery of farm i in year t [tons of white sugar] 
A
itY
−   = A-quota under delivery of farm i in year t [tons of white sugar] 
A B C
it it itP , P ,P  = farm specific prices for A-, B- and C-sugar production in year t  
[€ per ton white sugar] 
Assumptions 
The relation between A- and B-quota is constant for all farms and equal to the national 
ratio qAB: 
B B
AB B AB Ai
i iA A
i
Q Q q Q q Q
Q Q
= = ⇔ =  
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This assumption is in line with the regulations in the CMO Sugar. The most important 
assumption in our estimation approach is that individual farm sugar quotas are equal for one 
farm for years – a valid assumption for the vast majority of farms because the total quota 
endowment of a country did not change as well. We further need to assume that the individual 
farm sugar content per beet is constant across farms and equals the national averages found in 
the national statistics (St). This is an unrealistic but necessary assumption because more 
regionalized data has not been found nor does FADN provide this information.  
3.2.2 Model Equations  
The estimation model contains the following equations: 
Sum of farm specific quotas, C-sugar production and B-quota under-utilisation should equal 
the observed farm production: 
(1.1) 
( )
A A B B C
it i it i it it t
A AB A A B C
i i it it it t
AB A A B C
i it it it t
Y (Q Y ) (Q Y ) Y /S
Q q Q Y Y Y / S
1 q Q Y Y Y / S i, t
− −
− −
− −
⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + − − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + − − + ∀⎣ ⎦
 
Observed sugar beet revenue is equal to sum of farm prices times production quantities of 
sugar: 
(3.2) A AB A B A B C A Cit t it it i it it it it it itR S Y P (q Q Y )(P P ) Y (P P ) i, t
−
= − − − − − ∀  
There are additional restrictions necessary concerning the variables A B Cit it itY , Y ,Y
− − . 
I. A farm cannot produce C-sugar and does not simultaneously fulfil the quota 
(3.3) B Cit itY Y 0 i, t
−
= ∀  
II. If a farm does not fully use its A-quota, the B-quota has to be completely under-delivered.  
(3.4) AB A B Ai it it(q Q Y )Y 0 i, t
− −
− = ∀  
III. The A-quota under delivery cannot exceed the A-quota 
(3.5) A Ait iY Q i, t
− ≤ ∀  
IV. The B-quota under delivery cannot exceed the B-quota 
(3.6) B AB Ait iY q Q i, t
− ≤ ∀  
Additionally A B Cit it itY , Y and Y
− − are lower bounded by zero. 
Farm specific prices are related to national prices by adding farm- and year-specific correction 
terms that are common for prices for A-, B-, C-beets: 
(3.7) A Ait t t itP P / S c= + ; 
B B
it t t itP P /S c= + ; 
C C
it t t itP P /S c= +  
Farm Quotas and Marginal Costs of Sugar Beet Production in FADN 
Estimation of Single Farm Sugar Quotas and Beet Prices 
 
 
31 
Alternatively, we test a version where farm specific prices are related to national-prices by 
multiplying farm- and year-specific correction terms that are common for prices for A-, B-and 
C-production: 
(3.8) A Ait t it tP P c / S= ; 
B B
it t it tP P c /S= ; 
C C
it t it tP P c /S=  
The weighted sum over farms of single farm quotas divided by the weighted sum over farms 
of single farm sugar production quantities equals the national relation quota sugar /sugar 
production in each year19 
(3.9) 
( )N AB A A Bi it
i 1
N
t
it it
i 1
1 q Q W
Q Q
YY W
=
=
+
+
=
∑
∑
 
Since this system of equations is not designed to use classical estimation procedures, we 
originally solved this set of equations using a cross entropy (CE) estimator20 
(GOLAN et al., 1996). A disadvantage of cross entropy estimation is the often arbitrary and 
non-transparent choice of support points and their prior probabilities. HECKELEI et al. (2005b) 
provide an alternative estimation procedure with the advantage of more transparent prior 
information. The so-called highest posterior density (hpd) estimator is a Bayesian approach 
where a prior probability density function, its mean and its standard deviation for each 
variable are chosen rather than using more arbitrary support points in a CE approach. As we 
do not know the pdf in our case, we make the most likely decision, namely to choose a 
normal. The choice of means and variance will be explained later on. It can easily be shown 
that the choice of a normal distribution boils the estimation problem down to a minimisation 
of squared differences of the chosen mean of the pdf and the estimates weighted by the 
assumed variance. This leads to 
(3.10) 
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∑ ∑  
µitQ and µitc are the assumed means for the farm quotas and the price correction factor 
respectively and σitQ  and σitQ their assumed standard deviations. The number of observations 
per farm ki ensures that all farms get the same weight in the objective function. 
                                                 
19 The experiences of HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003b) had shown that equation (3.9) caused several problems. 
Consequently, it had not been imposed. Mainly due to the new estimation approach instead of using cross 
entropy, those problems no longer appeared in our estimation for most EU Member States. The 
implications of imposing this restriction are analysed in section 3.2.4. 
20 See HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003b). 
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3.2.3 Implications of the Approach and Model Set Up 
Estimation properties 
The introduced estimation procedure finds those single farm quotas and price correction 
factors that are, given the restrictions introduced by the other equations, as close as possible to 
the assumed means. The prior standard deviation weights those deviations from the prior 
mean so that for a pdf function with a smaller variance deviations from the mean are punished 
more than the same absolute deviation in a pdf with a larger variance. Similar to the approach 
in HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003b) we choose different prior distributions for the quota 
estimate in each year of the observed period, although this is somewhat at odds with the 
assumption of constant farm quotas and the idea that there is only one prior distribution per 
variable.. But our prior information is the national relation of quotas over production and this 
is not constant across years. We want the relation at farm level to be as close as possible to the 
national one in each year and in order to reflect that, we define the mean of those prior pdfs 
for each farm in each year to be at the national relation of quota/production multiplied by the 
individual farm sugar production in the respective year. 
In case of the price correction factor, we want farm prices to be as close as possible to the 
national averages. Consequently, their means are equal to zero when equation (3.7) is 
imposed and equal to one if equation (3.8) is chosen alternatively. In the objective function 
the squared differences of estimated quotas and price corrections and their prior means are 
weighted with some standard deviations. Those are assumed at 20% of the respective mean. 
This relative definition of the standard deviation has the advantage that it corrects the 
heteroscedasticity, i.e., the objective function punishes a deviation of one ton from the prior 
mean less if the farm produces a lot of sugar as compared to a farm that produces only a few 
tons.21 To summarise, this model set-up leads to an estimate of farm quotas which best fit the 
available data restrictions, model assumptions and prior information as expressed by the 
chosen prior pdf.  
                                                 
21 For the price correction factor all farms have the same prior distribution. In cases where the correction factor is 
additive, the standard deviation was assumed at 5€. 
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Data 
The national producer price for the three beet types plays a major role with respect to 
estimation results. During estimation, prices for all estimation years (1990-1999) are required. 
We use EU guarantee prices minus the levy on A-beets for the A-sugar beet prices, the EU 
guarantee price minus the levy on B-beets for the B-sugar beet prices. In the case of C-sugar 
beet prices22, we use world market prices for sugar multiplied by 60% of the national average 
sugar content per beet. The C-sugar prices and producer levies were taken from 
LINDE et al. (2000).23 Hereafter the prices are scaled by a constant factor for each country to 
the national average prices as available in the CoCo database24 using the national shares of 
A-, B- and C-sugar. This guarantees that national supports of sugar beet production, common 
in Italy or Finland (BLUME et al, 2000), are included as long as they are part of the national 
production value of sugar beets. National quotas are taken from the respective regulations. 
The French quotas do not include the overseas territories, as they are not part of the FADN 
sample. National sugar production and sugar content per beet stem from the CoCo database as 
well. Farm individual data stems from FADN. While in section 2.5 all farms in the FADN 
sample are included in our investigation, we eliminate a number of observations for the 
estimation if either data errors are obvious or critical assumptions of our estimation approach 
seem to be flawed.  
First, we delete all observations in cases where a farm is part of the sample for less than 
two years because the estimation process boils down to a simple calculation if a farm is only 
one year in the sample. For each farm, we further need data on sugar beet production 
quantities and values and their weighting factors. We only accept farms where the data on 
these three variables is complete. Hereafter, we check all farms where the observations are not 
found in a continuous timeline. This is done because if a farm is removed from the sample, 
the same farm identification number could be allocated to a completely different farm some 
years later. Two different farms could therefore be found under the same farm ID. The 
assumption of a constant sugar quota is consequently flawed by definition. In such cases, only 
                                                 
22 The underlying assumption is that 60% of the companies’ sugar revenues are given to producers. 
23 Their source is mainly FO Licht, a commodity expert of sugar markets. 
24 The CoCo (Complete & Consistent) database combines times series on areas, herd sizes, production, yields, 
market balances, price and the Economic Accounts for Agriculture at national level for all current EU 
Member States. System estimations under consistency constraints ensure that gaps in the underlying raw 
data from EUROSTAT are closed and inconsistencies are removed. The database is used and maintained by 
the CAPRI modelling network (BRITZ et al., 2004). 
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the most recent observations that are in the time line remain in the sample. Further, some 
consistency checks delete farms with implausible values on sugar beet yields or revenues.  
Table 3.1 shows the implications of this reduction of observations. The highest reductions 
are found in Greece, Spain and Italy, mainly due to the problem of two different farms listed 
under the same farm ID. In Italy, Spain and even Germany, the samples are large enough 
compensate a high reduction in observations. 
Table 3.1: Number of observations for 13 Member State before and after corrections 
BAS change NEW
SE 476 -21% 377
FI 507 -13% 439
IR 807 -26% 595
AT 1825 -6% 1711
UK 2379 -37% 1491
DK 2998 -24% 2267
NL 3751 -11% 3356
BL 4511 -18% 3714
EL 4558 -56% 2014
ES 8142 -39% 4930
FR 8513 -11% 7620
DE 12868 -35% 8361
IT 15786 -41% 9400
 
   Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
This reduction of observations leads now to the problem that the new sample does not 
represent the sector anymore. However, this is a prerequisite for equation (3.9) and the 
subsequent presentation of aggregated results. Therefore, we decided to scale the farm 
specific representation factors so that the weighted sum over farms (of the new sample) of 
sugar beet production corresponds to regional and national production quantities for each year 
in the estimation. This scaling does not change the relations of representativeness among 
farms within a region (NUTS 2), but it can change those relations among farms of different 
regions. 
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3.2.4 Estimation Accuracy 
For such an unconventional estimation, it is not easy to make conclusions about estimation 
accuracy. Fortunately, we can test this approach for the Netherlands and Belgium because 
these countries provide data on farm quotas for most of the farms in some years. We compare 
four versions of our model that differ in whether the national relation (equation (3.9)) is 
imposed and the price correction factor is additive or multiplicative. The idea behind an 
additive price correction factor is that it can be interpreted as constant mark ups or reductions 
due to quality, transportation cost or dirt content of delivered beets that are equal for each beet 
type. A correction factor defined relative to the prices implies larger changes for quota sugar 
prices than for C-sugar. In reality, both types of payments exist (compare SCHMIDT, 2003), so 
that a combination of both types is probably more realistic. Introducing two correction factors 
without further restrictions, however, is not recommended for an estimation system with few 
degrees of freedom. Therefore, we will decide below which of the two versions we will use. 
Table 3.2 gives the definition of those four versions.  
Table 3.2: Four versions of the estimation model 
 Equation (3.9) Equation (3.8) Equation (3.7) 
MOD1 NO YES NO 
MOD2 YES YES NO 
MOD3 NO NO YES 
MOD4 YES NO YES 
         Source: Author’s illustration 
We choose a number of indicators that help to assess these versions. Those are: 
 Correlation between observed quotas and estimated ones calculated as 
(1.11) 
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The set S contains all (m) combinations of farms and years, where data on quotas 
was available in FADN (FQs). Qs denotes the estimated quotas for each 
observation s. The means are denoted by a bar above each variable. Finally,  
cc – the correlation coefficient – measures the correlation between estimates and 
data and can take values between zero and one, where a higher value indicates a 
stronger correlation. 
 The estimation bias calculated as the difference between the means over all 
observations of estimated quotas and original ones. 
 The standard deviation of quotas in the data and the estimates, calculated as:  
(1.12) 
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 Finally, we calculate how many times the ‘quota fill status’ (is the quota filled or 
not) is identified correctly. The indicator, given in Table 3.3 as congruencies, is the 
share of correctly identified quota fill states of estimated quotas. 
Table 3.3: Indicators of estimation accuracy 
cc bias stdd congruencies
MOD1 0.934 15.268 29.156 59%
BL MOD2 0.747 -1.59 40.804 77%
MOD3 0.932 14.879 28.807 59%
MOD4 0.748 -1.597 40.758 77%
MOD1 0.973 17.206 30.505 52%
NL MOD2 0.797 -12.033 52.674 75%
MOD3 0.974 16.442 28.124 53%
MOD4 0.797 -12.02 52.693 75%
 
Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
As demonstrated in Table 3.3, the correlation between the estimated quota and the quota 
specified in the data is very high for models one and three in both countries. Models two and 
four show noticeably lower correlations. Obviously, imposing equation (3.9) influences the 
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correlation coefficient and the standard deviation between estimated and original quotas 
negatively, while it enhances the estimation in terms of bias and congruencies. A comparison 
of models one and three shows that the differences that occur when the price correction factor 
is defined relative or additive to the beet prices, change the presented indicators only very 
slightly. Inspection shows that the estimated quotas in model one and three (model two and 
four respectively) only differ very little. A difference, however, is found in the estimated farm 
prices, whereby a great disadvantage of the additive versions is the occurrence of negative 
C-sugar prices which can be prevented by using the relative definition. Therefore and 
although HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003b) argue in favour of the additive price correction 
factor, we decided to use relative ones as we use the estimated farm prices later on and would 
like to avoid implausible results caused by negative C-sugar prices. But is model one or two 
the better one? A not yet mentioned advantage of model two is – due to its design – that the 
aggregated results correspond to national statistics. This is greatly desired as we will include 
the results of this estimation in the regionalised agricultural sector model CAPRI in section 5. 
An econometrician would always choose the version that provides the highest correlations but 
for our analysis it is probably more important to ensure that the estimated quotas correspond 
to the observed aggregates as much as possible. The advantages and disadvantages of both 
models lead us to investigate an additional version of our estimation model (model five). We 
use the estimation system of model one. The resulting quotas are then scaled by a constant 
factor, so that national quotas are met. With these quotas, A-, B- and C-sugar prices are then 
recalculated. The results presented in Table 3.4 are promising. We preserve the high 
correlations from model one and gain in terms of all other indicators. We obtain congruencies 
of the fill status of original and estimated quotas of 93% in Belgium and 82% in the 
Netherlands. The bias, compared to model one, is noticeably reduced and the standard 
deviation between estimated and original quotas is greatly enhanced.  
Model five is therefore superior to the other ones. But this improvement has its price. By 
applying constant scaling factors in each year to correspond to national quotas, we break with 
the most important assumption in the estimation, namely constant farm quotas over time. The 
reason why we still favour model five is that both samples show variance in quotas over time: 
Belgium (95% of all farms) and the Netherlands (83% of farms). The average standard 
deviation of original farm quotas over time amounts to 3 tons of white sugar in both countries. 
The respective standard deviations of estimated farm quotas of model five, however, only 
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amounts to about 1 ton. Consequently, model five does not overestimate the variance in farm 
quotas over time and seems to be a further improvement compared to models one to four. 
Table 3.4: Indicators of estimation accuracy (2) 
cc bias stdd congruencies
MOD1 0.934 15.268 29.156 59%
BL MOD2 0.747 -1.59 40.804 77%
MOD5 0.935 -2.76 22.13 93%
MOD1 0.973 17.206 30.505 52%
NL MOD2 0.797 -12.033 52.674 75%
MOD5 0.973 -6.081 20.819 82%
 
     Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
Of course, it can be considered inconsistent to make a model assumption and then break 
with it after estimating the model, but both steps – the estimation and the recalibration of 
resulting quotas and prices – could be done within one step. Farm quotas would then be 
different across years with the restrictions that they can be calculated as a farm specific 
constant multiplied by a constant across all farms of a country and that they sum up to 
national quotas. This leads exactly to the same results but increases computation time.  
Figure 3.2: Aggregated results of farm quota estimation in term of pdf functions 
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 Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
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The favourite status of model five is also evident in Figure 3.2 which shows the 
probability density functions25 of estimated farm quotas with models one, two and five and 
those for the original quotas (BAS). Especially in Belgium we see a high degree of 
congruence between model five and the original data, while models one and two show 
noticeable differences. In terms of distance between the original data graph and those of the 
estimations, model five is also the optimal choice.  
3.2.5 Estimation Results 
We apply model five to all EU Member States considered in this analysis. As mentioned 
before, we are not able to test the estimation results for the other countries in the same way as 
is done above due to missing data on farm quotas. But the principal functionality of our 
approach has been pointed out and should be transferable to other countries as well.26 
Table 3.5 summarises the results of the quota estimation.  
Table 3.5: Key results of quota estimation 
Mean
Standard 
deviation < 100% Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation
BL 117.6 24.2 11.8 43.30 3.66 43.30 3.68 20.93 4.56
DK 117.2 22.5 14.5 52.78 6.34 33.52 4.28 23.53 5.66
DE 118.2 23.3 10.3 54.88 7.39 34.93 4.90 24.98 5.85
EL 88.4 52.3 60.2 59.75 11.63 63.21 12.46 33.35 8.99
ES 105.4 41.0 40.0 56.36 12.53 58.50 14.95 30.07 6.63
FR 137.1 28.6 1.6 43.22 6.68 27.44 4.21 19.72 4.86
IR 107.3 18.9 27.8 45.58 4.20 45.60 4.45 22.67 4.92
IT 99.6 38.5 53.0 57.29 9.78 58.33 10.32 30.65 8.19
NL 112.0 22.1 22.5 49.93 5.66 49.57 5.37 24.53 5.16
AT 123.3 21.6 6.7 49.23 5.18 31.06 3.42 22.45 5.86
SE 104.7 15.1 36.7 45.87 7.32 28.77 4.11 22.22 4.78
FI 103.2 30.0 42.1 61.55 8.21 39.45 5.71 31.31 7.16
UK 121.6 21.9 8.4 49.26 5.66 49.24 5.64 22.59 4.95
C beet price(€/t)Sugar production/Quota (%) A beet price (€/t) B beet price (€/t)
Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
                                                 
25 Kernel density estimates (see section 8.2) were used again. 
26 Note that Belgium and the Netherlands both apply the mixed price system. In the estimation, we deal therefore 
only with one quota and two prices. It cannot be precluded that the estimation behaviour is somewhat 
different for countries that apply the classical ABC system. Note that a price differentiation of C-beets 
(compare Schmidt, 2003) is not considered here either. . 
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The first block presents the distribution of the quota fill rate in the different countries. The 
first column shows the average quota fill rate for all farms and observation years and the 
second one their standard deviations. French farmers mainly seem to belong to the group of 
C-sugar producers as even the standard deviation subtracted from the mean production is 
more than 100% of quota production. Column 3 underlines this because a quota under-
delivery appears in only 1.6% of all observations in France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Austria and the United Kingdom are C-sugar producers as well but the share of observations 
where quotas are not filled ranges from 6.7% to 14% so that we cannot exclude quota under-
filling in those countries. 
Figure 3.3: Kernel density estimates: Relation production/quota in the EU 
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 Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
A country group consisting of the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden is also still producing 
above their quota endowments on average, but shows a larger number of cases where quotas 
are not filled. The last group, Spain, Finland, Italy and especially Greece is characterised by 
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an average production around or below the quota endowment and a lot of incidences were 
quotas are not filled. The density distributions in those countries vary greatly which means 
that even in those countries a number of farms produce C-sugar. These results are underlined 
by Figure 3.3 where we plot Kernel density estimates of the regional distributions of the 
production/quota relation. The density functions have different colours for production below 
and above the quota and are sorted by the share of observations where quotas are filled.  
The remaining blocks in Table 3.5 give us the means and standard deviations of estimated 
prices. All three beet prices vary among Member States in terms of mean and variance, 
indicating different payment schemes. Remember that these prices are meant to include all 
mark ups and discharges that may be paid for quality, transportation, etc. They refer to an 
average sugar content of 16% per ton of beets in order to make the prices more comparable 
among countries. Differences between A- and B-prices in countries where the pool price 
system is applied can occur since the presented prices are weighted averages across farms and 
years, where the sample size can differ for the different prices. In the average of B-beet prices, 
only those farms are included that produce B-beets. The differences occur mainly in those 
countries, where a high share of A-quota under-delivery is found like Greece, Spain and Italy, 
while in Belgium A- and B-prices are almost equal. The highest average A-beet price is found 
in Finland due to an additional national aid paid for sugar beet production. The means of 
C-beet prices are all well above 20€/t except for France. They show reasonable magnitudes 
compared to the calculated figures in LINDE et al. (2000) on page 161. Prices in Italy, Spain 
and Greece are at a higher level compared to other countries. In particular, C-beet prices may 
be overestimated in those countries. 
3.3 Sugar Beet Production Costs 
Key indicators for the production of sugar beets are naturally the production costs. It has 
already been noted several times above that the FADN dataset does not include information 
on costs allocated to the different production activities. Only total expenditures on some 
inputs are available. Crop specific inputs include seeds, plant protection, fertilisers and a 
category called other crop specific inputs. Additionally, total expenditures on energy, repairs, 
water and services, which are not only associated with the cropping activities, are available. 
Originally, a major objective of this study was to estimate marginal costs of sugar beet 
production according to a parametric econometric estimation approach, as carried out by 
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WIECK (2005)27 for example, but all efforts did not lead to usable results. Literature, on the 
other hand, provides some estimates of marginal production costs. Four different sources are 
described below: 
 FRANDSEN et al. (2003) 
In this article, the authors analyse reform options of the CMO Sugar using a global 
general equilibrium model at European Member State level. Each country is 
associated with a certain producer type similar to the definition in Figure 3.1. This 
association is done according to the observed sugar production. Countries with 
high observed C-sugar quantities are therefore estimated to be low cost producers 
while countries that do not entirely fill their production quotas are assumed to have 
higher marginal production costs. They further assume that farmers consequently 
overshoot their quotas in their planning by an amount of two times the standard 
deviation of total production of the respective country to compensate for yield 
uncertainty. Under the definitions in Figure 3.1 they allocate Portugal, Finland, 
Italy and Greece to type MC1, Sweden, the Netherlands and Ireland to type MC2, 
Denmark, Belgium and Spain to MC4 and France, Germany, Austria and the 
United Kingdom to the low-cost producer group MC5. This approach has several 
disadvantages. First, it neglects farm heterogeneity. As shown in the previous 
chapter, we find in every country different fill rates of single farm quotas, which 
means in terms of the definition of FRANDSEN et al. (2003), that we also find 
different types of marginal costs curves. This is a general problem of aggregated 
models, but in the system of production quotas, it is an even greater one. The 
authors assume the low cost countries to be competitive at C-beet prices; 
consequently, the only relevant variable at the margin would be the C-beet price. In 
other words, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria are assumed to be 
completely independent of the quota system and their production will not change if 
quotas or quota beet prices are reduced. Consequently, these four countries hardly 
react in the analysed scenarios – a not very plausible result. 
 
                                                 
27 This study estimates marginal production costs of milk production. The framework relies on a cost 
minimisation problem, which is the likely choice, because in the milk sector the production output is quite 
limited by the quota. An adoption of this approach to the sugar sector is problematic due to the possibility 
to produce C-sugar beets. 
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 BUREAU et al. (1997) 
The analysis of an introduction of quota mobility is the main topic of this article. 
The authors develop regional quota supply and demand curves for twenty-five 
European regions (NUTS 2 or Member State level). This is done with the help of 
regional marginal cost curves. The analysis is based on single farm data. They also 
discuss the lack of detailed cost information in the data, which is, however, 
available for the French regions. They stack single farm Linear Programming 
Models where each farm maximises gross margins in order to obtain opportunity 
costs28 of sugar beet production for each farm. Afterwards, they estimate a 
parametric function relating these opportunity costs to the total production and 
calibrate this function to the regions where cost data is incomplete. In those 
regions, farm data stems from FADN and other national data sources. Compared to 
FRANDSEN et al. (2003), this method allows for farm heterogeneity. The resulting 
opportunity costs of sugar beet production are, in terms of the ranking of individual 
Member States, comparable to FRANDSEN et al. (2003), but generally show a higher 
cost level.  
 HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) / VIERLING (1996) 
HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) apply a method developed by VIERLING (1996). 
Both studies use the FADN data set but at different time periods. The problem of 
missing data on production costs of specific activities is solved here by using the 
ARACOST program, developed by DG AGRI, to obtain estimates. This program is 
based on simple algorithms that use the share of monetary outputs of one crop in 
the total crop, arable land or total farm output and multiplies this by the total 
expenditures of the respective input. This method implies that variable costs are 
high for those products that attain higher monetary outputs. In other words, the 
relation of total monetary output of an activity to its variable costs is constant for 
all activities that use the same factors, which is likely to be an unrealistic 
assumption. Furthermore, this calculation translates all fluctuations of the unit 
value of an activity into its costs. In the case of a bad harvest, the resulting variable 
costs are lower than in years with a good harvest. The same occurs for high and 
                                                 
28 Opportunity costs equal the dual value of the quota constraints in the LP models 
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low prices, although the variable costs in reality are not correlated with these 
stochastic variables. One might argue that high prices are often correlated with low 
yields and vice versa, that a bad harvest in one production activity goes with bad 
harvest in the other ones so that the relations of monetary outputs are rather 
constant over time, but this only slightly diminishes the weakness of the approach. 
Both studies address this problem by using three-year average data so that 
stochastic fluctuations are smoothed. Once the variable costs of sugar beet 
production are established for each sugar beet producing farm, opportunity costs 
are added. VIERLING (1996) defines them as the gross margin of a predefined 
competing crop. We cannot predict which crop a farmer would switch to if sugar 
beet became more or less attractive, therefore, any attempt to predefine that crop is 
questionable. HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) do not use a predefined competing 
crop. They say that a farmer will enhance all products which are part of his 
production program by the same share so they use the average gross margin of the 
farm specific crop mix excluding sugar beets as opportunity costs. Potatoes and 
perennials are excluded here. This method is still a simplification but an 
improvement on VIERLING (1996) since it reflects the crop rotation of a certain 
farm.  
To summarise, the three different approaches lead to different estimates of marginal costs 
and all methods have their disadvantages. The most convincing approach seems to be that of 
BUREAU et al. (1997) since it uses data on variable costs available in France. Since such data 
is not available to us, we use the method of HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) here with small 
modifications. Variable costs per activity are calculated in the same way as in 
HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a). Opportunity costs are defined as the average gross margin of 
competing crops on each farm, but we do not categorically exclude potatoes since they are, in 
terms of production requirements, comparable to sugar beets. We only exclude potatoes if 
their share in the crop rotation is higher than 25% since an extension of potatoes above this 
share may not be considered advisable. This modification is especially relevant in the 
Netherlands where many farmers produce potatoes at the maximal level with respect to soil 
requirements.29 
                                                 
29 All estimates have in common that they refer to the short term.. Costs for long-term decisions, such as 
investments in new buildings or machinery, are not included. 
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In Table 3.6 we compare the estimates for marginal costs of sugar beet production from 
the different sources mentioned above with our own estimates. Not very surprisingly, our 
estimates are comparable to those from HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a), since we use the same 
dataset. Both estimates are based on three-year average data of the years 1997-1999. 
Differences stem from the different treatment of competing crops explained above and from 
slightly different sample sizes.30  
Table 3.6: Marginal costs of sugar beet production from different sources  
(€/t , 16% sugar content)31 
Bureau Frandsen Vierling Henrichsmeyer Adenäuer
AT % 20.7 % 27.1 25.0
FR 29.6 21.9 34.0 29.7 26.9
DK 24.8 32.1 35.4 29.8 28.8
BL 31.0 33.5 33.1 28.8 29.2
DE 24.8 20.4 32.6 35.2 32.2
SE % 41.1 % 34.3 32.7
IR % 49.8 39.3 35.1 34.2
UK 32.0 19.9 35.9 34.9 34.3
ES 49.0 44.8 % 27.7 37.3
NL 34.8 49.2 36.2 36.3 37.8
FI % 58.1 % 40.0 40.8
IT 65.7 65.1 44.5 40.4 41.7
EL 46.0 67.2 % 41.4 50.9
 
Source: BUREAU et al. (1997), FRANDSEN et al. (2003), VIERLING (1996), 
HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) and author’s calculations 
The estimates of VIERLING (1996), compared to those from HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) 
and our own calculations, are generally at a higher level. This might either be a matter of 
different handling of competing crops or – as an economic explanation – due to technical 
                                                 
30 We only use the smaller sample derived in section 3.1 which includes only those farms for which quotas were 
estimated. HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003), in contrast, use all sugar beet producing farms during the period 
in question. 
31 Marginal costs of sugar beet production for all studies are translated into standard costs for sugar beets that 
contain 16% of sugar in order to obtain a better comparison among different countries with different 
average sugar contents. This is done by dividing the marginal costs of sugar beet production by the national 
average sugar content and multiplying it by 16%. Furthermore, BUREAU et al. (1997) and VIERLING (1996) 
do not present national values if more regionalised information is available. We calculate those values by 
averages across regions of a country weighted by regional three-year average sugar beet production. 
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progress, since the estimates of Vierling are based on 1988-1992 data. The estimates of 
FRANDSEN et al. (2003) are mainly influenced by their allocation of Members States to 
different producer types. You find countries with marginal costs around 20 €/t for the low-
cost producing countries. Compared to the other estimates for those countries, one might 
conclude that the competitiveness of France, Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom is 
over-estimated. The estimates from BUREAU et al. (1997), which are based on 1990 data, are 
apart from some exceptions in a comparable range to our own estimates. The most obvious 
differences appear in Germany and Denmark, which according to our evaluation are less 
competitive, and Italy and Spain where the opposite is true.   
All estimates confirm that Austria and France are among the most competitive countries in 
sugar beet production, while Italy and Greece are the least. The results of our own calculation 
of marginal costs are further illustrated in Figure 3.4. There it becomes obvious that in the 
countries where we find high average marginal costs, like Greece and Spain, the variance over 
farms is high as well.  
Figure 3.4: Kernel density estimates: Marginal costs of sugar beet production for 13  
EU Member States 
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  Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
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A recent study carried out by ISERMEYER et al. (2005) presents estimates of the price floor 
of sugar beet production in regions of the EU-25 below which sugar beet production is said to 
be abandoned in the respective region. Their approach shows similarities to ours, but rather 
than defining marginal cost at farm level and aggregating them to regional averages, they start 
with regional standard gross margins32 of sugar beet production, reflecting the decoupled 
payment scheme as laid down in the CAP reform from 2003. Consequently, their marginal 
production costs are not differentiated within a region. They assume that sugar beet 
production leaves a certain region if marginal revenues are below marginal costs. Using 
horizontal aggregation of their regional estimates and quota endowments, they derive a price 
floor curve for the EU-25 as given in Figure 3.5. We now compare this curve to a curve that 
ranks our marginal cost estimates among European regions for which an estimation was 
carried out. The absolute levels of that price floor and our marginal costs are not comparable 
because our estimates do not include the effects of the decoupled payment scheme. It is the 
ranking between regions that should be comparable. Of course, we can only compare regions 
which are reflected in both studies. Both studies allocate Greek, Italian, British and Dutch 
regions to the right hand side, meaning that they are among the less competitive regions in 
Europe, but ISERMEYER et al. (2005) consider the Spanish regions much less competitive than 
we do. The Rioja region is especially eye catching in this respect. We identify this region as 
one of the most competitive across the selected regions while it is found at the other end of 
the scale in Figure 3.5. The same accounts for the eastern region Alsace in France. For 
Finnish regions the opposite occurs. Germany is generally considered more competitive by 
ISERMEYER et al. (2005) and our estimation shows lower variance of costs within a country. 
But, all in all, there are considerable differences in the results of both studies.33 
In conclusion, our estimates of marginal costs of sugar beet production show reasonable 
magnitudes and are in line with some other studies, but they contradict the findings of 
ISERMEYER et al. (2005) in some ways. Nonetheless, the estimates are considered good 
enough to serve as inputs for the following analyses. 
                                                 
32 They use EUROSTAT data from 1996. 
33 Differences in the ranking of regions can technically be a result of different decoupled premiums. Although 
ISERMEYER et al. (2005) do not explain how regional marginal costs are corrected by the decoupled 
premiums, it is likely that regions where a high premium volume is distributed are more corrected than 
those with lower premium volumes. 
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Figure 3.5: Price floor of sugar beet production (ISERMEYER et al., 2005) 
Quota (Mio t)
Price floor (€/t)
 
Source: ISERMEYER et al. (2005) 
Figure 3.6: Ranking of marginal cost estimates among EU-15 regions 
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3.4 Summary 
Section 3.1 gives an overview of what the quota and price support system currently in use 
implies for a farmer in a framework of profit maximisation, while section 3.2 deals with 
estimation of single farm quotas and beet prices for farms in the FADN sample. It becomes 
apparent that many European farmers produce considerable amounts of C-sugar beets. Section 
3.3 deals with costs of sugar beet production. The estimated marginal costs of beet production 
are generally above the estimated C-beet prices given in Table 3.5.34 In a framework of profit 
maximisation that would mean that producer type five (explained in Figure 3.1) should not 
exist at all. But that would be inconsistent with the observed large amounts of C-sugar beet 
production all across the 13 selected EU Member States. We conclude that profit 
maximisation is not an appropriate behavioural model for sugar beet farmers.  
In the next chapter, we therefore consider and test behavioural hypotheses that go beyond 
the simple profit maximisation hypothesis. Hereby, we make use of the FADN sample and the 
results on prices and quotas and marginal production costs found in the current chapter.  
                                                 
34 Note that the presented prices are based on the period 1990-1999 while marginal costs are based on the period 
1997-1999.  
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4. Incentives to Supply Sugar Beets 
It can be concluded from the previous section that many European farmers are producing 
C-sugar beets. Hence, if we compare total costs and total income of C-beets to soft wheat as 
other studies have done (e.g. LINDE et al. 2000, SCHMIDT, 2003), it becomes apparent that the 
gross margin of a hectare of C-beets is lower in nearly in all countries than that of competing 
crops. According to LINDE et al. (2000), the (EU) average marginal costs amount to 16 € per 
ton of beets and a gross margin of 12€ per ton is necessary in order to compete with soft 
wheat. Consequently, C-beet prices should be above 28€. This price has not been reached in 
the last decade according to our estimates presented in Table 2.1. SCHMIDT (2003) points out 
that marginal costs for C-beet production are considerably higher than the price which can be 
received for them. He also analyses the effects of possible price differentiation for C-beets. 
According to him, most sugar enterprises pay a higher price for a certain amount of C-beets35 
in Germany. But he points out that even this higher price is not sufficient to generate positive 
gross margins. In contrast to his study, our estimated average C-beet prices for Germany are 
somewhat higher. They fall in the range of those calculated by LINDE et al. (2000). Hence, the 
question is still unanswered why we observe large C-sugar amounts in the EU although gross 
margins tend to be negative. 
This chapter provides an analysis of possible incentives for farmers to produce C-sugar 
beets part of which has already been published by ADENÄUER and HECKELEI (2005) and 
ADENÄUER (2005). Several hypotheses are made and their implications are presented. 
4.1 Expected Profit Maximisation 
4.1.1 Sugar Beet Production and Yield Uncertainty 
Yield uncertainty is a general phenomenon in agriculture. A farmer cannot perfectly 
predict the yields of his production activities, because they are influenced by weather and 
other environmental factors. In a quota system, this becomes even more relevant as there are 
typically additional economic incentives to fill the quota even in the case of a bad harvest. 
FRANDSEN et al. (2003) and LINDE et al. (2000) use a common assumption on the impact of 
                                                 
35 Here, C-beets are distinguished into C1- and C2-beets. C1-beets receive slightly higher prices. Their quantity 
is again limited. 
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yield variance. They simply distinguish ‘unintended’ and ‘planned’ C-sugar production. The 
first one is only caused by yield variance and the latter is planned by farmers. The magnitude 
of unintentional C-sugar is predefined as a certain percentage of quota production 
(LINDE et al.) or according to the national yield variance (FRANDSEN et al.). This assumption 
is an extreme simplification of the decision situation of European farmers. In fact, what they 
call unintentional C-sugar production is likely to depend on production cost, perceived yield 
variance, individual quota endowments, and expected prices.  
Similar to SCHMIDT (2003) 36, let us assume normally distributed sugar beet yields with a 
certain variance as in Figure 4.1. Suppose a farmer plans to produce – on average – the 
amount of sugar beets that is exactly equal to the quotas (X1). In this case, the quota is under-
filled with 50% probability implying loss of high quota revenue. Maximising expected profits 
may therefore require a higher planned production level (e.g. X2).  
Figure 4.1: Yield variance and quotas 
A Quota B Quota
PA
PB
PC
Beet production (X)X1 X2  
Source: Author’s illustration 
Since both sugar beet delivery rights and sugar beet prices (see Table 3.5) are based on 
average sugar contents, they consequently adapt if those contents deviate from that average. 
                                                 
36 Schmidt (2003) analyses the impacts of stochastic yields on sugar beet production within Monte Carlo 
simulations. We want to generalise his assumptions by deriving an analytical framework of this problem. 
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To eliminate these intermediate calculations, we now define sugar beet production as the 
process of cultivating beets but the harvested product is sugar. Consequently, we define prices 
and quotas as well as yields on a sugar basis.  
4.1.2 Mathematical Framework37 
Stochastic sugar yields imply stochastic revenues. Consequently, we start with the 
mathematical definition of revenues of sugar beet production. In order to make the following 
derivations more transparent, let us for now assume that there is only one quota quantity Q 
and two prices for sugar produced within the quota and sugar produced above it. After 
deriving the mathematical framework for this case, it is straightforward to extend it to the 
slightly more complex actual quota regulation. The definition of revenue (RS) of selling sugar 
to the processing firm is defined as 
(4.1) ( )Q Q C CS S SR p y p p y= − − . 
yS denotes sugar production quantity and ySC  sugar quantity exceeding the quota. The 
respective prices are given by pQ and pC. We have chosen this specific formulation because it 
implies only one censored stochastic variable ySC resulting in less cumbersome derivations 
compared to alternative formulations. Assuming prices to be non-stochastic38, the expected 
value of the sugar beet revenue is a function of expected total and expected C-sugar 
production written as 
(4.2) ( )Q Q C CS S SER p Ey p p Ey= − − , 
where E denotes the expectation operator. Assume now that the production yS is an 
outcome of a normally distributed random process with the pdf 
(4.3) ( ) ( )SS Sf y N Ey ,= σ  
and the cumulated density function (cdf) 
(4.4) ( ) ( )
c
S SF c f y dy
−∞
= ∫  
where σS is the standard deviation of sugar beet production yS. The density functions of yS 
and ySC for a given land allocation may appear as in Figure 4.2. Compared to the normally 
distributed variable yS, the density function of the C-sugar quantity ySC is first mean-shifted by 
                                                 
37 Parts of the mathematical framework were carried out by Thomas Heckelei. 
38 We follow the approach of SCHMIDT (2003) who neglects price uncertainty. Hence, at least C-beets prices – 
are depending on world market prices and thus uncertain. We will focus on this problem later on. 
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-EyS and then censored at zero. In contrast to a truncation point, the censoring point receives 
all the probability mass of outcomes of yS below the quota limit Q, i.e. all cases where the 
C-sugar quantity is equal to zero. The censoring always moves the mean of the variable away 
from the censoring point. Using properties of censored random variables (see, for example, 
GREENE 1990, chapter 21) we can write equation (4.2) as 
(4.5) 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
Q Q C C
S S S
Q
S
C2Q C C S
S C
Q
S
2Q C S
S
Q
S
2Q C S
S
ER p Ey p p Ey
p Ey
f 0
p p 1 F 0 Ey q
1 F 0
p Ey
f q
p p 1 F q Ey q
1 F q
p Ey
p p 1 F q Ey q f q
= − −
=
⎡ ⎤
− − − − + σ⎢ ⎥
−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
=
⎡ ⎤
− − − − + σ⎢ ⎥
−⎣ ⎦
=
⎡ ⎤
− − − − + σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
where fC and FC are the pdf and cdf of the censored variable ySC, respectively. The second 
equal sign follows from the standard formula for a mean of a random variable censored from 
below and using the fact that the censoring point of the variable ySC is zero. The third equal 
sign reveals that all probability and density values can be expressed in terms of the 
distribution of the total sugar quantity and the fourth follows from algebraic manipulations.  
Figure 4.2: Density functions of total and C-sugar beet production for given land allocation 
0
0 2
0
0 2q
0
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y S C
E y S
E y S C
S o u r c e :  o w n c a l c u l a t i o n s  
   Source: Author’s illustration 
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We now further assume that the standard deviation of sugar beet production is 
proportional to the planned sugar beet production, i.e. σS = EyS⋅σ0, where σ0 is the standard 
deviation of one unit of expected sugar beet production. Under expected profit maximization, 
optimal expected sugar production is given where marginal costs equal expected marginal 
revenues. Therefore, we need a formula for the expected marginal revenues (EMR), i.e. the 
derivative of (4.5) with respect to EyS: 
(4.6) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
QS
S
2Q C s o s
S
S S
dER EMR p
dEy
dF q df q
p p Ey q 1 F q 2 f q
dEy dEy
= =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
− − − − + − + σ σ + σ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
The expression involves several derivatives of density values and cumulative density values 
with respect to the mean of the distribution. Let’s first look at the derivative of the density 
value, for example: 
(4.7)
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ){ }
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 S2
SS
S S
2 S2
S20
S
22 0
S SS
0 S 2 42 40 0
S S
2 S2
S
2
S S
S 2 22 30 0
S S
1d exp q Ey 2
df q 2
dEy dEy
1 exp q Ey 2
Ey
q Ey 4Ey2 q Ey1 1
Ey2 2 Ey 4 Ey
exp q Ey 2
q Ey q Ey1f q
Ey Ey Ey
⎛ ⎞
− − σ⎜ ⎟
πσ⎝ ⎠
=
−⎡ ⎤
− − σ⎢ ⎥
σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞
− σ⎢ ⎥
−⎜ ⎟
= + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟σπ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟σ σ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− − σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤
− −
−⎢ ⎥
= + +⎢ ⎥
σ σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2 22S
S S S S
2S
S
22 S
S
2S
S
Ey q Ey q 2Ey q Ey
f q
Ey
q Ey q
f q
Ey
⎡ ⎤
− σ + − + − +⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥
σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤
− − σ⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥
σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
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Noting that the F(qA) is 
( ) ( ){ }Aq 2A S2SS1F q exp x Ey 2 dx2−∞= − − σπσ∫  
and that the derivative of an integral is equal to the integral of the derivative (if bounds of 
integral do not depend on the variable of integration), we can write 
(4.8)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ }
( ){ }
( )
22 S
q S 2 S2
S2S SS S
q
2 S2
SS
S
2 S2
SS
S
S
x Ey xdF q 1 exp x Ey 2 dx
dEy 2 Ey
x 1 exp x Ey 2
Ey 2
q 1 exp q Ey 2 0
Ey 2
q f q
Ey
−∞
−∞
⎡ ⎤
− − σ⎢ ⎥
= − − σ⎢ ⎥πσ σ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞
= − − − σ⎜ ⎟
πσ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
= − − − σ −⎜ ⎟
πσ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫
. 
Substituting equations (4.7) and (4.8) into (4.6) we obtain an analytical expression of 
marginal expected revenue as 
(4.9) 
[ ]
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
S Q
S
S
S
Q C 22 S
2 Ss o s
2S
S
dE R
EMR p
dEy
q f q Ey q 1 F q
Ey
p p q Ey q
2 f q f q
Ey
= =
⎡ ⎤
− + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− − ⎡ ⎤
− − σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ σ σ + σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
, 
which can be simplified to  
(4.10) ( ) ( )( ) ( )Q Q C S 0EMR p p p 1 F q f q⎡ ⎤= − − − + σ σ⎣ ⎦ 39 
                                                 
39 Note that in case of stochastic prices the result for EMR would be exactly the same as long as prices and yields 
are independent. In this case, prices only need to be replaced by the mean of the expected prices. Stochastic 
prices therefore play no role for the analysis of expected marginal revenues. 
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4.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Expected Marginal Revenues 
Equation (4.10) gives the expected marginal revenue of sugar production for our ‘one 
quota assumption’. It can easily be extended to a ‘more’ quota system. In this section, we will 
analyse the properties of the EMR with respect to the variables on which it depends. Our 
model is therefore extended to a system with A-, B- and even C1-quotas. EMR is then given 
as: 
(4.11) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
A
A B A A S 0
B C1 AB AB S 0
C1 C2 ABC ABC S 0
EMR p
p p 1 F q f q
p p 1 F q f q
p p 1 F q f q
=
⎡ ⎤
− − − + σ σ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤
− − − + σ σ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤
− − − + σ σ⎣ ⎦
 
PA, PB, PC1 and PC2 are the prices for the respective sugar type and qA, qAB and qABC the 
respective cumulated quotas. The EMR of sugar beet production depends on the following 
variables: sugar prices, yield variance, and finally the quota endowments. To analyse the 
impacts of these variables on the EMR, we generate a reference farm with the following 
settings. For better comparability, we take the reference settings from SCHMIDT (2003), but 
transfer beet prices into sugar prices by dividing them by 16% sugar content per beet. 
Table 4.1: Reference data for EMR analysis 
A sugar 
quota
B sugar 
quota
C1 sugar 
quota
coefficient 
of yield 
variation
A sugar 
price
B sugar 
price
C1 sugar 
price
C2 sugar 
price
50 t 10 t 5 t 0.15 363 € 231 € 106 € 69 €
 
Source: SCHMIDT (2003) 
The magnitude of these numbers is not important for now, since we are analysing only the 
general properties of the EMR function.40 A comparison between expected marginal revenues 
and marginal revenues without stochastic yields is given in  
                                                 
40 Note that both C-sugar prices seem to be generally lower than our own estimates for Germany given in 
Table 3.5. There are two main reasons for this: (1) Our estimates include discharges and mark ups not 
included here and (2) the prices used by SCHMIDT (2003) refer to another time period. 
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Figure 4.3. Both variables are evaluated at different relations of the expected production to 
the A+B quota endowment.  
 
Figure 4.3: Expected marginal revenues of sugar production 
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  Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The marginal revenue of sugar production equals the respective price for the four different 
beet types. The expected marginal revenue (EMR), hence, smoothes out the characteristic 
kinks of the marginal revenue function, while both are congruent at both endings of the 
graphs. While a farmer producing sugar at marginal costs of about 300 €/t exactly fills his 
A-quota if he applies classical profit maximisation, he will not fulfil his A-quota under 
expected profit maximisation because getting less money for sugar produced beyond the 
A-quota is for him a greater loss than not completely filling his A-quota. On the other hand, a 
farmer with marginal costs of about 90 €/t supplies under EMR assumptions C2-beets, which 
he would not have done as a profit maximiser, because the expected loss of not filling his 
quota  in case of a bad harvest is higher than that of producing C2-beets prices that are lower 
than his marginal costs. 
Now we examine how expected marginal revenues depend on the different variables that 
are part of its definition. The EMR in  
Figure 4.3 is our starting point and will be repeated in all following figures. We start with: 
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Changes in the quota endowments 
Figure 4.4: Expected marginal revenues and quota changes (1) 
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  Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 4.4 shows that a higher B-quota reduces the slope of the EMR function while it is 
made steeper by a reduction of the B-quota. A higher B-quota therefore triggers higher 
production as long as marginal costs are not so high or so low that B-quota changes do not 
matter. Changes in C1-quotas have principally the same effect, but of a lower magnitude 
because price differences and absolute quota changes are lower. It is very likely that rising 
quotas trigger rising production; it may be more interesting to graph the EMR against the 
expected sugar production relative to the A+B-quota. Then, the picture looks different:  
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Figure 4.5: Expected marginal revenues and quota changes (2) 
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  Source: Author’s calculations 
At first sight, it is somewhat surprising that a higher B-quota now reduces the slope of the 
EMR function because with the same marginal costs the corresponding supply quantities 
relative to the A+B-quota would be lower. But imagine a farmer planning to fill his 
A+B-quota in the reference and then the B-quota is reduced. The probability that the A-sugar 
price is relevant in case of a bad harvest is then higher than before. Consequently, the 
expected marginal revenue rises as well if the farmer still plans to fill his quota exactly. A 
reduction of B-quotas can therefore trigger higher shares of C-sugar. 
Changes in sugar prices 
The impacts of price changes on the EMR of sugar beet production are obvious. Only 
those parts of the EMR function where the respective price plays a role are affected. A farmer 
who produces at marginal costs of 200 €, for example, is only affected by changes in B-sugar 
prices. A high cost producer, who has marginal costs that amount to about 300 €/t, does not 
care about changes in C-sugar prices, while he is greatly affected by changes in A-sugar 
prices. The contrary is true for a low cost producer who will react to C-price changes but not 
at all to varying A-prices. The impacts of varying C1-prices are obviously small but only as 
long as the C1-prices are only slightly higher than those for C2-sugar. If C1-beets received the 
same price as B-beets, this would trigger higher shares of C-sugar as well.  
Incentives to Supply Sugar Beets 
Expected Profit Maximisation 
 
 
60 
Figure 4.6: EMR for different sugar prices 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Mixed price system 
A special feature of European sugar markets is that processing firms have the possibility 
to pay farmers based on mixed prices. That means farmers receive the same price, regardless 
of whether they produce within the A-quota or within the B-quota. This system is 
implemented in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Greece, and the United Kingdom. 
The effects of such a system are shown in Figure 4.7. Compared to the classical payment 
scheme, the maximum values of the EMR functions are lower. But the decreasing part of the 
functions is moved to the right. A farmer producing at marginal costs of 200 € would cultivate 
more beets under a mixed price system than in the reference because it is now more 
‘expensive’ for him not to fill the B-quota. If there a mixed price system was implemented 
that also contained C1-beets, the effect would be even greater. Such a system is actually 
implemented in the Netherlands where farmers receive the mixed price for 106% of total 
quotas (LINDE et al. 2000). Generally speaking, mixed price payment schemes trigger higher 
C-sugar productions, as long as marginal costs of sugar production do not equal A- or C-beet 
prices. 
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Figure 4.7: EMR and mixed price systems 
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Source: Author’s calculations  
Changes in yield variance 
Figure 4.8: EMR for different yield variations 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Higher yield variation means in this context nothing but higher uncertainty. A C-sugar 
producing farm has to cope with a higher probability that B- or even A-sugar prices are 
relevant, so that the EMR function takes a higher value. A high cost producer, who does not 
completely fill his quotas, however, is faced with a higher probability that C-prices will be 
relevant for him. Consequently, expected marginal revenues are lower. One can see that a 
certain point exists – in our example at marginal costs of about 150 €/t – where the EMR 
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value does not react to changing expected yield variance. Here both effects, that of a higher 
probability of C-beet prices and that of A-beet prices, compensate each other. 
This small sensitivity analysis gives us an idea of how the expected marginal revenues of 
sugar production depend on certain variables. It becomes apparent that changing different 
economic variables will affect sugar production in different ways. All reactions are strongly 
dependant on the marginal costs of sugar production. The distinction between C1- and 
C2-sugar seems to be of minor importance under the assumed conditions. Therefore, we 
further refrain from using a C1/C2 differentiation and return to the classical case of A-, B-, 
and C-sugar.  
In the next section we will examine whether the framework of expected profit 
maximization can contribute to explain the observed C-sugar amounts in the EU. 
4.1.4 Contribution to Explain European C-Sugar Production 
We will now analyse observed sugar quantities in the EU Member States with respect to 
expected profit maximisation. In the first step, we treat each country as if it were one farm. 
This ignores all differences between farms, but in the second step, an analysis at farm level 
will be carried out.  
Analysis at EU Member State level 
As in section 3 and for better comparability with HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a), we deal 
with average figures during the years 1997-1999. Each aggregated national farm for now is 
assumed to own the national quota endowment. We take the A-, B- and C-sugar prices from 
the farm quota estimation in section 3.1 and calculate their weighted averages during the three 
years. The national yield variation calculated based on FADN is explained in the farm level 
analysis in the subsequent section. Production quantities and yields are taken from the CoCo41 
data base. To compare the observed sugar productions with the optimal one under expected 
profit maximisation, it is necessary to know the marginal costs of sugar production. For our 
analysis, we use our estimates shown in Table 3.6. For simplification we assume the national 
marginal production costs of sugar to be independent of sugar beet acreage. 
Figure 4.9 shows for France what the optimal sugar production would be under 
profit maximisation. On the x axis, sugar production quantities relative to the quota 
endowment are given. The red dotted line is the marginal cost curve of the French producer 
estimated at 168 €/t of sugar and assumed to be independent of the total production quantity. 
                                                 
41 See section 5.1.1 
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At the point where the marginal cost curve crosses the EMR function (at about 93%) the 
optimal sugar production is found. The observed production, hence, is given at 124% of the 
quota endowment. If that were the planned production of a producer that maximises expected 
profits, it would mean that his marginal costs of sugar production only amount to about 
120 €/t, which corresponds to only about 19 €/t of sugar beet.42 Our own estimates and those 
of the three other sources analysed in section 3.3, suggest that this would be quite low.  
Figure 4.9: Expected profit maximization of an average French sugar beet farmer 
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Source: author’s calculations 
The picture looks similar for most of the 13 EU Member States. But there are some 
countries where marginal costs at the observed production are closer to our estimates than in 
France. The optimal sugar production at estimated marginal costs under expected profit 
maximization, estimated marginal costs, and marginal cost at observed production quantities 
for the time period 1997 to 1999 are given in Table 4.2. Member States are sorted by the 
difference between estimated marginal costs and theoretical ones at observed sugar 
production under expected profit maximization. We find Greece at the top. According to their 
EMR function, they even produce at higher marginal costs than the estimated ones. 
Consequently, observed production is below the theoretical optimum. Greece is followed by 
two countries, where estimated marginal costs and those at the observed production are 
almost equal, Spain and the Netherlands. In the case of the average Dutch farmer, this is only 
because we enhanced the national quota endowment by 6% since LINDE et al. (2000) point out 
that in the Dutch payment scheme for sugar beets, the mixed price is paid for up to 106% of 
                                                 
42 Sugar content of 16% 
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the quota endowment. At position four and five we find Italy and Finland where observed and 
optimal production are not far apart. Starting with Austria, the gap between estimated 
marginal costs and those at observed supply quantities increases notably. Especially in the 
main C-sugar producing countries, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, expected profit 
maximization seems to be insufficient to explain beet producer’s behaviour. 
Table 4.2: Optimal and observed sugar production and corresponding marginal costs of 
sugar production under expected profit maximization, averages for 1997-
1999 
Sugar production 
in expected profit 
maximum / quota  
at estimated 
marginal costs
Observed sugar 
production / quota 
Estimated marginal 
costs  (€/t of sugar)
Marginal costs 
at the observed 
production     
(€/t of sugar)
EL 0.94 0.82 318.38 346.64
ES 1.03 1.04 233.02 224.73
NL 0.98 1.00 236.09 225.22
FI 0.96 1.02 254.72 237.32
IT 0.98 1.04 260.9 241.51
AT 1.02 1.24 156.48 126.6
DK 0.96 1.26 179.75 136.39
IR 0.94 1.06 213.58 167.2
FR 0.92 1.24 168.27 119.29
BL 1.00 1.16 182.61 130.93
SE 0.94 1.08 204.52 151.7
DE 0.92 1.20 201.03 141.35
UK 0.98 1.32 214.14 131.22
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
We should still keep in mind that the current analysis is based on average beet producers 
and disregards potential aggregation problems. That means in each country we find farmers 
with higher and lower marginal costs compared to the ones given in Table 2.1. Consequently, 
there might be farms where the optimal sugar production with respect to expected profit 
maximisation is closer to or farther away from the observed one. To test this theory, we will 
return to farm level analysis in the next section. 
Incentives to Supply Sugar Beets 
Expected Profit Maximisation 
 
 
65 
Analysis at farm level 
In the previous sections we pointed out potential problems with aggregate or average 
analysis. In each country we will find a distribution of marginal costs across farms around the 
average. This implies the general inability of the aggregate model to represent producer 
behaviour: for example, the national quota might be over-filled even if average values would 
indicate differently. To get an overview of distributional implications we calculate optimal 
sugar production quantities for sugar producing farms in the FADN database and compare 
them to observed ones. We use the same sample as in the quota estimation in section 3.1. 
Production quantities, sugar yields43 and the respective prices and marginal costs are 
calculated as three-year averages for each individual farm. Yield variation, however, is 
assumed to be constant (relative to the mean production) across farms within one region 
because an individual farm calculation of yield variance across maximal ten, but mostly about 
five years would result in a poor estimate. This is a simplification as well, because in reality, a 
farmer observes the yield fluctuation on his own farm and is less interested in that of his 
neighbours. The regional yield variance is calculated across all farms in one region that 
produce sugar beets in the years 1995-1999. Again, we use in each region only the 95 
quantiles of the probability mass in order to eliminate outliers. The regional coefficient of 
yield variation is calculated as: 
(4.12) 
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Ti is a cross set that includes for all farms i the dates of the period 1995-1999 where they 
are part of the sample. Vr is the coefficient of variation in region r, nr the number of 
observations in a region, yi,t the sugar yield of farm i in year t and µr the average regional 
sugar yield. FQit and MCit denote farm quotas and marginal costs.44 
As a result of this calculation, the yield variation amounts about 16% of the respective 
mean yield on EU average. It varies among the different countries and regions. Higher yield 
variances are found in Greece, Finland, Italy and Spain while they are lower in Belgium, the 
                                                 
43 Sugar beet yields are calculated by dividing production quantities by the respective acreages. Those are then 
multiplied by the average national sugar content derived from the CoCo data base. Thereby we disregard 
heterogeneity across farms in terms of sugar contents. 
44 We should add that yield variation is only estimated in those regions where at least 20 observations are 
remaining.  If the number of observations is lower, as in some regions in south Italy, the national average 
yield variation is used. 
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Netherlands and Denmark. The highest variance in sugar yields is found in Pais Vasco in 
Spain with 29%, while the northern German regions (11%) and Champagne-Ardenne in 
France (10%) show the lowest yield variations. As apparent in Figure 8.2 in the Annex, there 
seems to be a south-north decline in relative yield variation. 
Having defined all necessary variables to calculate the profit maximising production 
quantities for each individual farm and our base year, we can compare the results to the 
observed supply quantities. The ratio of expected profit maximising production over observed 
production is the indicator presented in Figure 4.10 in terms of Kernel density estimates. 
Figure 4.10: Kernel density estimates of optimal over observed production under 
expected profit maximization 
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  Source: Author’s calculations 
For better orientation, the functions are marked every 0.25 step of the support. In France, 
Denmark, Austria, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany we find hardly a single farm 
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with an observed production quantity above the expected profit maximum. In the other 
countries, there may be farmers whose expected profit could be the maximised objective 
function as a number of farms actually produce around the derived quantity (ratio takes an 
value is unity).45  
Under the given assumptions, we conclude that expected profit maximisation seems to be 
insufficient to explain observed sugar productions for most farmers across the 13 Member 
States considered. In order to rescue the hypothesis, one would have to refer to particularly 
high yield variability at particular locations which is neglected in our use of the average 
standard deviation or speculate that highly efficient farmers have not been included in the 
FADN sample. Both are unrealistic assumptions. 
The next chapter analyses whether the observed C-sugar quantities in the EU Member 
States are possibly the outcome of utility maximisation with risk averse behaviour.  
4.2 Utility Maximisation under Risk Aversion 
Expected profit maximization implies risk neutral behaviour of farmers. Risk averse 
behaviour can be modelled with a utility maximization framework where expected profit and 
variance of profits enter the utility function as arguments. To some extent, risk averse farmers 
are willing to accept lower expected profits as long as the profit variance decreases 
sufficiently. Which combination of profit mean and variance is optimal depends on the degree 
of risk aversion. We will now extend the analysis of the previous section to examine the 
additional importance of the variance of profits. 
4.2.1 Mathematical Framework 
The first required element, the definition of expected revenues, has already been derived 
in section 4.1.2 (equation (4.10)). It depends on planned production, the quota endowment, 
variance of yields, and prices. The variance of expected sugar beet revenues can be computed 
based on the definition of revenue given in equation (4.2). When we apply the formula for 
linear combination of two random variables46 we obtain the following result: 
(4.13) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2Q C Q C
S S S
Q C Q C
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VAR(R ) p VAR y p p VAR y
2 p p p COV y , y
= + −
+ −
. 
                                                 
45 Greece was excluded from this analysis due to data errors. 
46 See for example GREENE (1990), chapter 3.6.2. 
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Let us look at the different terms of the sum. The first contains the already used yield 
variance: 
(4.14) ( ) ( )2SSVAR y = σ  
Using the previously introduced notations, one can apply a formula for the variance of 
censored variables47 for the second term: 
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And finally we need the covariance of the two variables. Starting with the definition of the 
covariance one can write: 
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The second equal sign follows from the possibility to divide expectations into conditional 
expectations. We distinguish between two probability distributions conditional on ys being 
above and below q. Consequently, both distributions are truncated normal distributions, the 
first one being truncated from below, the second from above. Note that Eys>q[ys] is different 
from E[ySC] since the former is a truncated and the latter a censored variable. We can now 
substitute the relevant formulas for means of truncated, censored, and squared variables into 
(4.16) (GREENE 1990, chapter 21). The weighting factors (P[y<q] and P[y>q] are given by the 
value of the cumulated normal distribution at q and its complement value, respectively. 
                                                 
47 See for example GREENE (1990), p. 726. In our case, it makes no difference whether we use the distribution of 
the variable ySC that is censored at zero, or that of the variable yS, censored at the quota endowment. The 
variance of both distributions is the same. 
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The final formula derived by substituting (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16) into (4.13) is 
considerably more complex than the expected marginal revenue in the previous section. We 
will therefore refrain from writing it out here.48 Instead, we show the general shape of this 
variance function in Figure 4.11. Note that the variance of expected profits equals that of 
expected revenues as long as yield fluctuations do not affect the production costs.49 We keep 
this assumption in order show the interdependencies of expected profits and their variance. 
Figure 4.11: Expected sugar beet profits and the variance of profits 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
To understand this shape it is helpful to look at equation (4.13). Disregarding the price 
weights for now, there are three variance and covariance functions added up, all depending on 
the expectations of sugar production. It turns out that all of them are monotone increasing in 
expected sugar production as visible in the upper part of Figure 4.12. It is further apparent that 
all three functions are asymptotically identical, because increasing planned sugar production 
moves the censoring point of the C-sugar production to the left tail of the pdf so that both 
distributions become identical. Consequently, the variance of sugar production equals that of 
C-sugar production. Also, the covariance of two identical stochastic variables equals their 
variance, so that the functions are identical for high planned sugar production. The slope of all 
three functions depends on the assumed yield variation. The higher it is the steeper they are. 
                                                 
48 The mathematical derivation of the final formula is given in section 8.2. 
49 Some positions of total marginal costs, hence, might be considered stochastic. For example, transportation 
costs of sugar beets to the processing firms will be lower in the case of a bad harvest. The same accounts 
for opportunity costs. A farmer cannot predict his marginal income from competing crops, because yields 
and prices are likely to be uncertain as well. We disregard these points in our analysis. 
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The characteristic shape of the variance of expected profits, however, strongly depends on 
those three functions and on the prices that serve as weights. In the lower part of Figure 4.12, 
we find the three elements of equation (4.13) including the weighting factors. The two 
variances are added while the covariance part is negative because pC is generally lower than 
pQ. Obviously there is a certain scope where the covariance component is absolutely greater 
than the sum of the two variances. This is a necessary condition for the variance of profits to 
have local minima and maxima. One can imagine two cases were this condition is violated. 
Either the variance is extremely high so that the variance of sugar production dominates over 
the whole domain, or the weight of the covariance part is too small to compensate the other 
components. The product 2pQ(pC-pQ) must be of a certain magnitude or, in other words, if the 
difference between quota- and C-sugar prices becomes very small, the variance of expected 
profits might have no local minimum at all. Given the current price differences between 
quota- and C-sugar, the latter is likely to be irrelevant. 
Figure 4.12: Components of the variance of profits 
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It should be pointed out that it would be complicated to extend the system to include more 
quotas, because the variance and covariance of all variables have to be considered. In the case 
of the classical two-quota system, we deal with three normal distributions of which two are 
censored. Their variance will always be a positive part in the expected profit variance 
function. The covariance between the uncensored variable and each of the censored ones 
always accounts negative, but the covariance between the two censored variables accounts 
positive because they are both pre-multiplied by negative price differences. Nonetheless, the 
general conclusions remain the same. 
On the left side of Figure 4.11, we also plot an expected profit function. Where its 
maximum is located naturally depends on the assumed production costs. As long as the 
maximum lies to the left of the variance minimum, there is a certain range where both 
expected profits and their variance decrease. This range is marked with the black frame. Risk 
averse producers will operate within this range because they might forego higher expected 
profits if they gain in turn less profit variance. On the right side of the same figure, expected 
profits and variance are plotted on different axes in a mean-variance diagram. Here, the 
triangle marks again the range, where risk averse cannot be excluded.  
The question is now whether risk averse behaviour is sufficient to explain the observed 
C-sugar quantities in the EU. But before answering this question, we will provide a short 
sensitivity analysis of the variance function with respect to the variables it depends on. 
4.2.2  Sensitivity Analysis of the Variance Function 
The following sensitivity analysis, similar to that of the EMR, is based on the reference 
settings given in Table 4.1 on page 56. We systematically vary the variables of interest ceteris 
paribus and start with: 
Changes in the B-quota endowment 
In Figure 4.13, the B-quota is once reduced and once enhanced by 10% of the A-quota. 
Higher B-quotas shift the variance function to the left. This somewhat counterintuitive result 
depends on the unit of the x axis. If this was expected sugar production instead of the given 
ratio, higher B-quotas would shift the function to the right. But here we face two effects: 
(1) the values of the components of the variance function change and (2) the scaling of the 
x axis as well, because the denominator of the ratio is changed. The most interesting point of 
this analysis is to find out how the variance minimum is affected, because it characterises the 
point of maximum risk aversion. In this case, the location of the variance minimum is nearly 
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the same for the three B-quota endowments. Let us take the example of two producers who 
only differ in terms of their B-quota endowment and who are both so risk averse that they 
plan their sugar production at the minimum of the expected profit variance. The producer with 
the lower B-quota will supply less sugar while the C-sugar share relative to his total quota 
amount will stay almost constant.50 
Figure 4.13: Variance of sugar revenues – changing B-quota 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Changes in yield variance 
Figure 4.14: Variance minimum of sugar revenues – changing yield variance 
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Source: Author’s illustration 
                                                 
50 It should be added that increasing B-quotas are also likely to change the characteristics of the variance 
function. It appears that an additional local minimum occurs if B-quotas become large enough because the 
covariance between sugar production and sugar production above the A-quota is not able to dominate the 
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Changes in yield variance show an interesting result because increasing yield variance 
moves the variance minimum upwards but beyond a certain value downwards again as shown 
in Figure 4.14. Beyond a certain yield variance, no minimum exists at all because the function 
becomes monotone increasing. At this point the positive elements of the variance function 
dominate the negative ones across the entire domain. 
Changing sugar prices 
Figure 4.15: Variance of sugar revenues – changing prices 
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B Price 20% down             
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Variance minimum
Reference Sett ings      
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Source: Author’s calculations 
From Figure 4.15 it becomes apparent that the location of the variance minimum depends 
on all sugar prices. Changing A-prices has the lowest influence on the location of the local 
minimum. There is a tendency that higher A-prices shift the minimum to the right. The same 
accounts for higher B-prices, higher C1-prices and lower C2-prices. Generally one can say 
that the lower the price differences, the closer are the variance minimum and its maximum. 
As in the EMR analysis, paying the same price for B- and C1-sugar tends to result in higher 
                                                                                                                                                        
increasing variance effects. Nonetheless, this appears only for B-quota shares above 40% of the A-quota 
which is not reached by any EU Member State. Consequently, we will disregard that possibility. 
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C-sugar amounts, whereas the distinction between C1- and C2-sugar is of minor importance if 
C1-sugar receives only a slight mark up compared to C2. 
Mixed price system 
The location of the expected profit variance minimum strongly depends on the payment 
scheme. Figure 4.16 clearly shows that effect. The minimum is considerably shifted to the 
right the more prices are mixed. This is because the price differences between quota- and non 
quota-sugar become larger and it is apparent from the previous Figure that greater price 
differences lead to a variance minimum that is associated with larger C-sugar supply. 
Consequently, one would assume that in those EU Member States where mixed prices are 
applied, risk averse behaviour can explain more of the observed C-sugar quantities. This will 
be investigated in section 4.2.3. 
Figure 4.16: Variance of sugar revenues – Mixed price system 
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Expected Sugar Production / (A + B Quota)
Variance minimum
Reference Settings      
M ixed Price (A/B)        
M ixed Price (A/B/C1)        
 
  Source: Author’s calculations 
Stochastic C2 prices 
As we actually deal with uncertainty, one might ask why we examine yield uncertainty but 
not the more common variable in risk analysis – prices. We already mentioned that stochastic 
prices have no influence at all on expected sugar revenues. Their variance, however, depends 
on whether prices are uncertain or not. But are prices really that uncertain for sugar beet 
producers? At least prices for quota beets are laid down in inter-trade agreements between 
farmers and sugar processing firms before sugar beets are seeded. Consequently, it doesn’t 
make much sense to assume them to be uncertain. In contrast, C2-beet prices are derived from 
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the world market price of sugar which is a free market price with considerable fluctuations. It 
is therefore reasonable to evaluate the effect of stochastic C2-beet prices on the variance of 
expected profits.  
Under the condition that C2-prices are uncorrelated with sugar yields and using the 
properties of uncorrelated joint distributions, the variance of expected profits can be written 
as: 
(4.17) 
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This equation is the same as (4.13), except for the additional last line. An extension to a 
multiple quota system is very simple because it does not affect that new component. We 
assume that C2 prices will vary at 30% around the expected value given in Table 4.1. The 
impacts on the variance of expected profits are given in Figure 4.17. 
Figure 4.17: Variance of sugar revenues – stochastic C2-prices 
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Expected Sugar Production / (A + B Quota)
Variance minimum
Reference Settings      
Stochastic C2 Prices        
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Obviously, stochastic C2-prices shift the variance minimum to the left. Consequently, the 
scope where risk aversion is a possible objective becomes smaller. In other words, if we take 
uncertain world sugar market prices into consideration, it tends to lower C-sugar production 
of risk averse producers. 
To summarise, we can see that the shape of the expected profit variance function depends 
on price differences, quota endowments, yield variation and whether prices are stochastic or 
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not. The most interesting question is where the variance minimum is located because it gives 
the point of maximum risk aversion. We will now analyse whether this framework of utility 
maximisation under risk aversion may help explain the observed sugar supply. 
4.2.3 Contribution to Explain European C-Sugar Production 
This section investigates whether the theoretical framework derived in the previous 
section can help to understand why observed sugar quantities are well above the expected 
profit maximum in most EU Member States. The analysis is again carried out for an 
aggregated Member State model and at farm level. 
Analysis at EU Member State level 
The assumptions on prices and marginal costs are the same as in the EMR section. 
Consequently, we identify in Figure 4.18 the same maximum of expected profits at a 
production-quota relation of 92% in France. The calculated variance minimum is found at a 
ratio of 112%.  
Figure 4.18: Expected profits and variance of profits of an average French beet farmer 
0.50 0.92 1.00 1.12 1.24 1.50
Expecte d sugar production / quota
Expected profit maximum
Observed production
Variance minimum
Expected Profits
Variance
 
  Source: Author’s calculations 
We observe, hence, production at 124% of the quota endowment in a range where 
expected profits are decreasing and the variance increasing. Regardless of how the actual 
utility function of a risk-averse producer weights profits and variances, all combinations that 
are right of the variance minimum lead to a lower utility than those within the range between 
profit maximum and variance minimum. We must therefore conclude that utility 
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maximization with risk aversion cannot explain the observed sugar production in France in 
this average producer model.  
The picture looks different in Belgium as is apparent from Figure 4.19. The observed 
production lies well within the range where risk-averse behaviour is possible. Although the 
picture implies a high degree of risk aversion because the observed production is closer to the 
variance minimum than to the expected profit maximum, risk aversion might explain the 
observed sugar quantities in Belgium. 
Figure 4.19: Expected profits and variance of profits of an average Belgian beet farmer 
0.50 1.00 1.16 1.26 1.50
Expe cted sugar production / quota
Expected profit maximum
Observed production
Variance minimum
Expected Profits
Variance
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
But why do we find the variance minimum in France at 112% and in Belgium at 126% of 
the production over quota ratio? The answer can be derived from the sensitivity analysis in 
the previous section. In terms of yield variance, both countries do not differ much from each 
other. The B-quota shares, however, are different. In Belgium it amounts to about 22% of the 
A-quota and in France to about 27%. We already have shown that higher B-quota shares 
move the variance minimum slightly to the left. In terms of prices, a major difference between 
the two countries is that in Belgium a mixed price for A- and B-sugar is paid. Applying mixed 
prices ceteris paribus, leads to a variance minimum lying at a higher production quantity to 
quota ratio compared to the classical payment scheme (see page 74). 
The influence of the price system on the variance minimum is further stressed in 
Table 4.3. The lowest production quantities over quota ratios at the variance minimum are 
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found in countries applying the classical payment scheme, while they are generally higher in 
mixed price countries.51  
Table 4.3: Measures for average risk aversion for 12 EU Member States  
Observed 
production/quota 
Sugar 
production/quota at 
variance minimum
Percent of 
maximum risk 
aversion
AT 1.24 1.14 >100
DK 1.26 1.14 >100
FR 1.24 1.12 >100
DE 1.20 1.14 >100
UK 1.32 1.28 >100
SE 1.08 1.16 64
BL 1.16 1.26 62
IR 1.06 1.28 35
IT 1.04 1.18 30
FI 1.02 1.20 25
NL 1.00 1.24 8
ES 1.04 1.22 5
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The last column in Table 4.3 is called “percent of maximum risk aversion”. This 
measurement of risk aversion is simply calculated as the difference between observed 
production and profit maximum divided by the difference between variance minimum and 
profit maximum. Therefore, a value of 0% means risk neutrality and 100% implies production 
at the variance minimum as the maximal possible production that can be explained by risk-
averse behaviour.52 In Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, risk 
aversion obviously cannot fully explain the observed production, since it is above the variance 
minimum. In Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Finland and the Netherlands, risk 
aversion would be a satisfactory model.  
                                                 
51 Greece is excluded from this analysis because a very high relative yield variance and relative small price 
differences lead to a variance function without a local minimum. 
52 Admittedly, it would be desirable to use measures of risk aversion that are well known from literature (e.g. 
HIRSCHLEIFER AND RILEY, 1992). Unfortunately, such an analysis would require the definition of utility 
functions that classically depend on income or the share of agricultural income in the total family income as 
well as personal preferences which are all unknown to us. Nonetheless, our approach is sufficient to show 
how risk-averse behaviour may possibly contribute to observed C-sugar quantities. 
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Analysis at farm level 
This variance analysis is also carried out at the farm level. We calculate kernel densities of 
the pdfs of the ratio variance minimum over observed production for twelve EU Member 
States. This fraction indicates if risk aversion might explain observed production quantities, 
because this is only possible for values above one.  
Figure 4.20: Kernel density estimates of variance minimum over observed production 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
Figure 4.20 shows that in France, Denmark, Germany and Austria there is hardly a farm 
that supplies sugar below the minimum of profit variance. We can therefore confirm that risk 
aversion is insufficient to explain observed sugar quantities in these countries under the 
estimated quotas, prices and yield variations. From Table 4.3 the same conclusion might be 
drawn for the United Kingdom, but Figure 4.20 shows that about half of all farms in this 
country are producing below the variance minimum so that risk averse behaviour would be a 
valid model to explain observed behaviour for those farms. Whereas in Sweden or Italy we 
find a larger part of the probability mass to have a value below one of the selected ratios 
which we did not see in the aggregated view. It is clear that farm heterogeneity should not be 
neglected. 
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It should be pointed out that, in contrast to the farm analysis of the EMR, these results are 
independent of marginal cost estimates, because we assume them to be non-stochastic and 
consequently, they do not affect the location of the variance minimum.  
4.2.4 Downward Risk and Upward Potential 
Risk-averse behaviour, as discussed above, implies that farmers plan their sugar beet 
allocation not only based on expected profits, but on their variance as well. One might argue 
that the total variance of expected profits is a weak measurement to quantify the risk 
associated with a certain planned production, because it does not distinguish between the 
downward risk that the final profits might fall short of expected profits and the upward 
potential that they might be exceeded. It might therefore be possible that risk-averse farmers 
do not include the upward “risk” in their planning situation and only concentrate on the 
downward risk side. 
With respect to the analysis carried out in the previous section, such a distinction is 
unnecessary as long as the distribution of profits at a certain planned production is symmetric 
to its expectation value. ’The variance of outcomes that lie above the expectation value were 
the same as that of those below it and the minimum of total variance, hence, would be found 
at the same planned production as that of the downward component. However, profits from 
sugar beet production are not necessarily distributed symmetrically due to the interplay of 
several normally distributed and censored variables. We will therefore now analyse whether 
the conditional variance of profits below the expectation value has a different shape than that 
of total variance. For this purpose, we will consider again the reference farm given in 
Table 4.1 but use only the one-quota case for simplicity. For a number of planned production 
quantities (E[y]) we draw the final production (y) 200.000 times from a normal distribution 
and calculate the expected profits and the total standard deviation function similar as in the 
previous sections.53 Additionally, we now calculate the average downward standard deviation 
of profits conditional on the actual profit being below their expected value.54 Results are 
given in Figure 4.21. Obviously, the downward standard deviation of profits below their 
expected value is higher or equal to the total one. If it is higher, it means in other words that 
                                                 
53 We do not calculate variances but standard deviations in order to fit all curves into one graphic. The general 
shape of the variance function is the same as that of standard deviations which are their square roots. 
54 We calculate the average squared differences of profits that fall below expected profits and take the square 
root of that value. 
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expected profits are distributed such that the density function is flatter and wider for profits 
below the expectation value while it is steeper and narrower for higher ones. 
Figure 4.21: Expected profits, total and downward standard deviation 
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      Source: Author’s calculations 
This coherence is shown in Figure 4.22. Here we graph the density functions of profits at 
different planned productions. The part of the probability mass where profits lie above the 
expectation is marked with red stripes. It becomes obvious that the density functions are not 
symmetric around their means in a range where the probability to over- or to undershoot the 
quota is relevant, while they are symmetric if planned production moves away from the sugar 
quota. We further see that the probability to overshoot the planned profits seems to increase in 
this range while the spread of observations is higher for observations below the mean.  
Given the shape of the standard deviation function in Figure 4.21, we recognise that its 
minimum is found at a higher production level than that of the total standard deviation. We 
conclude therefore that concentration on the downward risk side provides further potential to 
explain observed C-sugar quantities. For two main reasons, we refrain from analysing this 
potential as detailed as in the previous sections: 
  The mathematical framework to derive the downward standard deviation function 
goes beyond the scope of this study.  
 Even if the concentration on downward risk might be able to explain more parts of 
the observed sugar supply in those regions where we were not able to explain it up 
to this point, we would have to refer to the assumption of extreme high-risk 
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aversion there. From our point of view, it is not likely that the most risk-averse 
farmers would be found in the main C-sugar producing countries, which are said to 
be the most competitive in Europe. Nonetheless, this cannot be ruled out.  
Figure 4.22: Distribution of profits at different planned production quantities 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
4.3 Further Explanations for Observed C-Sugar Quantities 
The results of the previous sections suggest that there are further reasons that might trigger 
additional sugar supply on European markets. In this section, we will analyse a number of 
specialities of sugar- and sugar beet production that might help explain the observed C-sugar 
quantities. We will start with a theory closely connected to the previous risk analysis. 
4.3.1 Risk Management 
It is appropriate to discuss the concept of risk management in a framework of sugar beet 
production and yield uncertainty. HARDAKER et al. (1997) define the process of risk 
management by simplifying it into three basic steps: 
 Identify the sources of risk or the uncertain consequences that may impact an 
outcome of interest pertaining to the operation. 
 Measure the effects of risk sources by determining the probability of their 
occurrence and the severity of their consequences. 
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 Manage the risk by understanding where current risk management strategies do not 
address the sources of risk adequately and then implement more effective 
strategies. 
Since we are concentrating on yield uncertainty, the first step has already been taken. Of 
course, there may be a number of other risks (price uncertainty for in- and outputs, quota 
uncertainty55, etc.), but we will not include them for now. The second step is the search for a 
tool with which this risk can be measured. In section 4.2.4, we chose expected profits and the 
variance of profits as an indicator to maximise the utility of the sugar beet production 
operation. JORION (2001) defines a risk management tool that focuses specifically on the 
downside risk facing an operation, and measures these risks in financial terms by using a 
single monetary value that is easy to interpret: The Value at Risk (VaR). How one can apply 
the concept of VaR in agriculture is described by HOTZ et al. (2004) with the example of 
uncertainty in pig production and marketing. They calculate the 20% VaR for different risk 
management strategies. In their example, 20% VaR means the cash flow losses that occur 
with a 20% chance in the selected period. He shows that taking into account different risk 
sources affects the cash flow losses considerably. The choice of the 20% VAR, however, is 
just an example because it is up to the farmer to choose it. One can further think of a situation 
where the farmer is not interested in the cash flow loss at a certain probability, but – the other 
way around – in the probability to meet a certain cash flow loss. A farmer chooses from 
different strategies the specific one with the lowest probability at which the trigger cash flow 
loss might occur (last step of risk management – choose the strategy). 
We can easily construct a VaR example for the sugar beet case. Let us assume that the 
farmer of our example farm (Table 4.1) wants to minimise the risk that his profits from sugar 
beet production fall short of a certain trigger level. As the expected profit maximum is found 
at about 7000 € in our example, we choose 4 trigger levels at 6000€, 5500€, 5000€ and 
4000€. Then we take the Monte Carlo simulations from section 4.2.4 and calculate for each 
planned production the share of observations where profits are below the different trigger 
levels.56 Results are given in Figure 4.23.  
                                                 
55 See section 4.3.2. 
56 The share of observations below a trigger level equals the probability to undercut that level because we 
compute enough observations for a convenient approximation of the real distributions. 
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Figure 4.23: Probability for profits being below a certain trigger value 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Obviously, the lowest probability that the final sugar beet profits are below the different 
trigger levels is found in the C-sugar producing range. The lower the level of profit that we do 
not want to undercut, the more C-sugar production is found at the minimum of those 
probability functions. It is therefore possible that such risk management behaviour potentially 
leads to C-sugar production even if we keep in mind that other risks might be included in a 
VaR analysis. But again there are reasons why we deem their contribution to the observed 
C-sugar supply to be marginal:  
 If we compare the probability to undercut the trigger levels at the expected profit 
maximum with its minimum, we see that the probability reduction is only 
marginal. For the 6000€ border, it is reduced from 25% to 18%. The farmer only 
gains a 7% reduction in the probability that his profits are lower than 6000€ at the 
costs of a loss in expected revenues of about 400€. For the lower trigger levels, his 
gains are even less and the costs even higher.  
 The VaR focuses only on the downward risk side which often limits the upward 
potential of financial performance as well. Like most risk management tools, it 
does not deal with maximising financial performance and choosing the most 
profitable risk management strategy. 
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Nonetheless, European farmers might apply risk management strategies rendering an 
additional piece in the puzzle of possible C-sugar explanations. 
4.3.2 The Role of Expected Quota Changes  
The theory presented in this sub-section assumes that producers expect future changes in 
their quota endowment to be based on current production. The higher current production is, 
the higher is the expected quota increase or the lower the expected quota loss. Farmers pay, so 
to speak, an insurance premium in the form of a higher beet production. Two hypotheses can 
be distinguished: 
Farmers expect to gain additional quotas. 
Suppose that farmers expect that a small amount of sugar beet quota will be reallocated 
every year. This happens when quotas return to the sugar processors from farmers abandoning 
their production or from quota cuts to farmers who do not fill their quotas. In such cases, 
sugar processors can redistribute this amount of quota among other producers. Further assume 
that the sugar companies distribute those quotas among the farmers of a region using a certain 
key that reflects a smaller quota package for a farm with a lower production (relative to its 
quota endowment) and vice versa. Consequently, each unit of beet production delivers an 
additional value in terms of raising the expected additional quota allocation to farmers. This 
additional value is the discounted stream of expected profit gains for the time after quota 
reallocation.  
Farmers expect (or fear) that their quota will be cut. 
This hypothesis is probably more relevant than the first one, because the probability of a 
quota cut seems higher than that of a quota increase to farmers through reallocation, 
especially in the context of the recent CMO reform proposals including quota reductions. 
Modelling the impact of expected quota cuts on the preferability of C-sugar production today 
is very similar to the case of expected additional quotas. The higher the production, the higher 
the probability of a lower quota cut which means a higher future value from the point of view 
of a beet producer.  
HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) base their analysis on both hypotheses by adding an 
insurance mark up on C-beet prices. This mark up depends on quotas and quota beet prices so 
that even regions supplying a large amount of C-sugar respond to changes in these two 
variables. They point out that the additional value that is added to C-sugar beet prices depends 
strongly on three variables: 
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 Expected quantities of distributed and reduced quota amounts 
 The differences between A-, B-, and C-sugar beet prices 
 The production of each producer in the base period 
The most uncertain variable is the first one, because there is only little information on the 
handling of quota cuts and redistribution of quotas. One incident occurred in 2003 in Ireland 
where 132 beet growers under-supplied their beet delivery rights by over 10%. Their quotas 
were reduced by the amount of the shortfall (IRISH FARMER’S JOURNALINTERACTIVE 2003). In 
regulation 90/45/EEC the European Commission lays down the rules for the Belgian sugar 
markets. There it says “….(29) Following the 1986/87 marketing year, the delivery rights thus 
allocated to the various growers (or suppliers) concerned can be readjusted according to the 
following basic rule governing the adjustment of rights: each winter in which an 
undertaking's average production for the last three marketing years is below its maximum 
quota, half of the delivery shortfalls of the growers (calculated by the difference between the 
supply right allocated during the last marketing year and the average of the supplies carried 
out during the last three marketing years) are allocated to the traditional growers (or 
suppliers) in proportion to the average of their deliveries during the last three marketing 
years. The factory committee (1), in agreement with the coordinating committee (2), can 
allocate a portion of such available quantities to solve special cases. ….” 
Nonetheless, the amount of actual quota redistributions in the last decade in the EU 
Member States has been very minor.  But from the farmer’s point of view, it is not that 
relevant how often it occurs as long as the processing firm can make them believe that they 
practice quota cuts and redistributions. Processing firms might have an interest to do this in 
order to fully use their capacities (comp. SCHMIDT, 2003). 
In their analysis, HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) assume that farmers expect every year a 
quota reduction of 2% and speculate that they might gain 0.5% additional quota.57 Based on a 
time horizon of 13 years and a redistribution key that reflects a higher quota package or a 
smaller quota reduction for regions with high C-sugar supply in the base period, they 
calculate the additional C-sugar beet value per ton of beets at about 26% of the respective 
quota rent on average across the European NUTS 2 regions. It varies between 20% and 30%.  
                                                 
57 The assumption of 2% yearly quota reductions is based on their expected quota reductions due to the EBA 
agreement. An expected reduction of 25% is distributed among 13 years. Lacking an empirical basis about 
the amount of expected yearly quota distribution, they choose a relatively small value for redistributed 
quantities. 
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Unfortunately, an empirically based calculation of the additional expected income coming 
from these speculative motives is hardly feasible. Nonetheless, this theory can contribute 
towards explaining observed C-sugar supply. 
4.3.3 Discontinuity in Land Allocation 
Discontinuity in land allocation at farm level might possibly be relevant. It is 
understandable that farmers prefer to avoid cultivating more than one crop per plot, because 
such divisions trigger additional costs.58 In that case, they face a finite number of possible 
field combinations. So far, our economic analysis of sugar land use assumes that land 
allocation is continuous. In this section we assume that sugar beet farmers are expected profit 
maximisers and calculate their optimal sugar beet land allocation according to the theory 
derived in section 4.1. The resulting optimal land allocation has to be approximated by any 
possible combination of plots. The farmer has then to decide whether he will supply above the 
theoretical optimum or below it given that he is not able to meet the continuous optimum 
exactly. 
We will now examine if there is any reason why farmers would prefer to round up the 
optimal land allocation according to the next larger field combination. In Figure 4.24 we show 
which variables are important to decide whether rounding up or down is the more profitable 
strategy. Let us assume a farmer knows his expected marginal revenue function. We further 
assume that he has constant marginal production costs given by MC1. The theoretical optimal 
production xopt is then given at the intersection of marginal costs and expected marginal 
revenues. For now we assume that this optimum is located exactly in the middle of the 
smallest final plot the farmer decides to cultivate with beets. If he does not want to divide that 
plot, he has to decide whether to grow sugar beets on the entire plot (round up to xup) or not to 
cultivate beets on it (round down to xdown). The answer to the question which decision is more 
profitable is found in the two shaded areas (a) and (b) in Figure 4.24. They represent the loss 
of expected profits compared to the optimal situation. We have chosen MC1 so that both areas 
amount to the same size. In this case, the farmer loses the same amount of money, 
independent of the direction he takes. It can easily be shown that shifting the marginal cost 
function to higher levels leads to a lower size of the shaded area (a). Consequently, rounding 
down is the better decision if marginal costs are higher than MC1. Inversely, lower marginal 
                                                 
58 The larger the plot, the lower the average costs because some cost components (make-ready time, headland 
cultivation) decrease with increasing plot sizes. If the harvest is done by a company, they often charge a 
certain fix amount per plot additionally to the hectare payment. 
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costs make area (b) increase relative to (a) so that rounding up is the more profitable decision. 
In Figure 4.24 we further define a linear increasing marginal cost function MC2 in order to 
show that the conclusions from this examination are independent of the assumption whether 
marginal costs are constant or linear increasing. It can be seen that the areas (c) and (d) have 
the same size so that they compensate each other. The decision remains a matter of (a) and 
(b).59  
Figure 4.24: Discontinuities in land allocation in a framework of expected profit 
maximisation 
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Source: Author’s illustration 
The relevance of this effect, however, cannot be very easily quantified. Nonetheless, we 
might obtain further insights from farm data. We use again our estimates on quotas, prices 
and marginal costs for sugar producing farms in the FADN sample. It is possible to analyse if 
the marginal cost estimates generally lie below or above the marginal costs indicated by MC1. 
The definition of MC1 in a one-quota case is given by the inflexion point of the EMR 
function. This can be derived by setting the second derivative of the EMR equation (4.10) to 
zero. The inflexion point is then found at an expected production of 
                                                 
59 For non linear marginal cost functions this rule does not hold. However, given that the range between xup and 
xdown is limited, the assumption of linear increasing marginal costs might render this a satisfactory 
approximation. 
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(4.18) 
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EySi is generally lower than q because the factor in front of n of σ0 and asymptotically 
reaches 1 when σ0 goes to 0 and approaches 0 if σ0 becomes infinite.61 Substituting equation 
(4.18) into (4.10) gives us the corresponding expected marginal revenue at the inflexion point 
which we calculate for each FADN farm in our sample. We then calculate the share of farms, 
where the estimated marginal costs lie below the EMR at the inflexion point.62 Results are 
given in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4: Shares of farms with marginal costs below the inflexion point of EMRs 
Share of farms with 
marginal costs below 
inflexion point (%)
Austria 96.9
France 96.4
Denmark 94.0
Germany 92.7
Finland 85.4
Belgium 84.2
Spain 83.7
Italy 76.0
United Kingdom 73.0
The Netherlands 70.5
Ireland 54.7
Greece 48.9
Sweden 37.0
 
      Source: Author’s calculations 
Obviously, in most EU Member States, the share of farms where marginal production 
costs are below the EMR at the inflexion point is above 50%. In Denmark, Austria, France 
                                                 
60 The derivation of equation (4.18) is available from the author upon request. 
61 The denominator of the pre-factor is always greater than the numerator if σ0 greater than zero, which can 
easily be shown mathematically. The differences between both becomes smaller, the smaller σ0 is and vice 
versa. 
62 The simplification to a one-quota system creates imprecision in cases where no mixed prices are applied, but 
we only intend to show general tendencies. 
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and Germany, the C-sugar supplying States, these farms amount to above 90%. Given these 
results, we can conclude that in these countries there is a clear tendency to fill the last plot 
entirely with sugar beets rather than to abandon it. 
We are aware that this analysis is based on the assumption that the decision on the final 
plot is symmetric to the continuous expected profit maximum. Of course, it is unlikely that 
this optimum is located exactly where the “last plot” is cultivated half way. A more empirical 
analysis would require information on the number of plots and the distribution of plot sizes 
within the FADN sample. This information is not available to the author; therefore we will 
adhere to the symmetry assumption because on average across farms it may render a good 
approximation. The results presented in Table 4.4 might therefore be biased if we face an 
actual distribution of plot sizes that trigger a situation where xdown is consequently closer to 
the continuous expected profit maximum than xup or vice versa. 
Although we are again not able to quantify the effect of discontinuities in land allocation 
on optimal land allocation, we conclude that this theory has the potential to trigger additional 
sugar supply and contribute to the possible explanations of observed C-sugar quantities.  
4.3.4 Calculations Based on Average Sugar Contents 
As mentioned before, farmers sign contracts with processing firms in which sugar beet 
delivery rights and prices are stipulated. These are based on an average sugar content of 16%. 
Normally a conversion table that shows how beet delivery rights and prices change with sugar 
contents that deviate from the average is included as well. But what if farmers simply plan 
with that average sugar content? As long as the effective sugar content lies above that 
average, which is valid for most of the EU-15 Member States, an underestimation of sugar 
contents will trigger additional sugar quantities as well. We will illustrate this effect by 
running the Member State model which was used in the sections 4.1 and 4.2 again based on 
the assumption that producers plan their supply based on average sugar contents. As expected, 
the resulting optimal supply quantities are observed at a higher production compared to 
section 4.1 for most countries as can be derived from Table 4.5. Compared to Table 4.2, only 
Italy, Spain, Finland and Greece show lower ratios of optimal production/quota because here 
the effective sugar content lies below 16%. We further see that the variance minimum moves 
in the same direction if we compare the table below with Table 4.3. Apart from the fact that 
theoretical optimum and observed production move closer together for those countries where 
large parts of observed production could not be entirely explained in the previous sections, we 
see that the observed production falls in the range between expected profit maximum and 
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variance minimum for almost all C-sugar producing countries. Utility maximisation might 
therefore be able to explain more of the observed production than previously assumed. Only 
France shows still production quantities that cannot entirely be explained by risk averse 
behaviour combined with sugar yield under-estimation.  
Table 4.5: Sugar production /quota – observed, expected profit maximum, variance 
minimum at 16% sugar content, averages for 1997-1999 
observed
expected profit 
maximum
variance 
minimum
FR 124 98 119
UK 132 113 148
DE 120 104 129
IT 104 90 109
DK 126 112 133
AT 124 114 127
ES 104 96 112
FI 102 95 119
SE 108 104 129
BL 116 112 141
IR 106 104 142
EL 82 80  -
NL 100 102 129
Sugar production / quota (%)
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
We can simply extend the model of underestimating the effective sugar content to a model 
of underestimating sugar beet yields additionally. It can be assumed that farmers have a yield 
expectation that underestimates technical progress. This would of course trigger additional 
sugar quantities. Generally, it is questionable to assume that a large share of farmers 
underestimate expected sugar yields per hectare. But we cannot rule out that a number of 
farmers might act overcautiously especially because the sugar yield breaks down into two 
uncertain components, namely, sugar beet yield and sugar content. Anecdotal evidence from 
some German farmers suggests that they consequently underestimate sugar yields. 
Unfortunately, this is only very poor empirical evidence on which to base a general 
behavioural model. We therefore conclude that underestimating expected sugar yields triggers 
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higher production quantities and might be an additional piece in the puzzle of explaining 
observed sugar quantities. 
4.3.5 C-Sugar from Quota Beets 
Persistent rumours in some Member States (e.g. Germany) suggest that sugar refineries 
distribute delivery rights above quota quantities (SCHMIDT 2002, SCHMIDT 2003). In this case, 
the aggregate C-beet production as perceived by growers is smaller than the quantity inferred 
from national statistics. Unfortunately, the relevance of this practice in the different EU 
countries is difficult to assess. 
Generally, processing firms are not allowed to distribute more delivery rights than their 
quota amounts, but the CMO Sugar shows some windows of opportunity. SCHMIDT (2003) 
points out that the CMO defines the average processing losses at 3%. This means that sugar 
beets with an average sugar content of 16% are processed to 13% sugar. Consequently, the 
sugar plants have to calculate the distributed delivery rights based on 13% effective sugar 
content. In reality, however, the processing losses have been reduced down to about 2% since 
the early days of the CMO, where those processing losses were defined. If beet delivery rights 
have not been adjusted since then, we would face today a certain percentage of C-sugar 
coming from quota beets. 
The incentives for sugar processors to engage in these practices might be to fully use 
existing capacities. SCHMIDT (2003) stresses further that about 65% of the sugar production 
costs are fixed costs that are not allocated to the C-sugar production. From the sugar 
processors’ point of view, C-sugar production can therefore be seen as profitable in terms of 
using existing capacities so that they might have the incentive to make the farmers deliver 
enough sugar beets. Distributing more quotas, hence, triggers additional costs, because the 
C-sugar from quota beets can only be sold at C-sugar prices, while the beets have to be 
bought at quota beet prices. But for the given example, the processing firm would pay the 
farmer only for an effective sugar content of 13% while they can derive 0.14 tons more of 
sugar from one ton of beets. 1% sugar per ton of beets would then enter the processing firm at 
zero costs. 
Although this hypothesis is highly speculative, we can conclude that if this is practised in 
the C-sugar producing EU Member States, our farm quotas are consequently under-estimated. 
As a consequence, all hypotheses to explain the observed C-sugar supply in Europe that have 
been discussed so far become more relevant, because we now need to explain less C-sugar 
beet production quantities at farm level. 
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4.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to find explanations for the observed sugar supply in the 
EU. This analysis is necessary because simple profit maximisation is insufficient to reflect the 
specialities of sugar beet production. Our first hypotheses include yield uncertainty in a 
mathematical framework of (1) expected profit maximisation and (2) utility maximisation 
under risk aversion.  
Expected profit maximisation changes the characteristically kinked demand function, as it 
existed under simple profit maximisation, to a continuous function decreasing expected 
marginal revenue from A- to C-sugar. It could be shown that, dependant on the effective 
marginal costs, C-sugar production is likely to occur even if a farmer’s marginal production 
costs of sugar are well above C-sugar prices. A sensitivity analysis of expected marginal 
revenues shows how it depends on sugar quotas, yield variation and sugar prices. Two 
simulation models, one at Member State level and one at farm level, are set up in order to 
answer the question whether expected profit maximisation is able to explain observed sugar 
supply. We have found out that under the given assumptions, only parts of the European sugar 
supply can be explained by this behavioural model whereas it seems to be insufficient 
especially for the major C-sugar producing countries. 
SCHMIDT (2003) discovered that utility maximisation under risk aversion might trigger 
further C-sugar supply depending on the degree of risk aversion. We extended his work by 
analysing the variance of expected profits mathematically. A sensitivity analysis shows how 
the location of the variance minimum, identified as the point of maximal risk aversion, 
changes with respect to quota endowments, prices and yield variance. Again we compare how 
the observed production is related to the variance minimum of expected profits at EU Member 
State and at farm level. As a result, we find a number of European farmers, again especially in 
the major C-sugar producing countries, where the observed production in the selected period 
exceeds the variance minimum so that risk aversion is insufficient to explain observed 
C-sugar production for those farmers as well. 
Four further theories that try to explain observed C-sugar quantities are discussed in depth. 
Those are (1) the fear of farmers of losing quota rights if quotas are not filled entirely, (2) 
discontinuities in land allocation, (3) the impacts of calculations based on average sugar 
contents and (4) the possibility that sugar refineries might distribute sugar beet delivery rights 
above sugar quota quantities. All these hypotheses have in common that their empirical 
relevance is difficult to assess, but potentially, additional C-sugar supply is triggered. 
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There may be additional explanations. To reconcile the low C-beet price with observed 
C-beet supply, it is frequently alleged that fixed costs are borne by quota beets alone while 
C-beet supply only covers the variable cost (SCHMIDT 2003). While this is a plausible 
explanation for the short run, beet growers should be inclined to reduce their capacity in the 
long run if the C-beet price permanently falls short of full cost coverage. We further know 
that supplying huge amounts of sugar beets is a matter of prestige or tradition for some 
farmers. Others claim that the assumption of rationalism of farmers is not valid. We chose not 
to include these theories in our analysis because it is even harder to assess their relevance, but 
they provide additional potential to explain observed C-sugar quantities. 
We conclude that all the presented theories have a certain capability to explain parts of the 
observed sugar production across the EU but none of them is able to explain it entirely. The 
reality is likely to be a mixture of the presented theories but we do not know which 
combination is true for farmers. For modelling purposes this insight is somewhat frustrating 
because modelling means applying certain behavioural models that are able to explain 
observed economic variables. Nonetheless, based on the analysis in this section, we will 
modify the sugar (beet) supply part of the agricultural sector model CAPRI in the subsequent 
sections in order to obtain a realistic supply response on quota and price changes. 
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5. Quantitative Analysis of Relevant Policy Options 
This chapter is designed to analyse the impacts of reforming the CMO Sugar with respect 
to several proposals that have been and currently are being discussed. We use a special 
version of the agricultural sector model CAPRI for modelling purposes. It differs from the 
standard versions because it is adjusted to reflect the economic incentives to supply sugar 
beets discussed in the previous section. Consequently, we provide in this section a small 
description of the standard CAPRI model, especially focussing on land allocation. This is 
followed by a discussion of the specialities of modelling sugar supply, processing and 
international trade. A sensitivity analysis is provided to show how the sugar beet allocation 
depends on certain assumptions before we finally define simulation scenarios and discuss 
model results. 
5.1 The CAPRI Modelling System – General Layout 
5.1.1 Overview 
The regionalised agricultural sector modelling system "CAPRI" (Common Agricultural 
Policy Regional Impact) was developed in the context of the Fourth Framework Project 
(FAIR3-CT96-1849)63 from 1997 until the end of 1999. It has been further developed under 
the “CAPSTRAT” (2001-2004) and in the current “CAPRI-DYNASPAT” project. Over the 
whole time period many applications of the modelling system have provided quantitative 
analysis of special agricultural policy reform proposals.64 The final model version of the 
CAPSTRAT project serves as a basis for our analysis. The model is generally designed as a 
projection and simulation tool for the European agricultural sector based on the following: 
 A physical consistency framework, including balances for agricultural area, young 
animals and feed requirements for animals as well as nutrient requirement for 
crops. Those are explicitly realised as constraints in the regional supply models.  
                                                 
63 The final consolidated report with a detailed model description is available on the project web site: 
http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/finrep.pdf . 
64 Find more details on http://www.agp.uni-bonn.de/agpo/rsrch/capri/capri_e.htm. 
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 Economic accounting principles according to the definition of the Economic 
Accounts for Agriculture (EAA). The model covers all outputs and inputs included 
in the national EAAs for the Member States of the EU-15. Revenues and costs are 
broken down consistently to NUTS 2 regions and production activities. 
 A detailed policy description that covers the relevant payment schemes with their 
respective ceilings on the supply side. Tariffs, intervention purchases and 
subsidised exports are included on the market side. 
 Behavioural functions and allocation steering strictly in line with micro-economic 
theory. Functional forms are chosen to be globally well behaved, allowing for a 
consistent welfare analysis. 
A model can only perform well if it is based on comprehensive data. As indicated by its 
name, CAPRI is a regionalised sector model, so that regionalised data is essential. At national 
level, the CAPRI modelling system makes use of the CoCo data base65 which is consistent 
with the EAA and completed using simulation estimation techniques under data consistency 
constraints in order to fill gaps. The only uniform data sources at EU level for regionalised 
data are the REGIO database from EUROSTAT and the FADN data. Both sources are 
exploited in order to build the CAPRI regionalised database. Given the regional resolution of 
these sources, NUTS 2 is chosen as the minimum level of regionalisation. REGIO is used to 
define acreage, herd sizes and yields at NUTS 2 level. Data at national level (cropped 
hectares, slaughtered heads, herd sizes and production quantities) are taken over without 
changes from CoCo and data from REGIO are corrected to allow for a consistent aggregation. 
FADN data provide parameters for input demand functions to estimate the input allocation 
and income indicators for activities at a regional level. In total there are about 200 regions in 
the database and modelling system, covering the whole of EU-15. 
The model distinguishes between a supply and market module, which are iteratively 
coupled. The interplay of the modules is shown in Figure 5.1. The supply module consists of 
aggregate programming models at NUTS 2 level, working with exogenous prices defined at 
Member State level in the market module. After being solved, the regional results of the 
NUTS 2 supply models – crop areas, herd sizes, input/output coefficients, etc. – are 
aggregated to Member State level. Member State models built with an identical structure as 
                                                 
65A detailed description can be found in: W.BRITZ, C.WIECK, T. JANSSON (2002): National Framework of the 
CAPRI Database: The CoCo-Module, CAPRI working paper 02-04, available on the project web site. 
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the NUTS 2 models are then calibrated to the aggregated results of the NUTS 2 models. Next, 
young animal prices are determined by linking these Member State models. Then, supply and 
feed demand functions of the market module are calibrated to prices of the current iteration 
and aggregated Member State results on feed use and supply. The market module is solved. 
Producer prices at Member State level, as calculated by the market module (a Multi-
Commodity Model based on the Armington Approach in Armington, P., 1969) drive the next 
iteration with the supply module. Equally, in between iterations, premiums for the activities 
are adjusted if ceilings are overshot according to the results laid down in the Common Market 
Organisations. After a certain number of iterations, equilibrium is found, so that prices and 
supply quantities take the same values in the supply and market parts. Finally, all model 
results are passed to an exploitation module to aggregate them to different levels, carry out a 
welfare analysis or calculate other indicators of interest. More detailed information on the 
CAPRI system is available in BRITZ et al. (2004). 
Figure 5.1: Schematic description of CAPRI 
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Source: Author’s illustration 
To provide a better understanding of the model adjustments made in order to model the 
European sugar sector that we will explain in section 5.2, a more detailed description of the 
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two main CAPRI modules – the regional programming models in the supply part and the 
multi commodity model – is given in the subsequent sections. 
5.1.2 Land Allocation in the Regional Programming Models of CAPRI 
One of the general philosophies on which the CAPRI model is based is that such a model 
should be able to reproduce a certain base year. In other words, observed base year production 
patterns are the result of an optimisation process. Each NUTS 2 region acts here like one 
farm66. Several exogenous variables enter the non linear programming models that are 
formulated for each region. The most important ones are: 
 The regional area endowment 
 Yields per hectare for all production activities observed in the base year 
 Per hectare variable production costs and input coefficients that were estimated 
from the FADN 
 Quota endowments 
 Product prices (as resulting from the market module) 
 CAP premiums  
 Set aside rates 
Given those exogenous factors in the base year, an optimisation of regional profits using 
linear programming models will not reproduce observed quantities, because linear 
programming models characteristically choose the most profitable production activity as long 
as no bounds are reached. This general problem of overspecialisation is further stressed in 
HOWITT (1995a) where the author provides an alternative: Positive Mathematical 
Programming (PMP). The idea of PMP, which has become very common in the last decade, is 
to introduce a non linear cost function, quadratic in land allocation (or production) and define 
the parameters of that function so that marginal profit in the base year is equal to zero, 
characterising a profit maximum.  
Unfortunately, the definition of such a cost function is not unique since there may exist an 
infinite number of possible choices. It is only known that marginal revenues equal marginal 
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costs in the base year, but that is not enough to define the two parameters of a linear 
increasing marginal cost curve. HECKELEI (2002) explains how such cost functions could be 
estimated using first order conditions as restrictions from time series data, but the adoption of 
his approach to the CAPRI supply module has not yet been done. A comprehensive overview 
of the history of PMP is given in HECKELEI (2005a). 
The importance of the parameters of the non linear cost functions is shown in Figure 5.2 – 
simplified to the one product case. The only hard information in the calibration is the point 
MC0, defined by the marginal revenue (MR0) at the observed land allocation (X0). MCe gives 
the explicit defined production costs per hectare which include the shadow costs of the 
explicit constraints in the model (land or set aside restriction). The figure shows that there is a 
gap between marginal costs and marginal revenues which we want to close using the PMP 
approach.  
Figure 5.2: Implications of PMP calibration 
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Source: Author’s illustration 
Therefore, we define a marginal cost function through the point MC0. FMC1 and FMC2 
are two of infinite possible choices for it. It becomes apparent how important the choice of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
66 In fact, we distinguish between two technologies, one intensive and one extensive production process. This 
distinction only complicates the explanation of the allocation steering mechanism at this point so we will 
disregard it here. 
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function’s slope is with respect to the steering of land allocation. To illustrate this, we shift 
the marginal revenue – due to rising product prices or premiums – to MR1, the resulting new 
land allocations XFMC1 and XFMC2 that refer to the two different marginal cost curves are quite 
different. HECKELEI (2002) e.g. points out the importance of the PMP slopes and shows how 
the original approach of HOWITT (1995b) arbitrarily chooses those parameters of the quadratic 
cost function. 
The slope of the marginal cost function should be based on observed supply behaviour. 
Until empirical supply elasticities are estimated, CAPRI uses prior supply elasticities based 
on expert knowledge in the calibration process. Basically, the slope of the marginal cost 
function (β) is derived from the elasticity formula: 
(5.1) 0 0
0 0
p px p 1
p x x x
∆ ∆
ε = ⇔ = = β
∆ ∆ ε
 
p0 and x0 are the observed base year prices and supply quantities of a certain product in a 
certain region. Once the slope is defined, the intercept of the marginal cost curve is 
recalculated with respect to the base year observations taking into account the explicit cost 
parts as well as the shadow values of restrictions in the model.67  
At this point, we need to address the difference between those prior supply elasticities that 
go into the calibration and those coming out of it because total costs are the sum of the 
quadratic cost function, explicitly modelled input costs and the shadow costs of binding 
restrictions of the non-linear programming models. The difference between the prior and the 
final elasticities in the model stems mainly from the latter cost component. Both elasticities 
would be equal if those shadow costs were constant. In fact, they are not, because if the price 
for one product increases while all other prices stay constant, the land price is likely to 
increase as well. Consequently, total cost, if production for that certain product is extended, 
increases at a higher rate than according to the quadratic cost function. As a result, the 
effective supply elasticities tend to be lower than the prior ones. 
5.1.3 The Market Module 
The CAPRI market module comprises 13 county blocks, trading among each other. Those 
blocks are the EU-15, East European countries, Norway, Mediterranean countries, Canada, 
the USA, Australia & New Zealand, high tariff traders (as Japan), free trade developing 
countries, India, China, ACP countries and the rest of the world. For each of them, except the 
                                                 
67 Note that the cost function does not include cross effects between products. 
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EU-15, a system of well behaved behavioural functions for supply, demand, processing and 
feed use for all products is set up. The EU-15 itself is broken down into Member States and 
the behavioural functions are defined at that level and aggregated to EU-15 level. These 
behavioural functions generally define the four market positions depending on respective 
(producer and consumer) prices. They are elasticity based using elasticities that stem from 
other studies or models. 
Trade between the country blocks relies on the Armington approach (Armington, P., 
1969). The basic principle here is that consumers have different preferences for a particular 
product depending on its origin. For example, a French consumer might be willing to spend 
more money on cheese originating in France than for cheese coming from the US. The 
Armington approach allows such preferences to be reflected without separating cheese into 
two products. Compared to a classical net trade model where products are considered 
homogenous and a spot world market is present, the Armington approach considers products 
heterogeneous and import prices for the same product from different origins are different as 
well. A CES utility function is calibrated for each product in each trading block so that 
observed trade flows and price differences in the base year can be reproduced by Armington’s 
optimality conditions. 
CAPRI uses a two-stage Armington approach. In the first stage, consumers decide about 
the consumption quantities of domestic sales and imports, while in the second stage, they 
choose between different import-origins. Those decisions are no matter of absolute price 
levels, but of price relations. The price for imports of a certain product in the first stage is 
calculated as the average of the import prices from the different origins weighted with the 
import streams according to the second stage. The weighted averages of import prices and 
domestic prices from the first stage define consumer prices that drive the behavioural demand 
functions. The substitution elasticities in the first stage are generally set smaller than for the 
second one, assuming that consumers will be less responsive regarding substitution between 
domestic and imported goods compared to changes between imported goods. Due to the small 
amount of empirical information on such substitution elasticities, they are defined for most 
products at 6 in the first stage and at 8 in the second one.68 
The market model represents a number of policy instruments that influence international 
trade. It reflects tariffs, tariff rate quotas, export subsidies and intervention taking into account 
                                                 
68 Some exceptions, mainly for less tradable goods like milk or meat products, are made where substitution 
elasticities are assumed to be lower. 
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WTO commitments. A detailed description of the policy instruments in the CAPRI market 
module is given in JUNKER et al. (2003). For a better understanding of the subsequent sugar 
specific adjustment in the market part, it is necessary to explain the modelling of tariff rate 
quotas more precisely. 
5.1.4 Modelling Tariff Rate Quotas in CAPRI 
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) establish a two-tier tariff regime: as long as import quantities 
do not exceed the import quota, the low in-quota tariff is applied. Quantities above the quota 
are charged with the higher Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff. CAPRI distinguishes 
between two types of TRQs: those that are open to all trading partners, and bi-lateral TRQs. 
With regard to model sugar trade with the EU, the latter are the more important ones. A 
market under a TRQ mechanism may be in one of the following regimes: 
(1) Quota under-fill: the in-quota tariff is applied. The willingness of consumers to pay 
for imported goods is equal to the border price plus the in-quota tariff. 
(2) Quota exactly filled: the in-quota tariff is applied. The willingness of consumers to 
pay and thus the actual price paid is somewhere between the border plus the in-
quota tariff and the border price plus the MFN tariff. The difference between the 
price on the market and the border price plus the in-quota tariff establishes a quota 
rent. Depending on property rights on the quota and the allocation mechanism, the 
quota rent is shared in different portions by the producers, importing agencies, the 
domestic marketing chain or the administration. Typically, the quota rent cannot be 
observed nor is there any knowledge about distribution of the rent rendering 
distributional analysis rather difficult. 
(3) Quota over-fill: the higher MFN-tariff is applied. Consumers pay, therefore, the 
border price plus the MFN-tariff. The quota rent is equal to the difference between 
the MFN and the in-quota tariff. Again, how the quota rent is distributed to agents 
is typically not known. 
Those 3 regimes are visualised in Figure 5.3. The characteristic kinks of the TRQ system 
as shown in LIAPIS and BRITZ (2001) are smoothed out by the sigmoid function in order to 
achieve a differentiable function. The import price for a certain product in the three regimes is 
equal to the market price in the exporting country + the respective tariff which is in regime (1) 
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the in quota tariff (tpref), in (2) the in quota tariff + a certain quota rent (qr) and the out quota 
or MFN tariff (tmfn) in the third case. 
Figure 5.3: Bilateral TRQ representation in CAPRI 
(1)
(2)
(3)
Net input demand 
functions
pe
pe+tpref+qr
pe+tpref
pe+tmfn
I(2) =TRQI(1) I(3)
prices
imports
 
Source: Author’s illustration based ON LIAPIS, and BRITZ (2001) 
A broader description of the actual version of the CAPRI model can be found in the model 
documentation (BRITZ et al. (2004)). We now proceed to a description of the model 
adjustments made in order to analyse reform options of the CMO Sugar.  
5.2 Sugar Specific Adjustments in CAPRI  
Originally the treatment of sugar beet production in CAPRI did not resemble the 
mechanisms of the CMO Sugar. Production quantities were bound to base year levels; there 
was no distinction between quotas and the corresponding prices. Impact analyses of changes 
in the economic and political environment of sugar beet production were consequently hardly 
possible. This section gives an overview of how we adjusted the CAPRI model based on the 
economic incentives to supply sugar beets analysed in section 1. 
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5.2.1 Quotas, Prices and Processing Industry 
Sugar quotas are publicly available only at national level. Since CAPRI treats each 
NUTS 2 region as one farm we need at least an estimate of the sugar beet delivery rights that 
are located within one region. We are well aware that something like a regional sugar quota 
does not exist because administrative regional borders do not necessarily correspond to the 
acquisition area of processing firms. But since we do not intend to model the sugar industry 
and the impacts of transportation costs or possible mergers of processing firms, our 
assumption is that regional sugar beet delivery rights are the weighted sum over all farms 
within that region of the estimated sugar beet quotas derived in section 3.1, where the 
estimation procedure ensures that national quotas and sugar beet production quantities of the 
three-year average period 1997-1999 are perfectly met by the weighted sums of the respective 
farm values (equation (3.9)). Our simulation base year, however, is a three-year average 
around 2001. Consequently, we need to adjust regional quotas, because in 2001 and 2002 
national sugar quotas were reduced. Regional quotas are consequently calculated as follows: 
(5.2) 
bas A398Y Qbas A398 n nQ Qr r A398bas YQ nn
=  
The regional sugar beet quota in the base year 2001 (Qrbas) is defined as the result of the 
weighted aggregation of farm beet quotas for the years 1997-1999 (QrA398) multiplied by the 
relation of national sugar production (Ynbas) over national sugar quotas (Qnbas) in the base 
year, multiplied by the reciprocal relation of the three-year average national figures around 
1998. The resulting sugar beet delivery rights enter the model and only change if national 
sugar quotas are adjusted during simulations. 
Differentiations of sugar beet prices have not been included in the CAPRI model so far. 
Generally, the model works with equal prices within EU Member States, disregarding 
regional price heterogeneity. This might not be relevant for a crop like soft wheat were prices 
are not likely to differ much among regions within a country, but for sugar beets, greater 
differences between prices paid by different sugar companies might exist, which we do not 
take into consideration. In CAPRI the linkage between each sugar beet price and market sugar 
price – as it results from the market module – is based on a reduced form equation given in 
equation (5.3). We link the farm-gate price (PbeetMS,x) of a type of sugar beets (x) to the 
relevant derived revenue from sugar and molasses (RmolaMS), taking into account the 
applicable levy and the processing coefficient ‘sugar per ton of beets’ (Φ MS,suga ). The 
parameter α is calculated so that consistency with an average beet price derived from the 
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EUROSTAT Economic Agricultural Accounts (EAA) is achieved, meaning that the sum over 
the product of the base year quantities of each sugar beet type multiplied by the respective 
price meets exactly the production value of sugar beets in the base year. 
Data on market sugar prices per EU Member State (Psugax) are taken from 
BLUME et al. (2003). Sugar world market prices are already included in the CAPRI system. 
The revenue of molasses, hence, is fixed on the basis of the by product revenue defined in the 
official calculation of the basic beet price (LINDE et al. 2000, p 9). Export costs are calculated 
by the price differences between the average EU market price for sugar and the world market 
price multiplied by the difference between A- + B-sugar production and domestic demand. 
From them, the respective levies are calculated. 69 
 
(5.3) ( )beet molasugaMS,x MS MS,suga MSxMS,xP RP levyα φ⎡ ⎤= +−⎣ ⎦  
 
We are well aware that our representation of the sugar processing industry is extremely 
simplified and that introducing an optimisation framework that is empirically based on the 
economic conditions in the processing industry would probably improve their representation. 
However, as the processing industry is not our primary focus of interest, we choose this 
simple but convenient method. The base year estimates of the variables in equation (5.3) are 
given in Table 5.1. It becomes apparent that the parameter α ranges from 0.41 to 0.66 
meaning that processing firms pass between 41% and 66% of their sugar revenues to the 
farmer. If we keep in mind that minimum beet prices are calculated with the rule of thumb 
‘sugar revenue multiplied by 58 percent’ (EU Commission AGRI/63362/2004), we see that 
our estimates range around that value. 
                                                 
69 HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) and ADENÄUER et al. (2004) use an additional coefficient in the price linkage 
function that reflects the variable processing costs of processing beets to sugar. We use a simpler version 
because it appeared to be easier to handle during the simulation runs. This method implies that sugar 
processing firms allocate less of their costs to C-sugar production than to quota sugar – a reasonable 
assumption. 
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Table 5.1: Sugar and sugar beet prices in the base year (2001) 
A-beet 
price (€/t)
B-beet 
price (€/t)
C-beet 
price (€/t)
MS sugar 
price (€/t)  α
BL 51.8 51.8 16.0 691.8 0.50
DK 50.3 43.4 15.7 672.5 0.48
DE 54.9 47.5 16.8 680.5 0.53
EL 53.5 46.5 17.2 682.7 0.66
ES 54.7 54.7 17.4 703.0 0.54
FR 44.7 38.8 13.2 706.1 0.46
IR 49.7 49.7 15.6 694.6 0.53
IT 39.8 39.8 13.1 685.2 0.48
NL 52.4 52.4 16.6 683.6 0.51
AT 51.2 44.3 15.8 685.6 0.48
PT 53.8 46.8 17.1 691.8 0.41
SE 52.4 45.4 15.9 687.8 0.48
FI 54.1 47.0 16.9 691.8 0.53
UK 52.2 52.2 15.5 725.4 0.50
World market price sugar = 194 €/t
 
        Source: Author’s calculations 
5.2.2 Introducing Marginal Costs from FADN 
As already noted, the regional nonlinear programming models represent one profit 
maximising farm, owning all regional production factors. In section 3, however, we found 
that profit maximisation may be inappropriate in the case of sugar beet production, because 
every region that supplies C-beets in the base year is assumed to be competitive at C-beet 
prices (see Figure 5.2). Therefore these regions will not react at all to changes in quotas or 
quota beet prices. Consequently, we replace it by expected profit maximisation under yield 
uncertainty which has proven to be a better solution compared to profit maximisation. 
Technically we substitute the regional sugar beet revenue definition by the definition of 
expected sugar beet revenues given in equation (4.5). This function requires regional quotas 
and prices, which are provided as described above, and information on the magnitude of 
regional sugar beet yield variances, which we calculated in section 4.1.4. 
As the discussion in section 3 has shown, introducing expected profit maximisation in 
CAPRI alone would barely make the regional sugar beet supply react to quota or quota price 
changes as long as we observe very high C-beet productions in the base year because such a 
region would be calibrated to very low marginal costs. In order to exploit the results from 
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section 3, we are now going to use our marginal cost estimates for sugar beet production. As 
mentioned before, those appear to lie above C-sugar beet prices in the base period. Farm costs 
are here aggregated to one regional marginal cost value as described below in section 5.2.3. 
Their magnitude is given in Table 5.2. One of the most relevant sugar specific adjustments of 
CAPRI is that we take those estimates, which also include opportunity costs, as given for 
now. We assume that each NUTS 2 region supplies sugar beets in the base year at those 
marginal costs. But if we change the marginal costs in the base year, we have to change the 
expected marginal revenues as well, to ensure that observed production quantities are still the 
‘optimal’ outcome of expected profit maximisation.  
To ensure this, we assume that the inconstancy between observed marginal costs and 
expected marginal revenues can be explained by dividing observed sugar supply quantities 
into two parts: one is based on the expected profit maximum and the second originates in the 
combination of all the hypotheses discussed in section 4 that may explain deviations from the 
expected profit maximum. This can be seen as a two-step decision procedure. In the first step, 
farmers plan their supply according to the theory of maximising expected profits and in the 
second step they decide upon the additional sugar quantities they want to supply in order to 
deal with the various risks or other specialties of sugar beet production. 
The technical resolution of the calibration procedure for one NUTS 2 region is shown in 
Figure 5.4. We denote the expected profit maximal production in the base year XP. This 
production quantity is rather simple connected with the observed base year supply (X0) as 
follows: 
(5.4) P 0X (1 ) X+ β =  
For each NUTS 2 region, the parameter β is defined such that the expected marginal 
revenues equal marginal costs (MCB) in XP. If β equalled zero, it would mean that there is no 
difference between observed marginal costs and expected marginal revenues. β is selected as 
a constant in simulations. By making this assumption, we imply that the combined effect of 
all those aspects that trigger additional sugar supply react proportionally to XP to changes in 
prices or quotas. In other words, quota or price changes would reduce the expected profit 
maximal production quantity by 10%, and the part of beet supply that results from other 
aspects than expected profit maximisation is reduced by 10% as well. This linear coherence 
is, of course, a simplification of ‘real’ behaviour but as we were not able to quantify the 
contribution of the different motives to supply C-sugar to the total sugar supply, it is deemed 
to be the best we can do without making further arbitrary assumptions.  
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Figure 5.4: Calibration of the CAPRI model to marginal cost estimates  
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  Source: Author’s illustration 
The following alternative to our calibration method was carried out by 
ADENÄUER et al. (2004). In order to reconcile the observed production with marginal costs 
estimates, the authors calibrate the CAPRI model to estimates taken from 
BUREAU et al. (1997). The idea of their concept is to define a virtual quota mark up such that 
the expected marginal revenue function equals the estimated marginal costs of sugar beet 
production at the observed supply level. The quota rent of this additional quota can be 
interpreted similarly as insurance that beet growers pay for the motives discussed before – or 
may especially reflect the rumour that processing firms distribute more sugar beet delivery 
rights than necessary to fill their corresponding sugar quotas (see section 4.3.5). 
As shown in Figure 5.5, the expected marginal revenue (EMR) function is simply moved 
to the right (EMR0 to EMR1). The virtual quota mark up is defined relative to the actual quota 
and is selected as a constant value in simulations as well. The marginal cost MCB corresponds 
now to the marginal estimate from BUREAU et al. (1997). While the actual quota endowment 
was at QA+B, ADENÄUER et al. (2004) envisage that the beet grower behaves as if his quota 
endowment is at Q*A+B. 
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Figure 5.5: Determination of virtual quota mark ups  
PA
PB
PC
Sugar beet 
production
Beet prices
Xo
MCB
QA QA+B
Q*A Q*A+B
EMR0 EMR1
 
Source: ADENÄUER et al. (2004) 
It could be shown that the calibration method used in ADENÄUER et al. (2004) leads to a 
supply response that is very similar to the one we use in the current study. The differences 
turned out to be negligible. The only mathematical reason why the versions differ at all is 
found in the yield variance which in our case equals the yield variation coefficient times XP 
rather than times X0 in the virtual quota mark up version. 
5.2.3 Introducing Supply Elasticities from FADN 
The last adjustment of the supply part is to introduce elasticity estimates from FADN 
during calibration. Those were calculated as follows: given marginal cost estimates for a 
number of FADN farms for the three-year average in 1999 as derived in section 3.3, it is 
possible to compute regional marginal cost curves by horizontal aggregation of their 
production quantities. Sugar quantities of each farm are hereby weighted by the farm specific 
factor of representativeness. 
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Figure 5.6: Regional marginal costs curves from FADN 
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  Source: Author’s illustration 
The resulting functions have a general shape similar to fMC(X) in Figure 5.6. X denotes the 
sugar beet production and MC marginal costs. There are a few farms with low marginal costs 
– lots with an average magnitude and again a fewer number with high marginal production 
costs of sugar beets. The implementation of these curves as marginal cost curves for a region 
implies that marginal costs for each farm are assumed to be constant and adjustments on 
farms are disregarded. A farm would therefore stop sugar beet production if marginal 
revenues fall below their marginal costs in our model. Our goal is now to ensure that the 
supply response of our regional supply models approximates those curves. We apply the 
following method to transfer at least some information from FADN to CAPRI. First, we 
estimate a linear function (f*MC(X)) but only over 40% of the farms that have the highest 
marginal costs (XMin to XR). We choose only the right part of fMC(X) because the regional 
supply quantity (XR) is located there and if the model supply response is to aim at simulating 
the abandoning and starting of farms, it is the more relevant scope. The next step is to 
calculate the marginal costs f*MC(XMID) and the supply elasticities εR at the same point. Both 
are passed over into the calibration process of CAPRI. This method is only applied to regions 
with at least 30 observations. In all other regions, we use marginal costs and elasticities 
derived from applying that calculation to the whole Member State.  
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Table 5.2: Regional estimates of marginal costs and supply elasticities 
Region NUTS code
Supply 
elasticity
Marginal costs 
( €/ton of beets)
AUSTRIA AT000000       2.00 26.95
BELGIUM BL000000       1.09 33.79
GERMANY DE000000       2.02 35.40
BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG DE100000       1.89 34.77
BAYERN DE200000       1.37 34.67
HESSEN DE700000       3.51 35.60
NIEDERSACHSEN DE900000       2.61 36.32
NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN DEA00000       1.96 34.17
RHEINLAND-PFALZ DEB00000       3.14 37.85
SACHSEN-ANHALT DEE00000       2.14 33.85
DENMARK DK000000       2.07 32.38
Greece EL000000       1.45 42.39
ANATOLIKI MAKEDONIA- THRAKI EL110000       1.57 43.25
KENTRIKI MAKEDONIA EL120000       1.57 43.25
DYTIKI MAKEDONIA EL130000       1.57 43.25
THESSALIA EL140000       1.57 39.64
SPAIN ES000000       1.03 36.74
NORESTE ES200000       1.77 33.19
RIOJA ES230000       2.50 29.64
CENTRO (E) ES400000       0.91 32.81
CASTILLA-LEON ES410000       0.79 28.88
SUR ES600000       1.01 44.85
FINLAND FI000000       1.84 38.13
FRANCE FR000000       2.23 26.89
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE FR210000       1.90 25.84
PICARDIE FR220000       2.58 27.24
HAUTE-NORMANDIE FR230000       2.33 25.15
CENTRE FR240000       5.09 25.21
BASSE-NORMANDIE FR250000       2.89 25.98
ALSACE FR420000       10.29 23.99
IRELAND IR000000       3.71 35.77
ITALY IT000000       1.98 37.37
NORD OVEST IT100000       1.10 35.95
NORD EST IT300000       2.51 37.58
VENETO IT320000       3.01 38.02
FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA IT330000       2.01 37.14
TOSCANA IT510000       2.03 35.32
UMBRIA IT520000       1.98 39.35
MARCHE IT530000       2.00 36.10
MOLISE IT720000       1.31 31.12
NETHERLANDS NL000000       1.55 38.95
SWEDEN SE000000       1.48 36.73
UNITED KINGDOM UK000000       1.64 38.57
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 5.2 gives the resulting regional levels of marginal production costs and supply 
elasticities for those EU Member States that were included in the FADN analysis and all 
sugar producing NUTS 2 regions, where more than 30 observations of marginal cost estimates 
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were available.70 The information given in Table 5.2 is further visualised in Figure 5.7. The 
green shaded regions have marginal production costs below 35 €/t of sugar beets and the red 
ones range above that value. In most countries, we do not find much regional heterogeneity 
while in Germany and Spain, for example, it is much more relevant. The Spanish region Rioja 
is one of the regions with the lowest marginal production costs as well as all the French and 
Austrian regions, most parts of Germany, Belgium and Denmark. 
Figure 5.7: Regional distribution of marginal costs of sugar beet production 
 
  Source: CAPRI modelling system and author’s calculations 
                                                 
70 Note that the marginal cost estimates presented in Table 5.2 differ from those given in Table 3.6 on page 45 
for two reasons. (1) In the current section, we include only the 40% of farms with the highest marginal 
costs in the calculation of weighted averages and (2) those in Table 3.6 are based on average sugar 
contents, while we refer here to the national effective sugar contents per ton of beets. 
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5.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Marginal Costs and Supply Elasticities 
In Figure 5.2 we have already seen how important the choice of prior elasticities is in the 
calibration process. We further know that the magnitude of marginal production costs in the 
base year influences the supply response of the model as well. To quantify the importance of 
the values that both variables take in the calibration, we perform a sensitivity analysis, 
exemplary for Denmark71. For this purpose, we calculate the supply response and effective 
supply elasticities based on a 10% quota reduction ceteris paribus in the base year. Marginal 
costs are reduced in five steps from 95% of the A-beet base year price to 105% of that of 
C-beets. PMP slopes are calibrated with prior elasticities from 1 to 5. As mentioned above, 
there is a difference between prior elasticities and those arising from the calibration. How the 
effective point elasticities, calculated from a 10% quota reduction, differ from the prior ones 
is apparent from Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Supply elasticities depending on marginal costs and prior elasticities for 
Denmark 
prior elasticity 1 2 3 4 5
marginal costs 
(€/ton of beets)
16 0.38 0.75 1.11 1.47 1.81
24 0.56 1.11 1.64 2.17 2.67
32 0.74 1.47 2.18 2.86 3.53
40 0.93 1.83 2.70 3.55 4.39
48 1.11 2.18 3.23 4.25 5.25
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Except for the last line, we see that effective (EMR-) elasticities are generally lower than 
the initial ones. That difference is higher, the lower marginal costs are. Not very surprisingly, 
we find that elasticities are higher, the higher marginal costs are, meaning that regions that 
produce at higher costs in the base year will react stronger to price and quota changes than 
those with lower ones. Given the existence of a gap between prior and effective elasticities 
                                                 
71 It turned out that this sensitivity analysis leads to similar results in different EU regions so that the results for 
Denmark can be transferred to other European regions at least in relative terms. 
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combined with the wish that our regional supply models mimic the supply curves from 
FADN, we iteratively adjust the prior elasticities in the calibration, until the calculated 
effective elasticities meet those presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.4: Supply response induced by a 10% cut in quotas for different marginal costs 
and prior supply elasticities in Denmark 
prior elasticity 1 2 3 4 5
marginal costs 
(€/ton of beets)
16 -1.3% -2.5% -3.4% -4.1% -4.8%
24 -6.2% -7.7% -8.4% -8.7% -9.0%
32 -7.0% -8.2% -8.7% -9.0% -9.2%
40 -6.6% -7.9% -8.5% -8.8% -9.0%
48 -4.1% -5.6% -6.5% -7.1% -7.5%
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In Table 5.4 the supply response of Denmark to a quota reduction of 10% depending on 
assumed marginal costs and elasticities is given. The importance of the choice of both 
variables with respect to model results is obvious. We can make Denmark follow a 10% quota 
cut by only 1.3% up to 9.2%. It makes a great difference which marginal costs are assumed in 
the base year. We find that marginal costs are more important to that respect than elasticities, 
because within one row the maximal and minimal supply reduction varies only by about 3% 
while it varies about 6% in the columns. If we exclude the two outermost rows from our 
examination, the supply response varies considerably less. Fortunately, estimated marginal 
costs fall generally in a range around the mid-point between A- and C-beet prices so that we 
might conclude that we are acting in a range where the resulting supply response is not that 
sensitive to a small misspecification of marginal costs. Elasticities range generally from 1 to 4 
with two outliers in Italy and two in France. The vast majority of regions shows supply 
elasticities72 between 1.5 and 2.5 (Table 5.2). 
It might surprise the reader that the supply reduction induced by a 10% quota reduction is 
not inversely proportional to marginal costs. It reaches a maximum when marginal costs rise 
                                                 
72 Supply elasticities are not price elasticities in the context of expected profit maximisation. They have to be 
interpreted as the relative change of sugar beet supply if the Expected Marginal Revenue increases by 1%. 
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but is reduced afterwards. This phenomenon can be explained by the theory of expected profit 
maximisation. Figure 5.8 illustrates how the expected marginal revenue function of expected 
sugar production changes, if quotas are reduced (EMR0 to EMR*). Three marginal cost 
functions (MC1, MC2, and MC3), which have the identical slope but differ in terms of their 
intercept, are plotted as well. ∆x is then the respective supply change induced by the quota 
cut. Obviously ∆x2 has the largest magnitude which provides us further insights into the 
simulated supply response in Table 5.4. 
Figure 5.8: Sugar beet supply response to a quota reduction depending on marginal 
production costs 
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Source: Author’s illustration 
With this small sensitivity analysis we can show that the supply response of sugar beet 
production with respect to changes of expected marginal revenues strongly depends on 
marginal production costs and supply elasticities in the calibration point. Thus, marginal costs 
are the more sensitive variable. 
5.2.5 Quota Trade Module 
Trading sugar quotas has not been an option within the limits of the CMO Sugar so far, 
despite the well known positive welfare effects. Nonetheless, it has been discussed in the past 
(e.g. BUREAU et al. 1997). Since quota trade is an option of sugar market reforms, the 
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introduction of a sugar quota trade module into CAPRI is required. The general economic 
conditions that lead to quota trade are illustrated in Figure 5.9.  
For the moment, we will abstract from expected profit maximisation, the two different 
quota types and C-sugar and go back to a simple textbook example of any product that is 
bound by a production quota. We find two regions (or farms), r1 and r2 with quota 
endowments that amount to qr1 and qr2. Marginal production costs in region r1 (MCr1) are 
higher than in r2 (MCr2). Moreover, we find in region r1 a higher product price (pr1) than in r2 
(pr2). 
Figure 5.9: Quota trade in the two region case 
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   Source: Author’s illustration 
The quota rents in both regions are given by λr1 and λr2. The one in region r2 is obviously 
higher than that in r1. Differences in quota rents are a requirement for quota trade. A producer 
will demand quota rights as long as the unit price is lower than the unit quota rent and he will 
offer them as long as the quota market price is above the quota rent. Consequently, in market 
equilibrium, quota rents are equalised and equal to the unit market price for quotas. This 
equilibrium is given in Figure 5.9 at a quota rent of λ*r1 (=λ*r2) and regional quota 
endowments of Q*r1 and Q*r2. In the diagram we assume that quota trade is established 
without any transaction costs. If those were reflected, the market price for quotas would no 
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longer equal the quota rents in all regions but equal the difference between quota rents and 
transaction costs.  
Transaction costs are disregarded in the CAPRI quota trade module, because we do not 
know anything about their magnitude. The computation of quota rents in the framework of 
sugar beet production and expected profit maximisation is less straightforward than in the 
simplified case given in Figure 5.9. Nonetheless, if we interpret quota rents as the additional 
profit of an additional unit of quotas, it can be calculated as the first derivative of expected 
profits (EPS) with respect to the quota endowment (q) which can be decomposed into the 
difference between the first derivative of expected revenues (ERS) and that of total costs (CS) 
with respect to q. In our one quota case73 this leads to: 
(5.5) ( ) ( ) ( )S S SEP ER Cq,Ey(q) q,Ey(q) Ey(q)
q q q
∂ ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Expected revenues are a function of the quota endowment and the expected sugar 
production which itself depends on the quota endowment. Total costs are not directly linked 
with the quota endowment, but with the expected production. The latter two derivatives can 
be decomposed using partial differentials and the chain rule into: 
(5.6) 
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Marginal revenues equal marginal cost in the expected profit maximum. Cosequently, the 
difference of the revenue and costs differentials equals the partial derivative of expected 
revenues (equation (4.11)) with respect to the quota endowment. This application of the 
envelope theorem74 simplifies the calculation of quota rents to: 
(5.7) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2Q Q C SS S
S
p Ey p p 1 F q Ey q f q
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q q
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ − − − − + σ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
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Notations are the same as in section 4.1.2. The terms that contain the quota variable are 
the normal distributions F(q) and f(q). Their derivatives with respect to the variable q are 
given by: 
                                                 
73 We compute the quota trade module for only that case, because we simulate quota trade only in combination 
with a merger of A and B quotas to one single quota. 
74 Originally proposed by the Canadian economist Jacob Viner (1931) and later developed by the American 
economist Paul Samuelson. 
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Substituting (5.8) and (5.9) into (5.7) the first derivative of expected revenues with respect 
to the quota endowment can be written as 
(5.10) 
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. 
This final formula for the quota rent is nothing but the difference between the two prices, 
which gives the maximal possible quota rent, multiplied by the cumulated probability that 
production exceeds the quota. It can be used to simulate quota trade in CAPRI based on the 
considerations in Figure 5.9. Thereby, the first best solution seems a simultaneous 
optimisation of regional expected profits, where the regional quota endowment becomes a 
variable and an additional restriction that forces regional quota rents to be equalised across all 
regions is implemented. In this sense, unfortunately, a simultaneous optimisation of the 
regional supply models is technically infeasible due to a number of equations and variables 
introduced. We therefore introduce a quota trade module in CAPRI which is solved in every 
iteration between the supply and the market model that converges to the quota trade 
equilibrium. The equation system is given by: 
(5.11) 
r r r r
eu r
eu r
r
pq q
s.t.
pq pq
q q
= α + β
=
=∑
 
Regional quota prices (pqr) are defined in a linear quota demand function dependant on 
exogenous parameters αr and βr and the regional quota endowment qr. The two other 
restrictions guarantee that regional quota prices are equal to the uniform quota trade price pqeu 
and that the sum over all regional quota endowments equals the total quota endowment at 
EU level. All regions r are included in the model where sugar beets have been produced in the 
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base year. This model is based on sugar rather than on sugar beets. The parameters αr and βr 
are adjusted for every iteration as presented in Figure 5.10. 
Figure 5.10: Iterative solution of sugar quota trade in CAPRI 
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Source: Author’s illustration 
Exemplary for one region, the iterative convergence of the quota trade module is achieved 
as follows: The regional quota rent of a ton of sugar from the supply module calculated with 
formula (5.10) is given in the first iteration by qri1. We know that it corresponds to a quota 
endowment of qi1. In the first iteration, αr is defined as the maximal quota rent because we 
know that quota rents shrink if quotas are reduced, so their maximum should be achieved at 
zero quotas. Parameter βr is defined so that the curve pq(q)i1 runs through the point defined by 
qri1 and qi1. When αr and βr are specified the quota trade model is solved and a quota trade 
price (e.g. pqi1) and new regional quota endowments (qi2) are achieved. Those quotas are then 
passed over to the next iteration of the supply module and quota rents are calculated again 
(qri2). Parameters αr and βr are then redefined such that the quota/quota rent combinations of 
the last two iterations are met by the demand function pq(q)i2. Quotas are then traded again 
and a new quota price (pqi2) is found at a new quota endowment (qr3) which is given back 
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again to the supply part which in turn feeds back new quota rents (qri3). From the third step, 
the definition of αr and βr follows the principle to exactly meet the combination of quota rents 
and quotas from the last supply model results and such that squared differences between the 
combinations of the last four iterations (if existent) and the values given by the quota demand 
function are minimised. Thereby squared differences are weighted giving the previous 
iteration a higher weight than before and so on. Convergence is achieved when quota rents 
from the supply module are equalised across all regions and equal to the quota trade price.  
As mentioned before, the implemented quota trade system is simplified. It assumes that 
processing firms follow the most profitable sugar beet production location without any costs 
and that transaction costs do not exist. Nonetheless, with its help we are able to shed light on 
how quotas may move between regions and which prices are likely to be paid for a ton of 
sugar quota.  
5.2.6 Sugar Trade in the World Market Model 
As introduced in section 5.1.3, the world market module of CAPRI uses the Armington 
assumptions on heterogeneous goods for simulating bilateral trade flows. Sugar, however, is a 
quite homogenous good. In order to address this, we use higher elasticities of substitution for 
sugar than for other products. They are set to 10 for both levels in all trading blocks of the 
model.75  
High MFN tariffs and the safeguard clause prevented any non preferential sugar imports 
into the EU-15 in the past. Preferential agreements on sugar imports are regulated in the 
CMO Sugar and laid out in CEC (2004a). In the following paragraphs, we introduce the 
reader to the various preferential agreements that exist today and will become relevant in 
2009. We further address how those agreements are handled technically in CAPRI. 
 The ACP protocol. Originating in the Commonwealth agreements governing the 
import of raw cane sugar into the United Kingdom for processing and marketing, 
this agreement allows the ACP country group to export up to about 1.3 million 
tons of white sugar equivalent at a minimum import price at least 645 € into the 
EU-15. Further Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) that is destined to cover the net 
demand of sugar in the French overseas territories up to 0.3 million tons is added. 
Although the latter type of sugar is imported at slightly higher in quota tariffs and 
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its quantity depends on the net demand in the target regions, we simply define a 
TRQ for the ACP country group in CAPRI at about 1.6 million tons white sugar 
equivalent with zero in quota tariff.  
 At the time of their accession to the European Community, Finland negotiated that 
they are allowed to import about 85000 tons of raw cane sugar for refining from 
Brazil and Cuba at an in quota tariff of 98 € per ton. A price guarantee is not given 
for those quantities. Since Cuba and Brazil are members of the CAPRI regional 
aggregate ‘free trade developing’, we allocate a TRQ with those quantities and 
tariffs to that county group. 
 At the end of 2001, all import duties for products originating in the West Balkans 
were abolished. Imports from those countries into the EU have risen to 
270000 tons in 2003 and induced the last cut in European sugar production quotas 
in 2001. The West Balkan countries are members of the ‘rest of the world’ 
aggregate. Although in reality not existent, we introduce a tariff rate quota76 with 
zero in quota tariffs for this country aggregate as well and define it at the observed 
three-year average imports (104000 t according to EU Commission (2004a) from 
Western Balkans in the base year 2001 and expand it in simulations to an expected 
import quantity in 2009. HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003) expect this quantity to 
range between 0.4 and 0.8 million tons. We adopt the average value of 0.6 million 
tons. 
 The Everything but Arms77 initiative allows the 46 Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) to export all products (but arms) into the European Community without 
any duty or quota. For sugar, special assignments regulate that this state is reached 
stepwise by the year 2009. The high price level on EU sugar markets offers the 
LDCs a great incentive to export sugar into the EU. Export quantities into the EU 
are limited by domestic production in order to avoid swap transactions (rule of 
origin). In CAPRI, most of the LDCs are found in the regional aggregate ACP. A 
                                                                                                                                                        
75 Even higher elasticities of substitution might be realistic to mimic almost homogeneous goods in the 
Armington approach. However, model convergence turned out to be difficult to achieve for higher 
elasticities than 10.  
76 In the Commission’s reform proposal of 2004, it is recommended to introduce a tariff rate quota for imports 
from the West Balkans. This, and the relatively small amount of total imports makes the introduction of an 
TRQ for the ‘rest of the world‘ aggregate even more reasonable. 
77 Council Regulation (EC) Nr. 2501/2001, OJL 346, p 1, Article 9 (4) and (5). 
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smaller part is spread among the ‘rest of the world’ (ROW) and the ‘free trade 
developing’ (CAD) aggregate. The fact that not all ACP countries are LDCs and 
that the redefining of country groups with respect to questions on sugar markets 
was not feasible within the scope of this study, makes modelling the EBA initiative 
difficult. It will now be explained how we will proceed in order to simulate EBA. 
SOMMER (2003) identifies an additional export potential of LDC countries of about 
2.4 million tons of raw sugar equivalent. Hereby it is assumed that LDCs export their entire 
production into the EU and supply their own sugar demand from the world market. Although 
he further points out that expected exports are mainly in terms of raw sugar and that those are 
limited by the capacities of European refineries, we assume that those 2.4 million tons are a 
reasonable magnitude for expected additional imports and they are in line with the 
assumptions made by HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a).78 Our strategy to take into consideration 
those additional sugar imports into the EU-15 when we simulate reform options for the year 
2009, involves adding a certain amount to the tariff rate quota of those country aggregates that 
include LDCs, because all regional aggregates in CAPRI that contain LDCs include a 
considerable number of regions to which quota and duty free EU market access is not granted. 
We would overestimate EU sugar imports if we simply allowed the entire aggregates to 
import sugar at zero tariffs without any quota. We calibrate the market model such that TRQs 
are fully used in case EU prices stay at the same high level as today. 
5.2.7 Limitations of Modelling the Sugar Sector with CAPRI 
The introduction of several modifications in the CAPRI modelling system has made the 
model suitable to analyse changes in agricultural policy with respect to the CMO Sugar. 
Although the modelling of sugar beet supply, world markets for sugar and the processing 
industry are adjusted to take into consideration all specialties of the CMO Sugar, there are a 
number of limitations and unresolved issues. Besides the general limitations of an applied 
economic model, the representation of the sugar sector is specifically limited due to: 
 A strong dependency of sugar beet supply response to estimated marginal 
production costs and supply elasticities in the base year. Although the specification 
                                                 
78 Based on SOMMER (2003) and HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003), we expect additional sugar imports from LDC 
countries in 2009 under current EU market prices to reach about 2.5 million tons white sugar equivalent 
assuming some additional imports in 2009 compared to those from Sommer (2003) calculated for 2001. 
The TRQs of the three country aggregates containing LDCs are then enhanced by this value multiplied by 
the share of average (1998-2001) exports of LDCs of an aggregate in total average LDC-sugar exports in 
the same period.  
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of both variables is based on farm data, their estimation avails itself of some 
crucial simplifications. Nonetheless, from the author’s point of view, it is the best 
we could do within the scope of the present study. 
 The general contradiction of assuming sugar to be a homogenous good and the 
Armington approach. We try to reduce this problem by using higher elasticities of 
substitution than for other products. But it cannot be ruled out that the Armington 
assumptions applied to the sugar sector lead to an underestimation of substitution 
of sugar from different import regions and, in turn, to an underestimation of price 
changes. But since sugar imports into the EU are mainly controlled by TRQs, the 
problem may be of minor importance for the EU market. 
 The need to observe base year trade quantities to allow for trade flows in 
simulations. In reality, the formation of new bilateral sugar trade flow may be 
conceivable if sugar market prices change. Such effects are disregarded but 
probably of minor importance for EU imports as long as non preferential sugar 
imports are blocked by high tariffs.79 
 Simplifications and aggregation problems of the world market modelling. A 
disadvantage that occurs if we want to analyse the impacts of ‘Everything but 
Arms’ or similar bilateral trade agreements is that the global players affected by 
the concession (the Least Developed Countries) are not a single regional aggregate 
in our world market model. The trade impacts are therefore strongly dependant on 
exogenous assumptions regarding the definition of TRQs as described in 
section 5.2.6. 
 A rather simplified representation of the sugar processing industry. We principally 
disregard them as a global player on the sugar market by simply assuming them to 
pass a constant share of their revenues over to the farmer. Processing costs, 
however, are not explicitly modelled.  
 The quota trade representation. If quota trade is established across the entire 
European Union, processing firms will be heavily involved in that business. Our 
quota trade model assumes that each farmer (each region) owns sugar quota and 
                                                 
79 The problem of those zero observations in the Armington approach is analysed in WITZKE et al. (2005). 
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quota trade is strongly dependant on the sugar beet production costs, disregarding 
problems that occur if processing enterprises have to close or concentrate in other 
regions. 
 The ‘perfect market assumption’. We assume the European sugar market to be 
competitive. BLUME et al. (2003), however, analyse the question how it can be 
possible to observe sugar prices in the European Member States that lie 
considerably above the intervention price and differ among countries. They 
conclude that we face tacit collusion between sugar selling firms. Such effects are 
ignored as well. 
Although these are a number of points that might enhance the discrepancy between the 
model response and reality, the representation of the specialities of the CMO Sugar in our 
model is a significant contribution compared to existent approaches (e.g. FRANDSEN et al., 
2003). In the following section, we will apply the CAPRI modelling system to a number of 
selected reform options of the CMO Sugar. 
5.3 Scenario Definition 
In order to quantify the impacts of relevant reform options of the CMO Sugar as implied 
by the heading of section 5, we need to identify those options. But first and foremost, we have 
to define a reference to which we compare these scenarios. Generally, the base year could 
serve as a reference. The base year in our case is 2001 while we forecast the year 2009. 
Between those two years there are a number of exogenous developments, captured by yield-, 
price- or demand trends, GDP growth or inflation or general changes in the political 
environment. If we compared our policy scenarios to the base year, all those effects would be 
implicitly existent and might blur the effects of interest. Consequently, the reference must be 
dated in 2009 as well and include all those exogenous shocks to isolate the policies of interest. 
The assumptions on which our reference run is based, as well as the definition of three 
simulation scenarios, are outlined in the next sections. 
5.3.1 The Reference Scenario 
There are a number of exogenous shifts that are based on estimates of the European 
Commission and other sources like FAPRI or the World Bank. Those are mainly population 
growth and price trends as well as trends on production and consumption quantities. Those 
are used to calibrate the market model in the year 2009. The reference run further includes the 
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full implementation of the CAP reform of 2003. The main measures of the 2003 CAP reform 
include an adoption of a single decoupled direct payment, a reduction of administrative prices 
and a payment modulation system. The most important measure is the substitution of the 
different direct payments or premiums received according to the Agenda 2000 settings with a 
‘single payment per farm’ beginning in 2005. Such single farm payments are calculated on 
the basis of ‘a reference amount in a reference period 2000-2002’. This implies that the 
amount of the single farm payment would no longer depend on what and how much the 
farmer actually produces. The single farm payment is, therefore, said to be ‘decoupled’ from 
production. The reform, however, gives each EU Member State the possibility to choose a 
‘degree of decoupling’ among different options. In Table 8.1 in the Annex we show the 
options of the 2003 CAP reform each Member State of the EU15 has chosen, which are taken 
into account in the reference and subsequent simulation scenarios. A detailed description of 
the calculation of the decoupled premium can be found in BRITZ et al. (2002). On all product 
prices where explicit price forecasts are not available, CAPRI assumes a yearly inflation rate 
of 1.9% . 
Regarding sugar beet production, the exogenous assumptions on yield growth is that it is 
equal across European regions and amounts to 0.25% per annum which sum up to a 2% 
increase from the base year (2001) to the simulation year (2009).80 We further assume that 
both the import and the export regime are subject to base year regulations. Regarding sugar 
beet prices, we assume that the estimated coefficients listed in Table 5.1 are the same for 
2009. Sugar world market prices are projected to about 205 €/t of sugar.  
5.3.2 Scenario I: ‘EBA’ 
The ‘EBA’ scenario differs from the reference run only in that we implement the duty and 
quota free access of LDC countries into the EU for sugar. We further allow for additional 
imports from the West Balkan countries. The idea behind this scenario is to evaluate how the 
current regulations of the CMO Sugar would deal with additional sugar imports. As re-exports 
of those imports are not allowed by WTO restrictions, they have to be placed on the European 
sugar market. Consequently, domestic production of the same amount has to be taken out. 
This can be achieved in two ways: either the EU sugar market price or sugar quotas have to be 
reduced. Since the CMO Sugar aims at a high EU sugar price, it includes a mechanism that 
                                                 
80 CAPRI features an explicit yield forecast tool. Unfortunately, some unresolved problems led to unreasonable 
trends for sugar beet yields so that we make this exogenous assumption here. 
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cuts sugar quotas so that high market prices are achieved. This so-called declassification, 
described in Council Regulation (EC) No 2038/1999 under article 26, distributes the 
necessary quota cut among EU Member States and sugar types (white sugar, isoglucose and 
inulin syrup81) in a non linear way. More precisely, those EU Member States that own higher 
B-quota shares are penalised with higher quota cuts than those that own only small B-quota 
amounts. As visible from Table 5.5, Germany and France bear about 60% of the quota 
reduction although they own less than 50% of the EU-15 sugar quota. On the other hand 
Spain, where B-quotas amount only to 4% of A-quotas receives only a 3% reduction even 
though its total quota endowment amounts to about 7% of EU-15 total quotas. One can see 
clearly who suffers and who benefits from this regulation. 
Table 5.5: Sugar quotas of the base year (2001) and declassification coefficients (EU-15) 
A B total B/A on A quotas on B quotas on total quotas
unit %
EU 11383 2499 13882 21.9 80.3 19.7 100.0
BL 669 144 813 21.5 4.6 1.0 5.6
DK 322 95 416 29.5 2.7 0.8 3.5
DE 2585 795 3381 30.8 22.5 6.9 29.4
EL 287 29 316 10.0 1.2 0.1 1.4
ES 954 40 994 4.2 2.6 0.1 2.8
FR 2510 745 3255 29.7 23.3 6.5 29.8
IR 180 18 198 10.0 0.8 0.1 0.9
IT 1301 245 1545 18.8 8.2 1.6 9.8
NL 678 179 856 26.4 5.3 1.4 6.7
AT 311 73 384 23.3 2.3 0.5 2.8
PT 71 8 79 11.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
SE 333 33 366 10.0 1.4 0.1 1.6
FI 132 13 145 10.0 0.6 0.1 0.6
UK 1030 103 1133 10.0 4.4 0.4 4.9
1000 t 
Sugar Quotas Declassification coefficient
% of total quota reduction
 
         Source: CAPRI modelling system and Council Regulation (EC) No 2038/1999 
5.3.3 Scenario II: The Proposal of Franz Fischler (July 2004) 
This scenario is based on the proposal made by the retired commissar of agriculture Franz 
Fischler in July 2004 (CEC, 2004b). The proposal envisages the abolition of intervention for 
sugar and the replacement of the intervention price by a reference price that serves as a kind 
                                                 
81 Other types than white sugar do not play a major role on EU sugar markets, so that most of the quota 
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of price floor to derive minimum beet prices. It is defined at 421€ per ton of white sugar, 
which corresponds to a 33% reduction compared to the actual intervention price (631 €). A 
private storage system is introduced where sugar can be stored in case the market price falls 
below that price floor. Minimum sugar beet prices are reduced by the same relative change 
from 43.6 €/t of beets down to 27.4 €. These final reductions will be reached in three steps by 
2008. Since the CAPRI model is comparatively static and our simulation year is 2009, we 
assume the full reduction in our simulations.  
Quotas are envisaged to be reduced by 16% and A- and B-quotas are merged to one single 
quota which enters the model exogenously. The declassification as described above is 
abolished because it basically penalises those countries that are more competitive in sugar 
production. The EU Member States all receive therefore in contrast to scenario I the same 
relative reduction in quotas. It is further envisaged to partly compensate sugar beet farmers by 
a direct payment. National envelopes are defined and each Member State is required to 
incorporate those payments into the single farm payments defined in the CAP reform 2003 
based either on the quota beet production or total beet production in the historical reference 
period. This premium right belongs to the farmer and will not change even if quotas are 
traded or the farmer abandons sugar beet production. Assuming that those payments do not 
affect the crop allocation they are not included in the optimisation process but only in the 
income calculation and EU budget outlays. Hereby, regional envelopes are derived based on 
the total sugar beet production in the base year and those are added to the regional sugar beet 
income of farmers from premiums and to the FEOGA outlays for premiums as well.  
A reduction of subsidised exports to 400.000 tons of white sugar is further proposed and 
implemented in this scenario. The private storage system and the conversion scheme that 
compensates sugar factories that are forced to stop production are not modelled, the former 
because EU prices in the simulations did not fall below the reference price and the latter 
because the modelling of the sugar industry is simplified and not able to represent the closing 
of sugar factories. 
The last important change is the introduction of a quota trade system. According to this, 
quotas are allowed to be transferred between all sugar processing firms across the European 
Union. Again, due to the simplified representation of processing, we assume in the model that 
sugar beet producer can trade quotas and that they do this according to their quota rents as 
described in section 5.2.5. The assumption that sugar quotas are traded according to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
reductions affect white sugar from sugar beets. 
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difference between production costs and expected marginal revenues of sugar beet farmers 
implies that sugar processing firms are keen on remaining in regions where sugar beet 
production is the most competitive.  
5.3.4 Scenario III: The Proposal of Mariann Fischer Boel (June 2005) 
This scenario is based on the proposal made by the European Commission in June 2005 
(CEC, 2005). In some points it goes beyond the Fischler proposal, in other points it adheres 
closer to the existing system. It is not compulsory to reduce sugar quotas, for example. On the 
other hand, institutional prices are reduced further (-39%). This greater reduction is said to be 
necessary in order to keep imports at a lower level.  
Both proposals include the introduction of a private storage system, the merger of A- and 
B-quotas into one single quota as well as a compensation payment to sugar beet farmers. The 
latter is in scenario III higher, because a higher price reduction has to be compensated. A 
comparison between the national envelopes for direct income supports for farmers in 
scenarios I and II is given in Table 8.2 in the annex. 
It is further proposed to introduce a restructuring scheme that compensates processing 
firms that have to abandon sugar production because they are not able to cover their 
production costs at lower sugar prices. The EU Commission offers to buy their quota 
endowment out of the market at a price of 730 € in 2006/07. If a processing firm decides to 
leave the industry later than 2006/07, they only receive a reduced price for quotas. The price 
is reduced in three linear steps to 420 € in 2009/10 which is the last year the Commission 
offers the restructuring aid. The money necessary to create a new restructuring fond that 
would cover the costs of the scheme is collected from the remaining companies by charging a 
quota duty per ton over three marketing years. Additionally, for those EU Member States that 
are known as C-sugar producers, an additional quota amount is made available which they 
can buy from the Commission at the same prices at which the Commission buys quotas. 
Those funds are allocated to the restructuring fond as well. The sum of those additional quota 
amounts made available is limited to 1 million tons. 
Since the sugar processing industry is hardly represented in our model and the actors in 
the envisaged restructuring scheme are the processing firms, we have to make some 
assumptions about how restructuring might take place. We assume the following: If prices 
went down to the proposed level, some processing firms would not be able to continue 
production. In our model, quotas would simply be not fully used in less competitive regions. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume in our model that the unused quota quantities would be 
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sold. Exactly this is our assumption.82 We reduce regional quota endowments to the level 
where quotas are at least filled at 95%.83 By assuming that only regional competitiveness of 
sugar beet farmers regulates the quota amounts drawn out of the market, we assume that  
 at least one processing firm remains in those regions where sugar beets are still 
cultivated and transportation costs do not increase; 
 processing firms do not redistribute quotas from less competitive farmers in a 
region to the more competitive ones; 
 the competitiveness of processing is correlated with that of farmers in a region; 
 other reasons that might lead to a closure of processing firms are negligible. 
In order to represent the possibility for the C-sugar producing countries to buy additional 
quotas, we distribute the amount of 1 million tons among those regions according to their 
C-sugar supply in the base year. The costs for buying new quotas, as well as the revenues 
from selling them, are not included in the allocation mechanism of CAPRI, because we 
assume that processing firms bear those costs alone. This means we do not have to change the 
price linkage function implemented in the model. In 2009, which is our simulation year, the 
restructuring is not yet finished but the comparative static character of the model is not able to 
capture the transition period. We have to assume that the transition has been already 
completed. 
In the Commission’s proposal, there is no statement concerning subsidised exports and the 
lost WTO panel. It only says ‘Without prejudice to the EU’s stated intention to phase-out 
agricultural export subsidies in the framework of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the 
report of the WTO requires certain changes in order to ensure that EC export subsidy 
commitments are respected’. We interpret this to mean that the Commission assumes the 
CMO changes addressed above are sufficient to meet the WTO limits on subsidised exports 
including the panel decision (OXSFAM, 2004). According to that decision 1.3 million tons of 
subsidised exports remain ‘legal’.  
                                                 
82 Although quota trade is not an option here, one could alternatively imagine fixing the quota price in the 
respective module at the envisaged price at which quotas are drawn out of the market distributed over a 
planning period of 10 years. The problem here is that we cannot apply the whole price and compare it to 
farmer quota rents, because we do not know anything about how the processing industry and farmers share 
existing quota rents. It turned out that even a 50/50 distribution was so high that half of the European quotas 
vanished. 
83A slight undersupply might be likely due to some risk considerations. 
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As this latest reform proposal was published shortly before the present study was finished, 
we have to be content with the simplified representation of restructuring. Nonetheless, it may 
be valuable to compare its impacts to the Fischler proposal in scenario II, especially to 
identify the difference of a quota trade scheme based on farmers’ quota rents, compared to the 
assumptions that quotas are adjusted until they are not under-filled at regional level.84 An 
overview of the most important differences between the addressed scenarios is given in 
Table 5.6. A more detailed description of parameters that enter the model – those that are 
equal among scenarios and those that change – is available from the author upon request. 
Table 5.6: Overview on policy assumptions in the analysed scenarios 
Reference 
(2009) Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
CAP reform
Intervention 
price*/basic beet price 421 €/t S / 28 €/t SB 385 €/t S / 25 €/t SB 
Production quotas 1400.000 t endogenous adjustment 16% cut to reference
endogenous through 
restructering 
assumptions
Quota trade no no yes no
Tariffs and TRQ for 
LDCs
current WTO 
commitments
Subsidised exports limit: 400.000 t        (+ C sugar exports)
limit 1300.000 t       
(including C exports)
current WTO commitments
631 €/t S  / 48 €/t SB 
Member State MTR implementation - Further decrease in administrative prices  
duty and quota free access for LDCs
merger of A and B quotas,  no declassification, 
partial compensation
 
Source: Author’s illustration and CEC (2004b and 2005) 
*The intervention price is called reference price in scenario II and III and is subject to a private storage system 
and not to intervention 
  
                                                 
84 The results from sections 3 and 1 suggest that quota rents are not necessarily correlated with the C-sugar 
production so that we expect different results for both scenarios. 
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5.4 Results of Impact Analysis 
In this section we present the model results of the analysed scenarios. We will concentrate 
on the changes in sugar and sugar beet prices, sugar production and quotas, the EU sugar 
market balance, LDC imports and analyse the impacts on sugar consumers, sugar beet farmers 
and the FEOGA budget. The analysis is carried out at EU-1585 level and for some indicators 
even for EU Member State and NUTS 2 regions. We start with a comparison of the reference 
scenario to the base year situation. 
5.4.1 The Reference scenario 
The reference scenario, as described above, is mainly a projection of the base year sugar 
and sugar beet production quantities to the year 2009 under the conditions of the CAP reform 
2003. In Table 5.7 we summarise the reallocation of certain products / product groups in the 
reference scenario and compare them to the base year. We observe the effects of the CAP 
reform from 2003 that are found in other studies as well (for example, the Mid Term Review 
published by DG Agri in CEC, 2003): a strong decrease in cereal land allocation combined 
with an increase of fodder production on arable land. It is comprehensible that land cultivated 
with cereals is decreasing due to increasing yields and the decoupled payment scheme.86 But 
it seems contra intuitive that the area which is set free is mainly reallocated with fodder 
production because the animal sector loses a great deal of relative competitiveness as well. 
The reason for that is found in a reduction of production intensity in the animal sector. 
Compared to the agenda 2000 situation, it becomes cheaper to produce fodder on arable land 
so that production intensity is likely to decrease. 
More detailed information on the effects of the CAP reform from 2003 is found in the 
above quoted DG Agri report where an impact analysis of the Mid Term Review (MTR) is 
                                                 
85 The version of the CAPRI model that we use includes only the EU-15 Member States in the supply part. The 
new member countries are a single regional aggregate in the market part. Unfortunately, it was not possible 
to aggregate both to only one market within the scope of this study. Furthermore, it turned out to be almost 
impossible to make the regional aggregate of the new Member States react proportionally to the EU-15 
market, which mainly is due to the Armington assumptions. The final assumptions on the sugar market of 
the new Member States are that they are not joined. Over all scenarios their production trade figures stay 
almost constant according to our results. Nonetheless, the error we make with that assumption might be 
considered relatively small, because before the accession those countries produced at lower sugar prices than 
those guaranteed by the CMO. Their quota endowment was defined according to the production quantity in a 
base period. One might therefore expect that the sugar production in those countries will not be heavily 
reduced, if quotas and prices go down because sugar revenues are still above those in the base year. 
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carried out with different models, among them the CAPRI model. But since an MTR analysis 
is not a focus of this study, we are content with knowing that the political environment of our 
reference point is the latest CAP reform. 
Table 5.7: Land allocation in the reference and the base year (EU-15, 1000 ha) 
Base year (2001)
value
change to 
Base year
Cereals 37519 34709 -2810
Oilseeds 5306 5137 -169
Sugar beet 1881 1900 19
Potatoes 1275 1296 22
Fodderproduction 59886 62334 2448
Set aside 5609 5661 51
Non Food 487 420 -67
Other uses 20537 21326 789
Reference (2009)
 
 Source: CAPRI modelling system 
Sugar beet land allocation in the reference scenario is increasing. This is due to two 
overlapping effects. Increasing sugar beet yields tend to reduce sugar beet land allocation. But 
the dominating effect is that of increasing competitiveness due to the new premium scheme. 
Generally, those crops gain in competition, where premiums were lower in the Agenda 2000 
situation than after the CAP reform. Sugar beets are included in this group of crops because 
they did not receive any premium in the past and are now eligible for the decoupled premium. 
As a consequence, sugar beet production increases at European level by about 3% as apparent 
from Table 5.8.  
                                                                                                                                                        
86 Cereals lose relative competitiveness because the new per ha amount of premiums is lower than that applied to 
cereals in the base year under Agenda 2000 conditions. 
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Table 5.8: Key indicators on the EU-15 sugar (beet) markets – Reference and base year 
Base year (2001)
Unit value* value
% change to 
base
A sugar beet
producer price €/t 59.12 51.77 -12.4
production 1000t 80181 80175 0.0
B sugar beet
producer price €/t 54.45 47.17 -13.4
production 1000t 16370 16909 3.3
C sugar beet
producer price €/t 18.41 15.53 -15.7
production 1000t 15875 18633 17.4
Sugar beet total
average price €/t 52.69 45.26 -14.1
production 1000t 112425 115716 2.9
EU price €/t 807 708 -12.3
World market price €/t 226 190 -15.9
Quota 1000t 13882 13882 0.0
Domestic supply 1000t 16068 16534 2.9
Belgium 1000t 933 966 3.6
Denmark 1000t 509 529 3.9
Germany 1000t 4041 4178 3.4
Greece 1000t 322 332 3.0
Spain 1000t 1075 1098 2.1
France 1000t 4196 4284 2.1
Ireland 1000t 211 210 -0.5
Italy 1000t 1415 1482 4.8
Netherlands 1000t 961 986 2.6
Austria 1000t 431 447 3.7
Portugal 1000t 85 84 -1.4
Sweden 1000t 415 429 3.3
Finland 1000t 153 161 5.4
United Kingdom 1000t 1322 1350 2.1
Imports 1000t 1818 1821 0.2
Total supply 1000t 17886 18355 2.6
Domestic demand 1000t 12951 12967 0.1
Exports 1000t 4935 5388 9.2
Subsidiesed 1000t 2618 2673 2.1
C sugar exports 1000t 2317 2715 17.2
Total demand 1000t 17886 18355 2.6   
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*Monetary values in the base year are inflated (1.9% per annum) 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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For a better comparison of the change of price incentives in the reference relative to the 
base year, we inflate the base year monetary values. The nominal increase of the EU sugar 
market price from 695 to 708 € is in fact a decrease (from 807 to 708 €) in real monetary 
terms. Revenues per hectare from sugar (quota) beet production are consequently decreasing 
as well. Even this is overcompensated by the decoupled premium scheme making sugar beet 
production more competitive. The degree of overcompensation naturally differs among EU 
Member States and regions. As visible in Table 5.8, not all EU-15 Member States extend 
sugar beet production. In Portugal and Ireland, it is reduced. Those regional differences are 
further illustrated in Figure 5.11. 
Figure 5.11: Relative change of sugar beet supply:  
Reference scenario (2009) to base year (2001), EU-15 NUTS 2 in % 
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Apparently, apart from the Portuguese and Irish regions, production is reduced in two 
other Spanish regions as indicated by the green colour. The darkest red regions, which are 
those where sugar beet production shows the strongest increase relative to the base year 
production, are located in Italy, although Italian regions were estimated to be among the high 
cost producers (compare Table 5.2). But regional differences occur not only as a result of 
sugar beet production costs. They also depend on the relation of price reduction for beets to 
the comparative advantage of the new premium scheme or the changes in opportunity costs to 
sugar beet production. The domestic sugar demand of the EU-15 is projected to increase by 
0.1%. 
Table 5.8 further illustrates that sugar beet prices react proportionally to the EU- and the 
world market price for sugar, respectively.87 The latter is decreasing in both real and nominal 
terms. This is because the rising EU sugar supply triggers more C-sugar exports which, in 
turn, puts pressure on the world market price. Sugar production quotas, as indicated above, do 
not change and sugar imports stay basically at base year levels as well.  
To summarise, the reference run is characterised by  
 slightly increasing sugar beet production in most EU-15 regions due to the CAP 
reform which benefits those arable crops that have not received premiums 
beforehand; 
 price decrease for sugar and sugar beets in real terms; 
 increasing C-sugar exports and  
 domestic demand and imports that stay on base year levels. 
5.4.2 Scenario I: ‘EBA’ 
The ‘Everything but Arms’ scenario differs from the reference run in that we assume that 
quota and duty free access for all products including sugar are granted to the LDC group. We 
further expect additional imports from the Western Balkan countries. To maintain the high 
EU sugar prices, a reduction of European sugar quotas is necessary which is ensured by the 
declassification mechanism (see section 5.3.1).  
As intended by the quota reduction, arable land assigned to sugar beet production is 
decreasing as shown in Table 5.9. The 282 000 ha allocated to sugar beet production in the 
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reference run can be switched to other crops. Mainly cereals and fodder on arable land 
substitute for sugar beets. Although the sugar beet area is reduced by about 15% we see that 
the area released from sugar beet production leads only to very small relative changes in area 
for possible substitutes. This again stresses that the sugar beet sector plays only a minor role 
in agriculture as a whole. One argument of the sugar beet lobby frequently proclaimed in 
order to achieve solidarity between non sugar beet farmers and those that cultivate beets is 
that even the former group of farmers would suffer from a politically induced substitution of 
sugar beets by, say, cereals. This would create a greater supply of cereals that would put 
pressure on prices. This argument might be considered weak because even if the total area 
that is cultivated with sugar beets today were moved to cereals, it would only mean a 5% 
increase in cereal production. This would not put too much pressure on cereal markets. To 
confirm this hypothesis, Table 8.4 on page 180 shows the development of producer prices for 
arable crops over all scenarios analysed. There it is apparent that resulting price reductions are 
comparably small. 
Table 5.9: Land allocation in the reference and scenario I (EU-15, 1000 ha) 
change to 
Reference
 relative 
change to 
Reference
Cereals 34709 34754 45 0.13%
Oilseeds 5137 5169 32 0.62%
Sugar beet 1900 1618 -282 -14.84%
Potatoes 1296 1299 2 0.19%
Fodderproduction 62334 62457 123 0.20%
Set aside 5661 5696 35 0.63%
Non Food 420 427 7 1.55%
Other uses 21326 21364 38 0.18%
Reference 
(2009) Scenario I
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
                                                                                                                                                        
87  A real world market price for sugar does not exist within the Armington approach. We use the unit value of 
all sugar exports of the EU-15 as a proxy for it. 
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Due to the minor importance of the sugar sector, we refrain from presenting tables such as 
Table 5.9 or Table 5.7 in the following scenarios, because the picture looks very much the 
same. For those who are still interested in the figures of all scenarios please see Table 8.3 on 
page 179. 
Regarding sugar prices in the current scenario, we see in Table 5.10 that our goal to 
maintain the price level of the reference is not entirely reached. The EU-15 sugar market price 
falls by 0.6 % to 704 €. Nonetheless, this can be considered basically the same price level.88 
The change in sugar beet prices is somewhat confusing at first sight. A- and B-beet prices are 
increasing although sugar prices are going down and a difference between both prices no 
longer exists. The explanation for this phenomenon is found in the levy mechanism. 
According to HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) European sugar producers would no longer have 
to pay for subsidised exports because it is not quota sugar that is exported, but LDC imports. 
Those would be financed by the EU budget. Consequently, as the supply of EU quota sugar 
falls short of sugar demand and no B-sugar has to be exported, no levies are collected. As a 
result, there is no longer a price differentiation between A- and B-sugar beets and the joint 
price is above the A-beet price found in the reference scenario where levies were collected 
even on A-beets. The distinction between A- and B-sugar is therefore obsolete in the current 
scenario. C-beet prices stay basically at the same level as in the reference because the world 
sugar market price hardly changes either. 89  
The necessary quota cut in the current scenario amounts to about 20% or 2.7 million tons. 
This is slightly lower than the 3 million tons of additional imports. One reason is that in the 
reference, more quotas were not filled in some Member States than in the current scenario. 
The main reason, however, for the difference of about 300000 tons is due to a general 
problem of the Armington assumptions. In Table 5.10 we have added a line called 
aggregation error. This error occurs because the physical market balance does not necessarily 
come out even. The Armington approach only ensures that the market balance in terms of 
utility adds up to zero. As EU sugar is assumed to have other utility than imported sugar, the 
error becomes larger, the farther we move away from the quantity framework of the reference.  
                                                 
88 Due to technical feasibility, it was not possible to meet the reference price exactly. 
89 One might have expected that it increased because the reduced EU supply should reduce the pressure on world 
market prices. Indeed, all sugar prices countries outside the EU-15 increase in the current scenario, but we 
use the unit value of all exports leaving the EU at different prices which exists due to the Armington 
assumptions. This value depends not only on price developments in the exporting regions, but also on the 
change of the export pattern as well. If the share of exports to countries with lower prices increases, it is 
possible that the average unit value of all exports will decrease, even though all export prices are 
increasing. 
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Table 5.10: Key indicators on the EU-15 sugar (beet) markets - Reference and scenario I 
Unit value value
% change to 
Reference
A sugar beet
producer price €/t 51.77 52.98 2.3
production 1000t 80175 65077 -18.8
B sugar beet
producer price €/t 47.17 52.98 12.3
production 1000t 16909 13765 -18.6
C sugar beet
producer price €/t 15.53 15.49 -0.3
production 1000t 18633 19236 3.2
Sugar beet total
average price €/t 45.26 45.63 0.8
production 1000t 115716 98079 -15.2
EU price €/t 708 704 -0.6
World market price €/t 190 189 -0.3
Quota 1000t 13882 11190 -19.4
Domestic supply 1000t 16534 13993 -15.4
Belgium 1000t 966 824 -14.7
Denmark 1000t 529 436 -17.4
Germany 1000t 4178 3415 -18.2
Greece 1000t 332 308 -7.2
Spain 1000t 1098 1049 -4.5
France 1000t 4284 3410 -20.4
Ireland 1000t 210 190 -9.6
Italy 1000t 1482 1315 -11.3
Netherlands 1000t 986 813 -17.5
Austria 1000t 447 381 -14.7
Portugal 1000t 84 79 -6.0
Sweden 1000t 429 395 -8.0
Finland 1000t 161 149 -7.3
United Kingdom 1000t 1350 1229 -8.9
Imports 1000t 1821 4792 163.2
India 1000t 10 10 -0.2
ACP 1000t 1620 4052 150.1
Rest of the world 1000t 104 610 486.5
Free trade developing 1000t 87 120 38.0
Total supply 1000t 18355 18785 2.3
Domestic demand 1000t 12967 12972 0.0
Exports 1000t 5388 5423 0.7
Subsidiesed exports 1000t 2673 2620 -2.0
C sugar exports 1000t 2715 2803 3.2
Aggregation error 1000t 0 390
Total demand 1000t 18355 18785 2.3   
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 Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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The origins of imports are given in Table 5.10 as well. We see that most additional 
imports stem from the ACP county aggregate that contains most of the LDCs. Imports from 
the free trade developing group rise, too, because this aggregate contains some LDCs as well 
as the rest of the world. Most of the increase of the latter group, however, stems from the 
Western Balkans. 
The differences in supply reduction among EU-15 Member States mainly come from the 
declassification mechanism. As noted before, the countries that own larger B-quotas receive a 
higher quota reduction according to this mechanism. France and Germany, for example, 
receive a quota reduction of about 24% while in Spain the reduction amounts only to about 
8%. It is apparent that EU sugar production follows the quota cut slightly dampened 
indicating a substitution of former quota sugar with C-sugar.  
In Figure 5.12 the effect of the declassification is illustrated. In the darker green shaded 
regions, the supply reduction of sugar beets is stronger than in brighter ones. Regional 
differences within Member States seem to be negligible. The only striking region is Alsace in 
France. But taking into account the results on supply elasticities given in Table 5.2, we find 
that this region shows extremely high estimated supply elasticities. It is therefore not 
surprising that this region shows the largest relative supply reduction in France. 
Summarising this scenario, the CMO Sugar in its current design is able to cope with 
additional sugar imports, but it penalises those countries that are assumed to be more 
competitive in sugar beet production. We should further keep in mind that the scenario is not 
a long-term equilibrium. It is to be expected that the LDCs will be able to extend their 
production even more than assumed in our analysis. Further quota cuts would be likely, 
especially if the exporting countries find a way to evade the rule of origin that limits exports 
from a country based on its domestic sugar production in order avoid swap transactions. EU 
welfare positions are analysed in the overview of all scenarios in section 5.4.5. 
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Figure 5.12: Relative change of sugar beet supply: 
Scenario I to reference, EU-15 NUTS 2 in % 
 
 Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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5.4.3 Scenario II: The Proposal of Franz Fischler (July 2004) 
As indicated above, the Fischler proposal is characterised by a decrease in European sugar 
quotas by 16%, combined with a decrease in institutional prices by 33% and partial 
compensation. Furthermore, trade of sugar quotas between sugar companies of the European 
Union is introduced.  
Analysing the key indicators on European sugar markets, we find in Table 5.11 that the 
EU market price for sugar amounts to 434 €, which is higher than the proposed reference 
price (421 €). The same accounts for the average sugar beet price for quota beets, which is 
found above the minimum beet price of 28 €/t. C-sugar beet prices are slightly increasing due 
to an increase of the world market price for sugar. As a consequence of resulting price 
changes and the quota reduction combined with the trade option, European sugar supply is 
going down by 21%. This is a greater decrease than was found in scenario I. We further see 
that imports basically reach the level of the reference run. They are considerably lower than in 
scenario I because the incentive to supply sugar into the EU is greatly decreased by the lower 
market price. The tariff rate quota allocated to the Western Balkan regions is reduced to 
174 000 tons in this scenario, so that they supply considerably less than in the EBA scenario. 
The total EU sugar supply, given by the sum of domestic production and imports, amounts to 
about 15 million tons, 3 million less than in the reference. 
Domestic sugar demand slightly increases due to lower prices. The most affected position 
in the market balance, however, are sugar exports. The proposal includes a reduction of 
subsidised sugar exports to 400 000 tons or 85% of the reference quantities. Furthermore, 
C-sugar production greatly decreases, so that total exports are reduced by 3.5 million tons. 
Note that the Armington aggregation error is nearly zero again, because the quantity 
framework of imports and domestic use of quota sugar is closer to the reference.  
We further recognise that the relative decrease of sugar production varies greatly among 
EU-15 Member States. Large reductions are found in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Greece, 
while Belgium, Spain and France show lower relative supply reductions. Those differences 
arise from different production costs but also from the introduction of tradable quotas. The 
impact of the trade regime on quota reallocation is shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Table 5.11: Key indicators on the EU-15 sugar (beet) markets -  
Reference and scenario II 
Unit value value
% change to 
Reference
A sugar beet
producer price €/t 51.77 31.80 -38.6
production 1000t 80175 65534 -18.3
B sugar beet
producer price €/t 47.17 31.80 -32.6
production 1000t 16909 14652 -13.3
C sugar beet
producer price €/t 15.53 15.73 1.3
production 1000t 18633 10109 -45.7
Sugar beet total
average price €/t 45.26 30.00 -33.7
production 1000t 115716 90295 -22.0
EU price €/t 708 434 -38.7
World market price €/t 190 204 7.4
Quota 1000t 13882 11661 -16.0
Domestic supply 1000t 16534 13049 -21.1
Belgium 1000t 966 904 -6.4
Denmark 1000t 529 460 -12.9
Germany 1000t 4178 3445 -17.5
Greece 1000t 332 184 -44.6
Spain 1000t 1098 1042 -5.1
France 1000t 4284 4006 -6.5
Ireland 1000t 210 22 -89.7
Italy 1000t 1482 495 -66.6
Netherlands 1000t 986 637 -35.3
Austria 1000t 447 536 19.9
Portugal 1000t 84 27 -67.7
Sweden 1000t 429 329 -23.4
Finland 1000t 161 114 -29.0
United Kingdom 1000t 1350 847 -37.3
Imports 1000t 1821 1933 6.2
India 1000t 10 5 -48.2
ACP 1000t 1620 1638 1.1
Rest of the world 1000t 104 174 67.6
Free trade developing 1000t 87 116 33.3
Total supply 1000t 18355 14981 -18.4
Domestic demand 1000t 12967 13113 1.1
Exports 1000t 5388 1863 -65.4
Subsidiesed exports 1000t 2673 416 -84.4
C sugar exports 1000t 2715 1446 -46.7
Aggregation error 1000t 0 6
Total demand 1000t 18355 14981 -18.4
Scenario II
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 Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Figure 5.13: Regional sugar quotas: 
Scenario II relative to reference quotas cut by 16% in % 
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
The equilibrium price for traded quotas turned out to be 28 € per ton of sugar quota which 
has to be interpreted as a yearly rental price. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, where the red 
shaded regions are quota buyers and the green ones sell parts of their quota, quotas flow from 
the Italian, Irish, Greek, Finnish, Portuguese, Dutch, some German, Spanish and French 
regions to Austria, France, parts of Germany and Spain as well as to Belgium, Denmark and 
western Sweden. As a reference quota endowment we do not choose those from the reference 
run, but reduce them by 16%, because the proposal includes a 16% quota reduction. The 
highest relative quota increase is found in Austria in Niederöstereich, while the highest 
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relative quota reduction is found in Veneto in Italy. The small Italian region Molise is the only 
region in Italy that belongs to the quota buyer group.90 
Table 5.12 shows the national quota flows. We see that only 12% of EU sugar quotas 
change their holder. In absolute terms, most quota quantities are bought by France, while 
Austria buys the most in relative terms compared to the reference run quota reduced by 16%. 
The Spanish region Rioja is the NUTS 2 region that buys the highest absolute quota amount 
across Europe. This is partly founded in the absolute size of that region and partly in 
relatively low marginal production costs in the base year. Italy sells more than half of their 
quotas due to high production costs and Ireland gets rid of 88% of their quotas. 
All in all, the results from the quota trade analysis are basically a mirror of the marginal 
cost estimates given in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.7. Again we have to point out that the limited 
representation of processing firms, who are in fact the holders of quota rights and therefore 
the actors when it comes to tradable quotas, limits the interpretability of our results. Only if 
more competitive processing enterprises are located where the more competitive sugar beet 
farmers are found, we would be close to a realistic picture of quota trade. Our results therefore 
only intend to show the direction where quotas might go rather than being a good indication 
of the absolute amounts of trade flows. 
To summarise the results of scenario II, the decrease of institutional prices reduces sugar 
beet imports from third countries compared to scenario I. Although sugar beet prices decrease 
considerably compared to the same scenario, EU-15 sugar supply increases. This partly comes 
from higher quota amounts at EU level but especially from higher quotas in more competitive 
regions because the abolition of declassification as well as the introduction of a quota trade 
scheme benefits those regions. Sugar exports decrease considerably which reduces the 
pressure on world sugar market prices so that they tend to increase. The income effects of the 
current scenario will be discussed in the welfare analysis given in section 5.4.5. 
                                                 
90 This region is the only one across Europe where marginal cost estimates were lower than the respective 
expected marginal revenue at base year production rendering a higher competitiveness than without the 
calibration to marginal costs. 
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Table 5.12: Trade of sugar quotas between EU-15 Member States 
absolute 
(1000 t)
relative to 
quota (%)
EU15 1 428.8 12
Belgium 153.3 22
Denmark 41.1 12
Germany 167.8 6
Greece -80.5 -30
Spain 259.7 31
France 592.7 22
Ireland -146.0 -88
Italy -813.3 -63
Netherlands -133.7 -19
Austria 214.0 66
Portugal -34.8 -52
Sweden -9.8 -3
Finland -10.2 -8
United Kingdom -200.5 -21
Sugar quotas traded 
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
5.4.4 Scenario III: The Proposal of Mariann Fischer Boel (June 2005)  
The latest proposal of the EU Commission goes beyond the Fischler Proposal in terms of 
price reduction, but in terms of quota reduction it is more moderate. There is no obligatory 
quota reduction at all. A reduction of European quotas is achieved by offering a restructuring 
scheme whereby processing firms can sell their quota rights. On the other side, there is a 
bonus for ‘classical C-sugar supplying countries’. They are allowed to buy an additional 
amount of sugar quotas.  
In Table 5.13 we observe that although institutional prices for sugar and sugar beets are 
proposed to be reduced to 385 €/t (25 €/t), the resulting prices are still higher. This is mainly 
because the pressure from LDC imports is greatly reduced. At the equilibrium price the 
EU-15 is only faced with about 900 000 tons of sugar imports. 91 
                                                 
91 Generally, the substitution of import sugar with domestic production compared to the reference scenario has 
two reasons: (1) the revenues for exporters to the EU are reduced due to a lower EU sugar price and (2) 
EU-15 sugar becomes more attractive for EU consumers by this reduction as well. Both effects lead to a 
sensitive model response of sugar imports on changing prices.  
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EU-15 sugar exports decrease considerably compared to the reference and WTO limits are 
perfectly met. Domestic demand increases due to lower market prices. Furthermore, we 
observe increasing sugar prices on world markets and greatly reduced C-sugar beet 
production. The main reason for this development is that classical C-sugar producing 
countries are able to buy additional quotas. C-sugar production is consequently partly 
substituted by quota production in those countries. The only reason why there is still C-sugar 
left stems from the fact that only 1 million tons of additional quotas are made available. Most 
C-sugar quantities as apparent from Table 5.15 are still produced in France and Germany in 
this scenario. 
Changes in sugar production per EU-15 Member State are again projected to be very 
heterogeneous. The most striking effect is that France supplies even more sugar than in the 
reference due to an quota extension of 20% or 665 000 tons as apparent from Table 5.14. In 
that table and in Figure 5.14 we show in which regions quotas have been reduced and in 
which they are increasing. We assume France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Denmark to 
be eligible for buying quotas92. In Figure 5.14 we see that the relative changes in sugar quotas 
range from +39% (to the reference) in Kaernten in Austria to a -90.5% in Veneto, Italy. Italy 
comes up with a supply reduction of about 70% and Ireland almost completely stops 
supplying sugar.  
Spain reduces sugar production by 18%. This large reduction compared to the previous 
scenario is due to the possibility to buy quotas. We do not allocate Spain to the group that is 
eligible to buy quotas although the region Rioja would like to, according to their production 
costs. Consequently, Rioja cannot compensate the supply reduction of the other Spanish 
regions as in scenario II. EU sugar quotas are finally reduced by 1.3 million tons. If we 
assume that all those quotas are sold in the first year of the restructuring scheme where quota 
sellers receive 730 €/t, the costs for buying quotas will amount to about 950 million €.  
The analysed proposal benefits those countries known to be the relevant sugar producers 
in Europe, above all France, but also Germany Austria, Belgium and Denmark. The following 
section will provide a better overview of the differences between the analysed scenarios and 
EU-15 welfare impacts. 
                                                 
92 The United Kingdom belongs to that group as well, but it turned out that they are not keen on buying quotas in 
the model, because the low prices led to a quota under-fill so that we assume that they will sell quotas rather 
than buy them. 
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Table 5.13: Key indicators on the EU-15 sugar (beet) markets –  
Reference and scenario III 
Unit value value
% change to 
Reference
A sugar beet
producer price €/t 51.77 29.66 -42.7
production 1000t 80175 70311 -12.3
B sugar beet
producer price €/t 47.17 29.66 -37.1
production 1000t 16909 16548 -2.1
C sugar beet
producer price €/t 15.53 15.78 1.6
production 1000t 18633 5851 -68.6
Sugar beet total
average price €/t 45.26 28.79 -36.4
production 1000t 115716 92711 -19.9
EU price €/t 708 404 -42.9
World market price €/t 190 204 7.8
Quota 1000t 13882 12581 -9.4
Domestic supply 1000t 16534 13406 -18.9
Belgium 1000t 966 891 -7.7
Denmark 1000t 529 501 -5.3
Germany 1000t 4178 3754 -10.1
Greece 1000t 332 157 -52.6
Spain 1000t 1098 901 -18.0
France 1000t 4284 4328 1.0
Ireland 1000t 210 22 -89.7
Italy 1000t 1482 454 -69.4
Netherlands 1000t 986 597 -39.5
Austria 1000t 447 429 -4.0
Portugal 1000t 84 9 -89.6
Sweden 1000t 429 320 -25.3
Finland 1000t 161 99 -38.6
United Kingdom 1000t 1350 945 -30.0
Imports 1000t 1821 968 -46.9
India 1000t 10 1 -85.5
ACP 1000t 1620 657 -59.4
Rest of the world 1000t 104 200 92.1
Free trade developing 1000t 87 109 25.5
Total supply 1000t 18355 14373 -21.7
Domestic demand 1000t 12967 13129 1.3
Exports 1000t 5388 1317 -75.6
Subsidiesed exports 1000t 2673 474 -82.3
C sugar exports 1000t 2715 843 -69.0
Aggregation error 1000t 0 -73
Total demand 1000t 18355 14373 -21.7
Scenario III
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  Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Figure 5.14: Regional sugar quotas: Scenario III relative to reference in % 
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Table 5.14: Change in sugar quotas of EU-15 Member States 
absolute 
(1000 t)
relative to 
quota (%)
EU15 -1 300.6 -9
Belgium 38.9 5
Denmark 51.4 12
Germany 162.5 5
Greece -164.3 -52
Spain -132.4 -13
France 652.3 20
Ireland -176.7 -89
Italy -1 080.2 -70
Netherlands -298.8 -35
Austria 15.5 4
Portugal -70.6 -89
Sweden -69.0 -19
Finland -48.9 -34
United Kingdom -180.3 -16
Change in sugar quotas
 
   Source: CAPRI modelling system 
5.4.5 Comparison of the Analysed Scenarios 
The tables showing the key indicators on European sugar (beet) markets presented in the 
previous sections are repeated in Table 8.5 on page 181. For a better overview they are 
summarised within one table. In terms of the reduction of domestic sugar production, 
scenario I shows the lowest value. This is because only quotas are reduced and prices stay at 
reference levels. As soon as EU sugar prices decrease, sugar supply also decreases. As 
mentioned before, the sugar supply is reduced at a greater rate in scenario II as compared to 
III. Even though EU sugar prices are decreasing in the latter case, this occurs due to more 
parts of the European sugar supply originating in more competitive countries.  
World sugar market prices increase in the order of presented scenarios. They are very 
close in scenario II and III. EU sugar imports considerably decrease from scenario I to III due 
to lower EU sugar market prices. Concerning sugar exports and WTO limits of subsidise 
exports, we clearly see that scenario I retains the high sugar export quantities from the 
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reference scenario and the base year. It would therefore violate the latest panel decision ruling 
that C-sugar as well as re-export of preferential imports have to be counted under the existing 
limit of 1.3 million tons. Due to this problem and the high incentive to export sugar to the EU 
for the LDCs, scenario I is not a realistic option of the CMO Sugar in the future. In scenario II 
subsidised sugar exports are reduced to 400 000 tons of re-exports + about 1.4 million tons of 
C-sugar summing up to about 1.8 million tons of sugar exports. We see the allowed (post 
panel decision) 1.3 million tons are overshot by 300 000 t. Consequently, the Fischler 
proposal is too moderate in terms of supply reductions in order to cope with WTO 
commitments. Scenario III finally meets the WTO restrictions per definition, but basically due 
to a higher price reduction on EU sugar markets and the additional quota amounts made 
available for C-sugar producing countries. In scenarios I and II the EU-15 remains a net 
exporter of sugar, while in scenario III sugar imports exceed exports by about 70 000 tons  
Domestic sugar demand slightly increases in scenarios II and III given the lower prices 
consumers have to pay. The supply reduction at regional level varies greatly across regions 
and scenarios. Generally speaking, the regional differentiation of supply reduction in 
scenario I is mainly driven by the declassification that benefits those countries that hold less 
B-sugar quotas. In scenario II those countries are benefited that have the highest quota rents 
and in scenario II, the advantage is found in the countries classified as classical C-sugar 
regions.  
Table 5.15 summarises the development of C-sugar production in the analysed scenarios. 
For most Member States the rule holds that C-sugar production decreases from scenario I to 
III, whereas in some of them, C-sugar production is higher in scenario III than it is in II. 
Spain, for example, buys quotas in scenario II while we do not allow this in III. Consequently, 
C-sugar production is higher in scenario III.  
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Table 5.15: C-sugar production in analysed scenarios per EU-15 Member State 
Reference 
1000 t 1000 t
% change to 
Reference 1000 t
% change to 
Reference 1000 t
% change to 
Reference
Belgium 153.1 161.9 5.7 68.3 -55.4 39.4 -74.3
Denmark 112.1 114.9 2.4 69.2 -38.3 33.0 -70.6
Germany 796.9 825.9 3.6 437.3 -45.1 210.6 -73.6
Greece 16.0 28.6 79.1 -1.1 -107.1 5.7 -64.1
Spain 104.3 129.4 24.1 -52.0 -149.8 39.3 -62.3
France 1028.9 956.6 -7.0 679.4 -34.0 421.3 -59.1
Ireland 11.7 14.6 24.5 1.1 -90.8 0.0 -100.0
Italy -63.1 33.4 % 10.4 % -11.4 %
Netherlands 129.5 138.8 7.2 51.8 -60.0 39.1 -69.8
Austria 62.7 72.5 15.7 -0.8 -101.3 29.1 -53.5
Portugal 4.5 7.5 65.9 -4.8 -205.3 -0.1 -102.0
Sweden 62.5 70.6 13.0 30.7 -50.9 22.8 -63.5
Finland 15.8 20.9 32.3 2.6 -83.8 2.5 -84.4
United Kingdom 217.1 227.6 4.8 95.7 -55.9 -7.0 -103.2
Scenario IIIScenario I Scenario II
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
So far we have not reflected on the impacts of the analysed scenarios on EU-15 welfare. 
Table 5.16 summarises the most relevant positions. We will concentrate on a few agricultural 
income indicators, the equivalent variation of consumers (explained in BRITZ et al., 2005) and 
the relevant positions of the FEOGA budget with respect to the analysed topic. All figures 
indicate the absolute change to the reference scenario. The first line shows the changes in total 
agricultural income including compensation payments. We see that the strongest reduction is 
found in scenario II. The following development of the input side corresponds to that of the 
outputs. Finally, we show the gross value added including premiums of total agriculture and 
sugar beet production. Both decrease from the left to the right side of the table.  
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Table 5.16: Impacts of analysed scenarios on EU-15 welfare (M€) 
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
absolute difference to 
reference
absolute difference to 
reference
absolute difference to 
reference
Agriculture
Total output + premiums -1116.4 -1771.0 -1510.2
of which from sugar beet -796.6 -2554.0 -2585.4
Total input -456.9 -641.7 -566.3
of which for sugar beet -366.8 -546.9 -496.8
Gross Value Added + premiums -659.5 -1129.3 -943.9
of which from sugar beet -429.9 -2007.1 -2088.6
FEOGA budget outlays
Total 293.8 91.2 280.9
of which on Premiums 8.2 1055.0 1214.4
of which on exports subsidies for sugar -41.0 -1295.5 -1297.0
producer levies 441.4 441.4 441.4
other outlays 114.9 109.8 77.9
Consumer
Equivalent variation 465.9 3696.0 3987.3
EU Welfare* -356.8 2016.2 2758.1
Gross Value Added + premiums per Member State
Belgium -21.8 -44.4 -29.5
Denmark -27.8 -37.0 -28.5
Germany -213.1 -326.4 -260.0
Greece -17.2 -59.2 -60.7
Spain -35.9 -81.9 -97.7
France -205.0 -267.3 -208.2
Ireland -5.7 -25.4 -20.8
Italy -43.5 -93.6 -77.5
Netherlands -18.4 -44.8 -38.8
Austria -16.0 -16.6 -23.3
Portugal -3.8 -9.0 -8.4
Sweden -8.5 -15.5 -11.5
Finland -6.8 -12.4 -10.0
United Kingdom -35.8 -95.8 -69.0
Gross Value Added + premiums of sugar beets per Member State
Belgium -23.9 -102.8 -113.3
Denmark -16.4 -53.0 -51.3
Germany -161.7 -503.4 -490.2
Greece -9.2 -82.6 -90.3
Spain -6.7 -139.3 -176.6
France -126.9 -378.4 -376.1
Ireland -3.3 -49.2 -49.3
Italy -29.8 -298.8 -311.3
Netherlands -26.4 -128.3 -137.7
Austria -11.5 -33.9 -50.3
Portugal -0.5 -12.2 -13.2
Sweden -1.5 -38.9 -41.6
Finland -1.8 -19.7 -21.4
United Kingdom -12.1 -169.8 -167.2  
*EU Welfare does not include processing  
Source: CAPRI modelling system.  
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At EU level we can therefore conclude that this development is highly correlated with the 
reduction of EU sugar market prices. From the producers’ point of view, Scenario I would 
harm them the least. The latter two lines are split up into EU Member States at the bottom of 
Table 5.16. Scenario I is still favourable in all countries in terms of the reduction of both the 
total agricultural gross value added (GVA) and that of sugar beet production. But the ranking 
of scenario II and III is not equal across Member States. In terms of total agricultural GVA, 
almost all countries show lower reductions in scenario III. Only for Greece, Spain and Austria 
the opposite is true. This is the result of the combined effect of reductions in the GVA from 
sugar beets and the income possibilities of alternative production activities. Concerning the 
GVA from sugar beet production, scenario III is only favourable in Denmark, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom. Disregarding those regional differences, the reform 
proposals II and III in particular lead to income losses for European farmers of about 
one billion €. 
FEOGA budget outlays are slightly higher than in the reference scenarios. Reduced 
expenditures on subsidised exports in all scenarios due to reduced export quantities and/or 
smaller differences between world market and EU market prices contribute to savings. On the 
other hand, there are two effects that raise FEOGA expenditures: (1) the introduction of 
compensatory payments in scenario II and III and (2) producer levies, which are collected in 
the reference but not in scenarios I to III, reduce the FEOGA income. In terms of FEOGA 
expenditures, all reform options are slightly unfavourable compared to the reference. The 
lowest costs arise from scenario II. In addition, expenditures and the new compensation 
payments for sugar beet farmers in scenarios II and II can completely be covered by the 
savings on subsidised export expenditures.93 
Finally, consumers benefit in all analysed scenarios compared to the reference due to 
lower prices for sugar and sugar products. In scenario I this gain in equivalent variation is not 
sufficient to compensate the losses on the producer and the budget side so that total welfare is 
reduced. But in scenario II and III, where prices considerably decrease, the equivalent 
variation of consumers increases such that positive welfare gains of 1.5 and 2.3 billion € 
respectively are achieved.  
 
                                                 
93 Note that the costs for the restructuring scheme in scenario III are not included here. 
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The overall welfare of the EU-15 therefore considerably increases in scenarios II and III.94 
Since our analysis focuses on the EU-15, we will only add some general remarks about the 
effects of the analysed scenarios on third countries. Producers in countries where sugar is 
produced at world market prices certainly gain from increasing world market prices, at least in 
scenarios II and III. On the other hand, consumers have to pay higher prices there. What is 
most interesting is the impact on those countries that have preferential access to the EU sugar 
market. Of course, producers in those countries suffer from the reductions of EU market 
prices. But we refrain from evaluating the magnitude of welfare impacts that the reform 
proposals might have on third countries due to the somewhat simplified representation of the 
world sugar market. 
5.4.6 Comparison to Other Studies  
Recently BROCKMEYER et al. (2005) presented a paper providing a brief literature review 
on research that analyses the CMO Sugar (see Table 5.17). The quoted studies are categorised 
according to the type of models the respective authors use in their analysis. The first group 
uses partial equilibrium models that only examine sugar, while the second group uses the 
same modelling approach but including the whole agricultural sector, while the last group 
uses general equilibrium models that cover the whole economy. In the right column of 
Table 5.17, the scope of each study is characterised. Apparently, the main analysed topic is 
rather different in all those studies. Naturally ADENÄUER et al. (2004) is very close to our 
simulations so we refrain from further comparison. As also stated by GOHIN and 
BUREAU (2005) there is much of variation in model results that result not only from different 
scenario definitions. FRANDSEN et al. (2003), for example, find only very small supply 
reductions in France, Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom even though sugar prices 
and quotas are reduced considerably in their selected scenarios. Only quota rents are reduced 
for those countries. This result, as stated various times above, is an outcome of the profit 
maximisation hypothesis that underlies their study. The countries mentioned before are 
assumed to be competitive at C-sugar prices so that it is not surprising that the authors do not 
identify a supply effect when quotas or prices for quota sugar are reduced. Compared to their 
                                                 
94 It is frequently noted by the lobby of sugar beet farmers that final consumers of sugar that appears mainly in 
processed products like beverages, chocolate or cake would not benefit from lower sugar prices because the 
sugar using industry would not lower the prices for their products but enhance their profit margin instead. 
This cannot be entirely ruled out, although it is to be expected that competition would eventually drive down 
prices. At any rate, if they did not reduce prices, the welfare gain would be on the part of primary sugar 
users. 
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analysis, our model can be considered an improvement, because it is closer to reality in terms 
of policy representation and behavioural models.  
Table 5.17: Overview of papers analysing the EU sugar market regime 
 
  Source: BROCKMEYER et al. (2005)95 
GOHIN and BUREAU (2005) exactly identify different approaches of C-sugar modelling in 
the various studies as one reason for such striking differences in model results besides other 
model assumptions and scenario definitions. They explain C-sugar production by assuming a 
mark up on C-sugar prices which is estimated econometrically and assumed to be linear 
dependant on quotas and prices. Principally this procedure reflects all those motives we 
described in section 4 and is very similar to the approach HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) use. 
                                                 
95  The authors state that ADENÄUER et al. (2004) do not reflect the self-financing aspect of the CMO Sugar. In 
fact they do reflect it, because they use the same CAPRI model with respect to this issue as we do. 
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Those studies along with WITZKE and KUHN (2004), ADENÄUER et al. (2004) and 
ADENÄUER (2005) are the only ones known to us where C-sugar production is explained by 
other aspects than C-sugar prices or constant shares of quota sugar (VIERLING, 1996). 
There is a wide spread in model results from studies that analyse sugar reform options in 
terms of world market price response as well. For example, POONYTH et al. (2000) analyse a 
scenario where EU supply is only reduced by about 3% and this induces a world market price 
increase of 9%. Our results only show an increase of 7% that corresponds to a supply 
reduction of -21%. A large increase in sugar world market prices might be questionable 
especially against the background of the Brazilian competitiveness in sugar production. There 
are many who say that Brazil would be able to double their production without high 
additional marginal costs (e.g. USDA, 2003). It might, therefore, be likely that the long-term 
impact on world market prices if the EU starts to be a net importer is not as high as expected 
by the authors.  
Recently ISERMEYER et al. (2005) prepared a study that evaluates the impacts of certain 
reform scenarios on German agriculture. They make use of the RAUMIS model, an 
agricultural sector model for Germany. Their scenario II is very close to ours, although they 
do not include tradable quotas because it is not an EU wide analysis. They project the German 
sugar beet supply to be reduced by 23% even at slightly lower prices. We forecast only a 
reduction of 17% but include the tradable quota regime. Their modelling of C-sugar assumes 
a restriction on C-sugar production such that C-beets would not appear if their price fell 
below 7.5 €/t. Using such a restriction, they are able to reconcile observed C-beet production 
with higher marginal costs than C-beet prices. This modelling of C-sugar is more a technical 
rather than an economic explanation for C-beet production.  
HENRICHSMEYER et al. (2003a) carried out a study for the EU Commission which is 
currently not available publicly. Although the author of the current study acted as a co-author, 
we are not allowed to refer to any model results given in that study. We can only say that the 
modelling of C-sugar is based on the fear of losing quota rights in case farmers do not fill 
their quotas and that our supply response to quota or quota price changes is slightly stronger.  
In the attempt to compare our results to other studies, it becomes apparent that differences 
in scenario definitions, model assumptions and set up make such a comparison problematic. 
In order to show the improvements implied by our modelling of European sugar supply 
compared to other studies that rely on profit maximisation, we mimic the scenarios analysed 
by FRANDSEN et al. (2003) with the CAPRI supply part. They define two scenarios. One is 
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characterised by a price cut of sugar beet prices in Europe induced by a reduction in border 
protection, and the other one assumes a reduction in sugar quotas. In both scenarios, B-sugar 
exports no longer appear so that a distinction between A- and B-quotas becomes obsolete. 
Consequently, A- and B-prices amount to the same value. In order to mimic those two 
scenarios we take over the price and quota changes from FRANDSEN et al. (2003) given in 
tables 4, 5 and 6 of that study. Price changes here are meant as relative changes in the basic 
beet price, which is the incentive price for A-quota sugar in their model. Consequently, we 
apply those relative price changes to our A-beet price in the reference and set the B-beet price 
equal to that for A-beets. C-beet prices change in the quoted study although their relative 
change is not presented in any of their tables. We assume that C-beet prices do not change, 
knowing that this triggers some imprecision.  
Table 5.18: CAPRI sugar beet supply response compared to FRANDSEN et al. (2003) 
sugar beet 
prices
sugar 
quotas Frandsen Adenäuer
sugar beet 
prices
sugar 
quotas Frandsen Adenäuer
EU total - 0.0 -18.7 -6.0 - -13.1 -0.4 -11.2
Belgium -24.0 0.0 -0.1 -6.6 3.0 -13.0 -12.9 -12.2
Denmark -24.0 0.0 0.0 -5.3 4.0 15.9 -14.1 15.4
Germany -23.0 0.0 -1.6 -4.7 0.0 -16.3 0.0 -13.7
Greece -14.0 0.0 -73.6 -4.5 -1.0 -8.1 5.6 -5.5
Spain -24.0 0.0 0.0 -6.6 2.0 -5.3 -2.0 -3.9
France -24.0 0.0 -0.7 -5.0 0.0 -15.0 0.1 -13.4
Ireland -9.0 0.0 -87.1 -4.5 0.0 -8.2 0.8 -8.6
Italy -7.0 0.0 -30.5 -10.0 -2.0 -12.0 1.3 -13.0
Netherlands -16.0 0.0 -76.1 -6.3 -1.0 -14.8 7.0 -14.2
Austria -23.0 0.0 -0.7 -3.5 0.0 -13.7 0.0 -11.0
Sweden -8.0 0.0 -59.9 -1.9 -2.0 -8.1 0.3 -4.2
Finland -18.0 0.0 -24.4 -3.8 0.0 -8.0 1.1 -6.2
United Kingdom -24.0 0.0 -1.3 -2.6 0.0 -13.1 0.1 -7.0
relative supply change
Price cut scenario
relative change in
Quota cut scenario
relative change in relative supply change
 
All figures are expressed in %, results for Portugal are not presented in FRANDSEN et al. (2003)  
Source: FRANDSEN et al. (2003) and CAPRI modelling system 
Table 5.18 shows the price and quota changes relative to the respective reference for both 
analysed scenarios. In the price cut scenario FRANDSEN et al. (2003) forecast a reduction in 
sugar beet supply of about 19%, mainly stemming from Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, which are assumed to have marginal production costs that 
lie between A- and B-beet prices (compare Table 3.5 and Table 3.6). At the same time, those 
countries assumed to be competitive at C-beet prices hardly react at all. The CAPRI 
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modelling system estimates an overall supply reduction of only 6%. A comparison across EU 
Member States shows here that differences between countries are not as large as in 
FRANDSEN et al. (2003). This is primarily due to the assumptions on marginal production 
costs and supply elasticities. Concerning the more competitive countries like France, 
Germany, Austria and Denmark, which show no response in FRANDSEN et al. (2003), the 
CAPRI model forecasts a sugar beet supply reduction even in those regions. Why is that? 
C-sugar production is reduced, because the difference between prices received for quota sugar 
and those for C-sugar is shrinking. From the farmers’ point of view, this means that it costs 
less if quotas are not entirely filled so that they can abandon parts of C-sugar production.  
The disadvantage of a model based on profit maximisation is even more apparent from the 
quota cut scenario. FRANDSEN et al. (2003) project the EU sugar beet supply to be reduced by 
0.4% if the overall quota is cut by 13%. Some countries even enhance their production. The 
authors explain this by rising producer prices due to the abolition of levies. While this 
argument is compelling, it cannot explain why in the Netherlands, for example, production 
increases although producer prices decrease. It is more than questionable that production 
would increase in any country if quotas are reduced, even if prices are slightly increasing, as 
long as quotas are filled in the reference situation. In our model, the quota cut induces a 
supply reduction in all selected EU Member States. Generally the relative supply reduction is 
smaller than the respective quota cut, except for Italy and Ireland.  
To summarise, we have shown that the inclusion of expected profit maximisation and of 
other aspects triggering C-sugar production into the CAPRI model has led to a more 
comprehensive framework with respect to the supply reaction of C-sugar than found in other 
studies, especially FRANDSEN et al. (2003). 
5.5 Summary  
The current section provides an overview of the CAPRI modelling system as well as the 
adjustments we incorporate in order to be able to analyse reform options of the CMO Sugar. 
The supply part for agricultural goods in CAPRI generally relies on a profit maximisation 
framework which we have shown in section 3 to be insufficient to reconcile observed supply 
behaviour in the past with production costs. Therefore, our behavioural assumption for sugar 
beet production is expected profit maximisation combined with a distinction of sugar beet 
supply resulting from expected profit maximisation and from other incentives to supply 
C-beets. In addition, we take over marginal production costs and supply elasticities from the 
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FADN analysis carried out in section 3 as well as regional sugar quotas. We further introduce 
a price linkage between sugar and sugar beet prices and a quota trade module based on 
differences in regional sugar quota rents. A number of adjustments in the CAPRI market 
module allow for an ad hoc simulation of the EBA initiative and all other imports that enter 
the EU-15 in the past and future.  
Next, three different future reform options of the CMO Sugar are analysed. The first one 
retains the CMO Sugar in its current regulations but includes the EBA agreement. The second 
one is based on a reform proposal which was posted by the EU Commission in 2004 and the 
last scenario reflects their latest reform proposal. We show that each of the analysed scenarios 
implies a reduction in European sugar supply and in the agricultural income as well. The 
impact on the EU budget is relatively small because savings in expenditures on subsidised 
exports are compensated by expenditures on compensation payments. Nonetheless, apart from 
the first scenario, the reduced prices for EU sugar allow for considerable gains for consumers 
so that overall welfare will increase in the EU-15. 
Finally, we provide a brief comparison of our model results to other studies and discover 
that a direct comparison is hardly possible due to great differences in models and scenario 
definitions. According to GOHIN and BUREAU (2005), the considerable differences found in 
literature concerning the analysis of the European sugar market are partly due to the 
representation of C-sugar supply. Therefore, we compare our model, which includes several 
explanations for C-sugar production, to that of FRANDSEN et al. (2003) who account for 
C-sugar by assuming that marginal production costs equal C-sugar prices and acknowledge 
that our model offers a more plausible supply reaction. 
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6. Summary, Limitations and Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
This study analyses the European sugar sector from several perspectives. After the 
research topic is briefly described and some background information is given, we provide an 
introduction to the Common Market Organisation for sugar. The main components of that 
CMO are prohibitive tariffs that protect the European Union from any imports from countries 
that might be much more competitive in sugar production than the EU itself. The prohibitive 
tariffs further guarantee that the EU sugar market price reaches price levels that amount to 
three times the world market price for sugar. Sugar production is subject to a two-quota 
system that limits the EU supply, on the one hand, and finances all exports of quota sugar, on 
the other. A speciality of the sugar quota system is that, in contrast to the milk quota system, 
it is possible to sell sugar quantities that are produced beyond the quotas (so-called C-sugar) 
on the world market at prevailing prices. Subsidised exports were limited in the past to about 
1.3 million tons of quota sugar plus another 1.3 million tons of preferential imports. C-sugar 
exports have not been considered subsidised so far. Preferential agreements with some 
countries or country groups, such as the African Pacific and Caribbean countries, allow for 
limited EU market access of extra EU sugar. In the past most Member States of the EU-15 
supplied more sugar than the amount of their quotas and most of the C-sugar originated in 
France and Germany. Sugar generally comes from farms producing sugar beets and signing 
contracts with sugar processing firms on beet delivery right and prices.  
One topic of this study is to analyse the impacts that certain reform options of the 
CMO Sugar might have on the European sugar supply. A pre-condition to this is to 
understand why European farmers supply large amounts of C-sugar beets although there is a 
general agreement among economists and farm management specialists that marginal 
production costs of sugar beet production exceed C-beet prices. Consequently, we further 
analyse farm data from the FADN of the European Commission. Here we show that sugar 
beet production plays a major role with respect to farm income for those farms that cultivate 
beets, while the sugar sector in agriculture as a whole is of minor importance. In section 3, an 
estimation of single farm sugar beet quotas and delivery rights is carried out. Results show 
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that in all EU-15 Member States, some farms do not fill their quotas, while others supply a 
large quantity of C-sugar. Farm heterogeneity is therefore not negligible with respect to 
aggregated supply response to quota or price changes. This is further stressed by an 
estimation framework of marginal production costs at farm level. After analysing the resulting 
regional distributions of those estimates, we find that sugar beets are produced at the highest 
costs in Greece, Italy, Ireland and Finland, while it is cheaper to produce beets in Austria, 
France, Germany or Denmark.  
After we have identified gaps between marginal production costs and marginal revenues 
in almost all EU-15 countries, we continue with by analysing incentives to supply sugar beets 
in Europe in section 4. We discuss and evaluate several behavioural hypotheses that go 
beyond the classic profit maximising hypothesis which has shown to be insufficient to explain 
observed supply behaviour. First we include yield uncertainty in a framework of expected 
profit maximisation. We evaluate this behavioural model by means of both national and farm 
data and come to the conclusion that expected profit maximisation potentially explains parts 
but not all of the observed C-sugar production. The same conclusion is drawn when we 
include risk aversion in a framework of utility maximisation. Other possible reasons why 
farmers supply more sugar than one would expect with regard to production costs might be 
risk management strategies, yield underestimation, indivisible plots or the fear of losing quota 
rights in case the quota is not entirely filled. We are able to show that all of those aspects 
potentially trigger additional C-sugar quantities while we are not able to quantify their effect. 
A last hypothesis is that sugar processing firms might distribute more quota rights than they 
de facto own. If this practice exists, C-sugar beet shares in total quotas at farm level are lower 
than C-sugar shares at the processing level. But again, the magnitude of this effect cannot be 
quantified because processing firms remain silent on this issue. 
The last section of the present study focuses on the empirical analysis of selected reform 
options of the CMO Sugar. For this purpose, we adjust the agricultural sector model CAPRI 
according to the findings of the previous sections. We further introduce some modifications 
necessary to analyse sugar market reform proposals. Next we define three different future 
options of the CMO Sugar. The first scenario basically retains the current regulations of the 
CMO but includes the EBA agreement. Additional sugar imports from LDCs trigger here 
sugar quota reductions through the declassification mechanism. The second scenario reflects 
the reform proposal of Franz Fischler from July 2004. Its main elements are a reduction of 
European sugar quotas by 16% and institutional prices by 33%. Furthermore, partial 
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compensation is granted to sugar beet farmers which is included in the premium scheme of 
the latest CAP reform. Moreover, sugar quotas are made tradable among the entire EU. The 
last scenario, based on the latest reform proposal that came out in June 2005, does not 
envisage a compulsory quota cut, but a reduction in institutional prices by 37%. Partial 
compensation is slightly higher than in scenario II. A restructuring scheme offers less 
competitive processing firms to abandon production by selling their quota rights to the 
community at fixed prices. Competitive firms in classical C-sugar producing countries are 
allowed to buy additional quota amounts at the same price. Their quantity is limited to one 
million tons of sugar at total EU level. 
The results of those scenarios are compared to a reference situation in 2009 where 
Agenda 2000 and the CAP reform 2003 are implemented. This reference is characterised by a 
slight increase of sugar supply because the decoupled payment scheme benefits those arable 
crops that did not receive premiums in the base year situation. This effect over-compensates 
the reduction of sugar beet prices in real terms. All scenarios show a considerable sugar 
supply reduction of the EU-15. The lowest one is found in scenario I because the EU sugar 
price level is retained. Scenario I turned out not to be a real future option because the recent 
WTO panel ruled that C-sugar exports and re-exports of preferential imports have to be 
counted under the existing subsidised export quota of 1.3 million tons of sugar which is 
overshot in scenario I by about four million tons. Those limits on exports are almost met in 
scenario II and perfectly met in scenario III. The question as to which reform proposal is 
preferable depends naturally one’s point of view. The EU budget is comparably burdened in 
all scenarios. Consumers gain the most in the scenario with the highest price cut, i.e. scenario 
III. From the farmers’ point of view, the preference for scenario II or III varies across 
Member States. 
Finally, we compare our model approach and results to that of other researchers analysing 
the CMO Sugar. We show that our modified version of the CAPRI model is able to produce a 
plausible sugar beet supply response to changes of quota beet prices and quantities. 
Furthermore, the ad hoc representation of the LDCs in the market allows for a representation 
of the EBA agreement which is not taken into account by most other studies. 
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6.2 Limitations of the Study and Further Fields of Research 
While the findings of the present study contribute to the state of art of analysing sugar beet 
supply behaviour, it goes with the following limitations which indicate that a careful 
assessment of results of our study is necessary. 
 The estimation of marginal costs of sugar beet production and supply elasticities, 
which are sensitive variables with respect to the supply response of the agricultural 
sector model CAPRI, makes use of simplifications. A derivation of a 
comprehensive, econometrically based method to define marginal production cost 
functions at regional level would therefore be desirable.96  
 The representation of the sugar processing level in CAPRI is rather crude. An 
explicit modelling of the sugar processing level could therefore be envisaged. 
Ideally, all existing firms that process sugar should be represented in the CAPRI 
model. This would require information on processing capacities and their cost 
structure. We further would need to allocate certain regions to processing firms. 
Such approaches are carried out by ISERMEYER et al. (2005) and von 
BLUMENCRON (2005), yet only for Germany. Given the current lack of information 
on the processing level and the prevailing objection of people who are in charge in 
to disclose information on the cost and profit structure of single plants, it is 
questionable that the kind of information needed will be available to researchers. 
 The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are not represented in the market part of 
the CAPRI model as a single country aggregate. A modelling of the Everything but 
Arms is currently only possible with an ad hoc solution by defining a TRQ 
according to expectations from other studies on the export potential of LDCs. This 
problem will be solved soon, because newer versions of CAPRI disaggregate the 
LDCs into a single country block. 
 Though the new Member States of the European Union (EU-10) are modelled in a 
free trade area with the EU-15 the sugar market is not affected, because there are 
hardly any trade flows in the base year. The EU-10 sugar market remains a single 
                                                 
96 It was originally planned to include this estimation in the study, but due to time restrictions, it was not 
possible. Such an estimation should be based on microeconomic theory and reflect our findings concerning 
the production of C-beets. 
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market not joined with the EU-15 in our analysis. An inclusion of the EU-10 into 
the supply part of CAPRI and improved modelling of EU-10 and EU-15 in the 
market part, has already been done in a newer model version and is able to solve 
this problem.  
6.3 Conclusions 
The overall objective of this study is the analysis of reform options of the CMO Sugar and 
the development of a modelling tool well suited for that purpose. The motivation of that topic 
is found in the actual need of such analyses due to the upcoming and inevitable reform of 
European sugar markets. For this purpose, it is necessary to identify the factors that influence 
sugar (beet) production in Europe. Based on our research, we can draw the following 
conclusions: 
 The analysis of single farm records with respect to sugar beet production shows the 
importance of sugar beet production for beet producing farms. It further sheds light 
on the distribution of that importance among farms within Member States of the 
EU-15.  
 The presented estimation of single farm quotas is an improvement over estimations 
by other authors who analysed sugar beet production. A general advancement is 
found in the inclusion of time series and some plausible a priori information, as 
well as the appliance of a new estimation method that can easily handle huge data 
amounts. 
 An estimation of marginal sugar beet production costs and supply elasticities for 
certain EU-15 regions is carried out and serves as a basis to 
1. show that C-sugar beet production is unlikely to be the outcome of 
competitiveness at C-beet prices but rather to be dependant on other aspects 
like yield uncertainty, risk aversion, the expectation that future quota 
endowments are correlated with the actual C-beet supply, indivisible plots, 
consequent sugar yield underestimation or processing firms that distribute 
more delivery rights for quota beets than corresponding to their sugar quota 
endowment. This analysis goes far beyond what other researchers who 
analysed European sugar supply found out so far. 
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2. adjust the agricultural sector model CAPRI to those estimates, reflecting the 
aspects that may be relevant to explain C-sugar supply in the equations that 
drive land allocation in the model.  
 It can be shown that the adjusted version of the CAPRI model is well suited to 
analyse reform options of the CMO Sugar. Compared to other modelling 
approaches, it is able to produce a realistic supply response of sugar beet 
production to changes in the economic supply incentives. 
 Finally, by means of an analysis of three reform scenarios, we are able to identify 
the impacts on European agriculture, the FEOGA budget, consumers and EU-15 
welfare. It can be shown that the agricultural income is greatly reduced in the 
analysed scenarios, but that sugar beet production would not leave Europe. Sugar 
consumers are projected to be the winners in those scenarios where sugar prices 
are reduced. 
All in all, we can conclude that our research was successful with respect to the initial 
questions outlined on page 3. The work provides a great contribution to the analysis of 
incentives to supply sugar beets in Europe and sugar sector modelling. Nonetheless, the 
presented limitations of the study identify further research fields that would potentially 
improve the possibilities to analyse the European and world sugar markets. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Figures and Tables 
Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 
Spain and Portugal: 
ES110000    GALICIA
ES120000    ASTURIAS
ES130000    CANTABRIA
ES210000    PAIS VASCO
ES220000    NAVARRA
ES230000    RIOJA
ES240000    ARAGON
ES300000    MADRID
ES410000    CASTILLA-LEON
ES420000    CASTILLA-LA MANCHA
ES430000    EXTREMADURA
ES510000    CATALUNA
ES520000    COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA
ES530000    BALEARES
ES610000    ANDALUCIA
ES620000    MURCIA
PT110000    NORTE
PT150000    ALGARVE
PT160000    ENTRE DOURO E MINHO
PT170000    TRAS-OS-MONTES
PT180000    BEIRA LITORAL
PT200000    ACORES
PT300000    MADEIRA
 
Austria 
AT110000    BURGENLAND
AT120000    NIEDEROESTERREICH
AT210000    KAERNTEN
AT220000    STEIERMARK
AT310000    OBEROESTERREICH
AT320000    SALZBURG
AT330000    TIROL
AT340000    VORARLBERG
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Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 (cont.)  
Germany: 
DE110000    STUTTGART
DE120000    KARLSRUHE
DE130000    FREIBURG
DE140000    TUEBINGEN
DE210000    OBERBAYERN
DE220000    NIEDERBAYERN
DE230000    OBERPFALZ
DE240000    OBERFRANKEN
DE250000    MITTELFRANKEN
DE260000    UNTERFRANKEN
DE270000    SCHWABEN
DE400000    BRANDENBURG
DE710000    DARMSTADT
DE720000    GIESSEN
DE730000    KASSEL
DE800000    MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN
DE910000    BRAUNSCHWEIG
DE920000    HANNOVER
DE930000    LUENEBURG
DE940000    WESER-EMS
DEA10000    DUESSELDORF
DEA20000    KOELN
DEA30000    MUENSTER
DEA40000    DETMOLD
DEA50000    ARNSBERG
DEB10000    KOBLENZ
DEB20000    TRIER
DEB30000    RHEINHESSEN-PFALZ
DEC00000    SAARLAND
DED00000    SACHSEN
DEE10000    DESSAU
DEE20000    HALLE
DEE30000    MAGDEBURG
DEF00000    SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
DEG00000    THUERINGEN
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Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 (cont.)  
Sweden, Finland and Denmark: 
SE010000    STOCKHOLM
SE020000    OESTRA MELLANSVERIGE
SE040000    SYDSVERIGE
SE060000    NORRA MELLANSVERIGE
SE070000    MELLERSTA NORRLAND
SE080000    OEVRE NORRLAND
SE090000    SMAALAND MED OEARNA
SE0A0000    VAESTSVERIGE
FI130000    ITAE-SUOMI
FI180000    ETELAE-SUOMI
FI190000    LAENSI-SUOMI
FI1A0000    POHJOIS-SUOMI
FI200000    AHVENANMAA/AALAND
DK000000    DANMARK  
Appendix 
 
 
173 
Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 (cont.)  
The United Kingdom and Ireland: 
IR010000    Border  Midlands and Western
IR020000    Southern and Eastern
UKC00000    North East
UKD00000    North West (including Merseyside)
UKE00000    Yorkshire and The Humber
UKF00000    East Midlands
UKG00000    West Midlands
UKH00000    Eastern
UKJ00000    South East
UKK00000    South West
UKL00000    Wales
UKM00000    Scotland
UKN00000    Northern Ireland
 
Greece: 
EL110000    ANATOLIKI MAKEDONIA  THRAKI
EL120000    KENTRIKI MAKEDONIA
EL130000    DYTIKI MAKEDONIA
EL140000    THESSALIA
EL210000    IPEIROS
EL220000    IONIA NISIA
EL230000    DYTIKI ELLADA
EL240000    STEREA ELLADA
EL250000    PELOPONNISOS
EL300000    ATTIKI
EL410000    VOREIO AIGAIO
EL420000    NOTIO AIGAIO
EL430000    KRITI
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Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 (cont.)  
Benelux countries: 
BL210000    Antwerpen
BL220000    Limburg (B)
BL230000    Oost-vlaanderen
BL240000    Vlaams Brabant
BL250000    West-Vlaanderen
BL310000    BRABANT WALLON
BL320000    HAINAUT
BL330000    LIEGE
BL340000    LUXEMBOURG (B)
BL350000    NAMUR
BL400000    LUXEMBOURG (GRAND-DUCHE)
NL110000    GRONINGEN
NL120000    FRIESLAND
NL130000    DRENTHE
NL210000    OVERIJSSEL
NL220000    GELDERLAND
NL230000    FLEVOLAND
NL310000    UTRECHT
NL320000    NOORD-HOLLAND
NL330000    ZUID-HOLLAND
NL340000    ZEELAND
NL410000    NOORD-BRABANT
NL420000    LIMBURG (NL)
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Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 (cont.)  
Italy: 
IT110000    PIEMONTE
IT120000    VALLE D'AOSTA
IT130000    LIGURIA
IT200000    LOMBARDIA
IT310000    TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE
IT320000    VENETO
IT330000    FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA
IT400000    EMILIA-ROMAGNA
IT510000    TOSCANA
IT520000    UMBRIA
IT530000    MARCHE
IT600000    LAZIO
IT710000    ABRUZZO
IT720000    MOLISE
IT800000    CAMPANIA
IT910000    PUGLIA
IT920000    BASILICATA
IT930000    CALABRIA
ITA00000    SICILIA
ITB00000    SARDEGNA
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Figure 8.1: Region-codes in the EU-15 (cont.)  
France: 
FR100000    ILE DE FRANCE
FR210000    CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE
FR220000    PICARDIE
FR230000    HAUTE-NORMANDIE
FR240000    CENTRE
FR250000    BASSE-NORMANDIE
FR260000    BOURGOGNE
FR300000    NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS
FR410000    LORRAINE
FR420000    ALSACE
FR430000    FRANCHE-COMTE
FR510000    PAYS DE LA LOIRE
FR520000    BRETAGNE
FR530000    POITOU-CHARENTES
FR610000    AQUITAINE
FR620000    MIDI-PYRENEES
FR630000    LIMOUSIN
FR710000    RHONE-ALPES
FR720000    AUVERGNE
FR810000    LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON
FR820000    PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D'AZUR
FR830000    CORSE
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on the mapping tool developed by Alexander Gocht, FAL, Braunschweig  
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Figure 8.2: Estimated relative yield variance from FADN in % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on FADN data 
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Table 8.1: Degree of coupling for different premiums after MTR implementation in 
CAPRI
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Table 8.2: Envelopes for direct income support for farmers (M€) 
Scenario II Scenario III
BL 62 84
DK 30 34
DE 241 278
EL 26 29
ES 86 96
FR 234 270
IR 16 18
IT 119 136
NL 63 74
AT 29 33
PT 6 6
FI 12 14
SE 30 34
UK 93 103
 
  Source: CEC, 2004b and CEC 2005 
Table 8.3: Land allocation in all scenarios (EU-15, 1000 ha) 
Base year (2001)
value
change to 
Base year
change to 
Reference
 relative 
change to 
Reference
change to 
Reference
change to 
Reference
Cereals 37519 34709 -2810 34754 45 0.13% 34804 95 34814 105
Oilseeds 5306 5137 -169 5169 32 0.62% 5185 48 5179 42
Sugar beet 1881 1900 19 1618 -282 -14.84% 1434 -466 1472 -428
Potatoes 1275 1296 22 1299 2 0.19% 1300 3 1299 3
Fodderproduction 59886 62334 2448 62457 123 0.20% 62543 209 62518 184
Set aside 5609 5661 51 5696 35 0.63% 5711 50 5701 41
Non Food 487 420 -67 427 7 1.55% 432 12 431 11
Other uses 20537 21326 789 21364 38 0.18% 21375 49 21369 43
Reference (2009) Scenario II Scenario IIIScenario I
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Table 8.4: Producer prices for arable crops (EU-15 all scenarios) 
Euro / t Euro / t Euro / t Euro / t
103.2 101.3 101.25 101.74
 -1.84% -1.89% -1.41%
95.35 93.22 92.93 93.44
 -2.23% -2.54% -2.00%
128.4 127.82 127.35 127.43
 -0.45% -0.82% -0.76%
100.58 97.13 96.58 97.75
 -3.43% -3.98% -2.81%
188.05 187.9 187.6 187.6
 -0.08% -0.24% -0.24%
86.14 85.88 85.81 85.85
 -0.30% -0.38% -0.34%
707.9 703.65 434.54 404.52
 -0.60% -38.62% -42.86%
161.99 159.75 159.99 160.64
 -1.38% -1.23% -0.83%
206.1 205.87 204.83 204.82
 -0.11% -0.62% -0.62%
220.11 219.24 218.67 218.8
 -0.40% -0.65% -0.60%
200.27 198.16 198.17 198.83
 -1.05% -1.05% -0.72%
574.15 575.09 574.28 574.08
 0.16% 0.02% -0.01%
790.76 789.83 789.3 789.44
 -0.12% -0.18% -0.17%
757.02 754.32 754.88 755.3
 -0.36% -0.28% -0.23%
226.37 226 225.53 225.58
 -0.16% -0.37% -0.35%
90.32 89.98 89.72 89.76
 -0.38% -0.66% -0.62%
82.78 81.3 80.43 81.46
 -1.79% -2.84% -1.59%
Rape cape 
Sunflower 
cake 
Soyameal and 
cake 
Rape oil 
Sunflower oil 
Soya oil 
Rape seed 
Sunflower 
seed 
Soya 
Pulses 
Sugar 
Starchy 
products 
Rice 
Other cereals 
Maize 
Barley 
Scenario III 
percent deviation to : 
Reference run (2009) 
Wheat 
Scenario I 
percent deviation to : 
Reference run (2009) 
Scenario II 
percent deviation to : 
Reference run (2009) 
Reference run 
(2009) 
 
Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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Table 8.5: Key indicators on the EU-15 sugar (beet) markets – all scenarios 
Base year (2001)
Unit value* value
% change to 
base value
% change to 
Reference value
% change to 
Reference value
% change to 
Reference
A sugar beet
producer price €/t 59.12 51.77 -12.4 52.98 2.3 31.80 -38.6 29.66 -42.7
production 1000t 80181 80175 0.0 65077 -18.8 65534 -18.3 70311 -12.3
B sugar beet
producer price €/t 54.45 47.17 -13.4 52.98 12.3 31.80 -32.6 29.66 -37.1
production 1000t 16370 16909 3.3 13765 -18.6 14652 -13.3 16548 -2.1
C sugar beet
producer price €/t 18.41 15.53 -15.7 15.49 -0.3 15.73 1.3 15.78 1.6
production 1000t 15875 18633 17.4 19236 3.2 10109 -45.7 5851 -68.6
Sugar beet total
average price €/t 52.69 45.26 -14.1 45.63 0.8 30.00 -33.7 28.79 -36.4
production 1000t 112425 115716 2.9 98079 -15.2 90295 -22.0 92711 -19.9
EU price €/t 807 708 -12.3 704 -0.6 434 -38.7 404 -42.9
World market price €/t 226 190 -15.9 189 -0.3 204 7.4 204 7.8
Quota 1000t 13882 13882 0.0 11190 -19.4 11661 -16.0 12581 -9.4
Domestic supply 1000t 16068 16534 2.9 13993 -15.4 13049 -21.1 13406 -18.9
Belgium 1000t 933 966 3.6 824 -14.7 904 -6.4 891 -7.7
Denmark 1000t 509 529 3.9 436 -17.4 460 -12.9 501 -5.3
Germany 1000t 4041 4178 3.4 3415 -18.2 3445 -17.5 3754 -10.1
Greece 1000t 322 332 3.0 308 -7.2 184 -44.6 157 -52.6
Spain 1000t 1075 1098 2.1 1049 -4.5 1042 -5.1 901 -18.0
France 1000t 4196 4284 2.1 3410 -20.4 4006 -6.5 4328 1.0
Ireland 1000t 211 210 -0.5 190 -9.6 22 -89.7 22 -89.7
Italy 1000t 1415 1482 4.8 1315 -11.3 495 -66.6 454 -69.4
Netherlands 1000t 961 986 2.6 813 -17.5 637 -35.3 597 -39.5
Austria 1000t 431 447 3.7 381 -14.7 536 19.9 429 -4.0
Portugal 1000t 85 84 -1.4 79 -6.0 27 -67.7 9 -89.6
Sweden 1000t 415 429 3.3 395 -8.0 329 -23.4 320 -25.3
Finland 1000t 153 161 5.4 149 -7.3 114 -29.0 99 -38.6
United Kingdom 1000t 1322 1350 2.1 1229 -8.9 847 -37.3 945 -30.0
Imports 1000t 1818 1821 0.2 4792 163.2 1933 6.2 968 -46.9
India 1000t 10 10 -0.4 10 -0.2 5 -48.2 1 -85.5
ACP 1000t 1616 1620 0.2 4052 150.1 1638 1.1 657 -59.4
Rest of the world 1000t 105 104 -0.9 610 486.5 174 67.6 200 92.1
Free trade developing 1000t 86 87 0.7 120 38.0 116 33.3 109 25.5
Total supply 1000t 17886 18355 2.6 18785 2.3 14981 -18.4 14373 -21.7
Domestic demand 1000t 12951 12967 0.1 12972 0.0 13113 1.1 13129 1.3
Exports 1000t 4935 5388 9.2 5423 0.7 1863 -65.4 1317 -75.6
Subsidiesed exports 1000t 2618 2673 2.1 2620 -2.0 416 -84.4 474 -82.3
C sugar exports 1000t 2317 2715 17.2 2803 3.2 1446 -46.7 843 -69.0
Aggregation error 1000t 0 0 390 6 -73
Total demand 1000t 17886 18355 2.6 18785 2.3 14981 -18.4 14373 -21.7
Scenario II Scenario III
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Source: CAPRI modelling system 
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8.2 Kernel Density Estimates 
In this section, we explain how one can draw a smooth distribution of a certain variable if 
only a finite number of observations are given. As an example, we use the rotational share of 
sugar beets in the FADN sample of Denmark. The red bars in Figure 8.3 give the weighted 
number of observations (rotational shares) that fall in 0.01 intervals.97 Those numbers are 
scaled so that the sum over all bars equals one and we can interpret them as a discrete density 
distribution. A tall bar stands for many observations that fall into the respective interval. The 
shape of this distribution indicates that the shares might be normally distributed. Therefore, 
we compute a truncated normal distribution with the mean and variance of Denmark given in 
Table 2.1 calculated by formulas for the truncated normal distribution in Green (1990). This 
function is plotted with a green line. It becomes apparent that the truncated normal does not 
fit the ‘real’ data very well especially in the range between 0.1 and 0.3. It approximates the 
shape of the discrete distribution, but there might be better solutions like the Kernel density 
estimator (LEWIS et al, 1988). In particular, we choose the normal kernel defined in 
equation (8.1). Here m denotes the number of observations in a sample and b is a smoothing 
parameter. A larger b leads to a smoother pdf but in turn, if b becomes too large, the resulting 
kernel estimate approximates a uniform distribution. Therefore, the choice of parameter b is a 
critical point in computing kernel density estimates. LEWIS et al. (1988) introduce a modified 
Maximum Likelihood estimation to find the optimal value for the smoothing parameter b. It 
turned out that this method is not suitable for the large number of observations we deal with 
in some EU Member States because of PC capacity problems. Thus, we finally decided to 
choose the standard starting value for b, also provided by LEWIS et al. (1988) and given in 
equation (8.2). 
(8.1) 
2
i
2
(x x)m
2b
i 1
1 1pdf (x) e
mb 2π
−
−
=
= ∑  
(8.2) 0.2b 2 mσ −=  
where σ is the standard deviation of the tackled sample. 
For Denmark, the Kernel density function is plotted with a blue line and it is quite obvious 
that the ‘real’ data is better fitted than the truncated normal distribution.  
                                                 
97 Observations refer to all farms that produce sugar beets in each year they are part of the sample 
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Figure 8.3: Probability density function of sugar beet rotation shares in Denmark 
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  Source: FADN and author’s calculations 
8.3 Mathematical Derivation of the Variance of Profits from 
Sugar Production 
As already addressed in section 4.2.1, one can derive the final formula for the variance of 
expected profits by substituting (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16) into (4.13). While both equations, 
(4.14) and (4.15), are expressed in terms of variables which are already known from the 
expected marginal revenue derivation, the formula for the covariance (equation (4.16)) 
includes a number of variables that we did not introduce before. Based on chapter 21 of 
Greene (1990), we give in this section the formulas for means of truncated, censored, and 
squared variables necessary to compute the variance of expected profits in the one-quota case. 
First, we repeat the covariance formula: 
(8.3) 
( ) [ ] [ ][ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
( )( ) [ ]
S S S
S
S
2 C
y q S y q S y q S SC
S S SC
S y q S S S S
C
S S y q S S
E y E y q E y E y
COV y , y P y q
E y E y E y q E y E y
E y E y E y P y q
> > >
>
≤
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟
= >⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟
− + + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − ≤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
All unknown elements included in this formula have some variables in common, which 
are now introduced: 
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(8.4) [ ]SS
yq E−
α =
σ
 
α is used to transform the our normal distribution f(q) into a standard normal distribution. 
Note that: 
(8.5) ( ) ( )20.5 S1 e f q
2
− αφ = = σα
π
 
and that 
(8.6) ( ) ( )F q=αΦ  
because the value of the cdf at a certain point x of the standard normal distribution is the same 
than that of a cdf with a different mean and variance, as long as x is shifted proportional. 
We adopt the definitions of the standard normal distribution (φ) and its cdf (Φ) as used in 
Greene (1990) to make the derivation of the following variables clearer. Greene (1990) 
further defines a variable λ that is different depending from which side the variable is 
truncated or censored: 
(8.7) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
S
S
y q
y q
1>
<
φ αλ =α
− α
−φ αλ =α
α
Φ
Φ
 
then he defines δ as: 
(8.8) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
S S S
S S S
2
y q y q y q
2
y q y q y q
> > >
< < <
δ = λ − αλα α α
δ = λ − αλα α α
 
Equation (8.3) contains several times the expectation value of yS if the distribution is 
truncated from below or from above at the quota endowment q. Greene (1990) defines them 
as 
(8.9) 
[ ] [ ]( ) ( )
[ ] [ ]( ) ( )
S S
S S
S
y q S y qS
S
y q S y qS
E y E y
E y E y
> >
< <
= λ+ σ α
= λ+ σ α
 
Additionally we need the expectation value of the censored variable ySC: 
(8.10) [ ] ( )( ) ( )( )SC SS S y qE y yE 1>⎡ ⎤ = + σ λ −α α⎣ ⎦ Φ  
Finally, we need the expectation value of the squared sugar production if the distribution 
is truncated from below at the quota endowment q. Generally the expectation value of a 
squared variable equals the sum of the squared expectation value of that variable and its 
variance, so that we obtain: 
(8.11) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )( )y qS SS 2 22 Sy q Sy q S 1E yE y >>> − δ⎡ ⎤ α= + σ⎣ ⎦  
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Knowing that P[yS>q] = 1-Φ(α) and P[yS<q] = Φ(α) we have now expressed all unknown 
variables in (8.3) in terms of noted variables so that the computation of the covariance is 
straightforward. 
An extension of the one-quota case to a system with more quotas is possible as well. It is 
necessary to reflect the variance and covariance between all censored and truncated variables. 
The mathematical derivation for the more-quota case is available from the author upon 
request. 
